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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM 
In his article on wage determination in the basic steel 
industry over the period 1945-1948, a period of rapid inflation, 
Albert Rees concluded that the steelworkers union did not raise 
real wages appreciably above the levels which would have been 
reached in its absence during the war and post-war inflationary 
period.l Lloyd Ul~an challenged this interesting conclusion and 
in his reply, Rees indicated that a •study of the effect of the 
union on steel wages since 1948 would now be of great interest."2 
Since the results of union bargaining in the steel industry 
from 1947-49 through the decade of the fifties, a period generally 
characterized as one of moderate inflation, did differ substantially 
from the conclusions derived by Rees, it is the purpose of this s 
study to describe the differential success of the union and to 
formulate and test a hypothesis which may adequately explain why 
the union was comparatively more successful in the moderately 
inflationary context. 
In other words, this dissertation addresses itself toward 
answering the question of why did relative wages in the basic 
lAlbert Rees, "Postwar Wage tetermination in the Basic Steel 
Industry," American Economic Review, XLI (June, 1951), pp. 389-404. 
2See Lloyd Ulman, "The Union and Wages in Basic Steel: A 
Comment," American Economic Review, XLVIII (June, 1958), p. 408-
426; and Albert Rees, "Reply," American Economic Review, XLVIII 
(June, 1958), p. 426-433. 
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steel industry rise so dramatically in the ten year span follow-
ing 1948, a period of moderate inflation, in contrast to the less 
rapid comparative rise during the much more inflationary period 
of 1945-1948 examined by Rees. 
In general, the inquiry here, undertakes to resolve the 
question by analyzing the price, demand, and market structure 
of the steel industry's product market in an atmosphere of moderate 
inflation. These factors may provide the permissive conditions 
for the favorable exercise of union bargaining power. 
There are other possi.ble approaches to the problem but none 
appears to provide an adequate reply to the question. One explana-
tion develops the impact of the role and power of the union in 
institutional terms. However, we are interested here in the 
economic factors that frame the range of wage and employment adjust-
ments rather than with the specific balance of power relation 
between union and industry at any point in time. Dunlop has 
observed that 11 the important realities" (skills, produc ti vi ty, 
the structure of the product market, etc.) "tend to set practicable 
limits to bargains,"l and suggests that wage settlements in the 
long run will not diverge markedly from the limits set by his 
theoretica-l framework. The union's influence is confined to 
influencing, where, within these limits the settlements actually 
fall. It is simply assumed here that the union is always seeking 
"more and more."2 
lJohn T. Dunlop, "Productivity and the 'Nage Structure," in 
Income, Employment, and Public Policy (Essays in Honor of Alvin 
H. Hansen), 1948, p. 360. 
2This approach is discussed in more detail on page 42. 
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Other explanations seek to answer the question by stressing 
the role and magnitude of economic factors such as productivity 
changes, the de and and supply of labor, cost of living movements, 
and ability to pay. These are thought to be important in the wage 
determination process and are relevant to the discussion here. 
However, because these factors point to contradictory conclusions, 
it is important to examine each in greater detail. 
Therefore, it is the purpose of this chapter to analyze 
closely the factors usually deemed to be significant in the course 
of wage determination and to show why such an examination leads 
to a hypothesis that must be allied to price, demand, and product 
market structure in the steel industry. 
Sconomic Factors in the Wage Determination Process 
PRODUCTI'VITY 
Before the significance of productivity movements for the 
wage adjustment process can be discussed properly, it is nec-
essary to discuss the meaning of the word productivity. It seems 
to mean all things to all people. 
Theorists, in general, have distinguished between four 
productivity concepts. These are: 
1) Average Gross Physical Productivity (AGPP) 
2) Ivlarginal Gross Physical Productivity (i.IGPP) 
3) Average Net Physical Productivity (ANPP) 
4) fiiarginal l~et Physical Productivity O!NPP) 
These four productivity concepts are illustrated below in a 
diagram. taken frOil1. Joan Robinson's Economics of I:nper..:'ect 
Competition, 1954 printing of 1933 edition, p. 246. 
I 
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The AGPP curve represents the average amount of output per 
man-hour per period, or total output divided by man-hours worked. 
The MGPP curve is the additional output resulting from combining 
ar. additional man-hour of labor w~th optimal additions to other 
factors. The ANPP curve is average output per man-hour less the 
average cost in terms of units of product of other factors employed 
per man-hour. The MNPP curve is the net additional output result-
ing from combining an additional man-hour of laoor with the optimal. 
addition to other factors, less the addition to the cost (in terms 
of units of product) of the other factors. This definition permits 
the varying of other inputs along with tLat of labor. 
An increase in the output per man-hour ratio can occur in 
two ways: 
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1) By a movement along the AGPP curve to its maximum, i.e., 
from B towards B". 
2) By an upwsrd shift in the entire curve. 
l11umber one is attributable to a change in the scale of operat:..ons 
and may be short term in nature. In the steel industry, unit labor 
costs rose sharply when the operating rate fell and fell substan-
tially when the operating rate rose. {See Chapter IIJ:, TABL.I!. 29 
Page 128) Number two is attributable to a number of factors such 
as improvements in skill or effort, more or better machines, more 
or better management, or improvements in technology. It represents 
a change in the production function. 
As a firm moves from B' to B", AGPP is increasing but MGPP 
is decreasing. Hence when the operating rate rises and AGPP is 
rising, one cannot be sure that Iv~GPP is also rising. 1 In addition 
the relationshj.p between the AGPP curve and the Al~PP curve is even 
more uncertain. As the steel operating rate rises and a movement 
takes place along the AGPP curve, the AJ>.PP can be increasing, 
decreasing, or constant. As the volv~e of operations rises and 
additional man-hours are employed, expenditures on raw materials 
and other fact.ors will increase. Yet the increase in ANPP need 
not be less than the increase in AGPP. This is because as total 
expenditures on materials and other factors incTeases, these 
expenditures need not increase per ~-hour of labor. If the raw 
material input does not increase any faster than the labor input 
and the high fixed costs of plant and equipment in steel can be 
lRees noted this: . Albert Rees, "Viage Determination in the 
Steel Industry," American Economic Review, XLI (June, 1951), p. 394. 
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spread over :nore units oi' labor, then ANPP will increase faster 
than AGPP. 
If the rise in AGPP is due to a shift upwards in the entire 
curve, the effect on AT\PP is even more difficult to predict since 
there are more factors which can shift the AGPP curve up. For 
example, if the reason for an upward shifting AGPP curve is a 
relatively costless innovation in management insight, the ANPP 
schedule will shift up more than proportionately. If the shift up 
of the AGPP curve is due to increased expenditures on raw materials 
or machinery, the productivity per man-hour ratio could rise sign-
ificantly with little effect on the ANPP schedule. The leas the 
man-labor coat of the productivity improvement, the greater the 
proportionate rise in the Al\!PP schedule. In addition, the :MNPP 
of labor need not increase even if the k~PP rises. Thus one cannot 
be sure of the direction of change, much leas the magnitude of the 
W~PP as the output per man-hour ratio changes. 
The tables below attempt to indicate the relative magnitude 
of the rela tionsrrl.ps be tween the raw material input, the labor 
input, and expenditures on raw materials per man-hour of labor in 
the steel industry from 1947-49 to 1958. 
TABLE 1 shows that the quantity of various principal raw 
mateJ•ials required to make one ton of steel fell from 6,249 pounds 
(1947-49) to 5,274 pounds in 1958, or 18.5 percent. ~ven though 
the physical quantity of raw waterials fell per ton of steel, the 
expenditures on materials rose from $46.23 to $64.33 or 38.5 percent. 
TABLE 1 
COhSUit.PTIOi' OF' PRI:t.ICIPAL IRON AhL STEELl\·:AKING 
RAW MATERIALS PER TON OF STEEL PRODUCED 
(In Pounds) 1947-49, 1958 
Material 
Iron Ore •• 
Coal • • .•. 
Scrap • • • 
Limestone •• 
Totals • 
1947-49 
• • • • • 2,554 
••••• 1,915 
• • • 1, 063 
• • • • • 717 
• • • 6,249 
Cost in Dollars $46.23 
1958 
2,263 
1,477 
1,075 
459 
5,274 
~~64.33 
Percentage 
Change 
-11 
-23 
- 7 
-36 
-18.5 
/38.5 
7 
Source: Charting Steel's Progress, American Iron and Steel 
Institute, New York, 1960 edition. 
TABLE 2 
COhSUI!!PTIOl'j AND EXPENDITUR~S ON RAW MATERIALS 
IN PRODUCil\G STEEL PER MAJ.\.,."iOUR OF PRO-
DUCTION LABOR, 1947-49, 1958 
1947-49 
Production Worker Man-hours 
Per Ton of Steel 15.62 
Pounds of Raw Materials Required 
Per Ton of Steel 6,249 
Pounds of Raw Materials Per Pro-
duction Worker W~n-Hour· 400 
Total Expenditure on Raw Materials 
Per Production Worker Man-Hour ~2.96 
Total Ingot Tonnage (Millions of 
Tons) 76.6 
1958 
12.20 
5,274 
422 
$5.27 
81.2 
Percentage 
Change 
-28.2 
-18.5 
/5.5 
/78.0 
I 6.o 
Source: Computed from TABLE 1 and American Iron and Steel 
Institute Armual Reports. 
TADLE 2 shows that it required 15.62 production worker man-
hours to make one ton of steel in 1947-49 and 12.20 in 1958, a 
fall of 28.2 percent. Thus the AGPP change appears sizeable. How-
ever, 400 pounds of raw materials were used per production worker 
man-hour in 1947-49 and 422 were required by 1958, a gain of 5.5 
percent; this was true even though the raw materials needed to 
8 
make one ton of steel fall by 18.5 percent over the period. Since 
the expenditure on raw materials per man-hour of labor rose from 
~2.96 in 1947-49 to ~5.27 in 1958, or 78 percent, it would appear 
that expenditures on this input per input in man-hours of labor 
rose quite drastically. Tentative support, therefore, is lent 
to the view that average gross physical productivity was rising 
while average net physical productivity per man-hour was falling, 
or at least not rising anywhere near as rapidly as the AGPP. 
In addition, the man-hours worked by salaried personnel rose 
from 263.5 million in 1947-49 to 344 million by 1958, a gain of 
around 50 percent. Exclusion of these man-hours produces an 
attractiveness in the AGPP of production workers that is spurious 
when translated into the demand curve for labor. Thus the M~PP 
curve would be less likely to rise as much as the AGPP curve. 
Since ceteris paribus factors cannot be held constant here, 
the figures provide only a rough guide. It would appear that the 
~~PP curve was falling or movement along it was downward, or at 
least it failed to rise in proportion to the AGPP curve, the 
latter apparently involved a rising movement along the curve or 
a shift upw8rd in the entire curve. 
THE IMPACT OF PRODUCTIVITY CHAl'WES ON OTHER 
WAGE DETERMINING F'ACTORS 
An increase in the AGPP curve initiated by an upward shift of 
the entire curve may be expected to have an effect on the demand 
curve for labor. However, as commonly thought, such a change 
cannot be depended upon to lead to an increase in the demand for 
labor. The demand curve for labor is identified here as the mar-
ginal net revenue product (Ml\iRP) and it is the curve which shows 
9 
the net addition to the income of the firm as a consequence of 
continually employing more units of labor. 
Two major links connect the shift in the AGPP schedule upward. 
The first is the MNPP schedule described above and the second is 
the steel industrys' product demand curve, or its marginal revenue 
curve (MR). The first has been discussed above, and it is suffi-
cient here to recall that shifts upward in the AGPP curve cannot 
be easily translated into changes of the MNPP curve. The relation-
ship between the two depends primarily upon the source of the 
upward shifting AGPP curve. Thus prediction of its effect on the 
~lliPP curve requires detailed knowledge of the events which brought 
the particular productivity increase. This type of data is not 
readily available in the form required for analysis. The ANPP 
curve might not change at all, or more than proportionally, or 
less than proportionally. A previous paragraph hypothesized that 
the ANPP was falling inasmuch as expenditures on materials and 
services, salaried personnel, and other steel industry costs .· 
such as depreciation were rising much more rapidly than man-hours 
of labor by production workers. As indicated above the links in 
the relationship between the various curves are tortuous ones. 
But it is likely that a falling ANPP would be accompanied by a 
declining MNPP. However, if the AGPP were rising rapidly (and 
output per man-hour for production workers indicated this by 
rising some 31 percent between 1947-49 and 1955 while production 
of ingot tons rose 39.4 percent) it would be possible for MNPP 
to be increasing and yet be accompanied by a falling demand for 
labor. This, of course, would be due to a rapidly falling 
movement along the MR curve as steel output rose substantially 
10 
under the assumption that the steel product demand is downward 
sloping and inelastic. 
This approach would lend support to the proposition that the 
extremely successful comparative wage gains achieved by the steel-
workers union from 1947-49 to 1957, 1958, or 1959 were not associated 
with productivity but with the steel industrys' ability to keep 
MR from falling as output expanded. In other words, the where-
withal to pay substantial wage increases came from an upward 
shifting steel product demand curve. Thus an unattractive MNPP 
and ANPP were offset by an upward shifting MR product curve. 
Appropriately, the key to the steelworkers comparative wage success 
in a period of moderate inflation should be sought by examining 
the demand for steel and steel pricing policy. Rees concluded 
that during rapid ir~lation the steelworkers were relatively 
unsuccessful because tbe steel industry failed to raise prices 
due to fear of government action, or perhaps reaction. A grey 
market existed for certain steel products; this represented an 
indication of a rapidly upward shifting product damand curve and 
marginal revenue curve. Perhaps a better explanation could have 
been sought by attempting to analyze an oligopolistic industry's 
inability to change prices frequently enough to adjust to a rapid 
upward shifting product demand curve in a period of accelerated 
inflation and industry success in making an improved adjustment 
to this phenomenon when inflation is more moderate. 
Adjustment may have been difficult in the 1945-48 period 
selected by Rees because of anticipated or potential changes in 
expected profits. In other words, it was widely believed that 
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the immediate postwar surge in economic activity would be followed 
by a period of contraction and downward shifting of the steel 
product demand curve. The industry did not want to be caught 
with an inflexible wage structure on the downside. Why tip the 
cart anyway. Rees showed that steel profits rose· about 190 
percent per ton from 1945-48. The operating rate remained close 
to capacity and with prices of steel products presumably set on 
the standard costs of a 70 percent operating rate, the high 
volume of operations from 1945 to 1948 resulted in falling actual 
costs. Profits rose substantially and would have risen even if 
unaccompanied by a price increase. An attempt to exploit the 
favorable product demand would have resulted in an embarrassment 
of riches and Kefauver's r~rrassment. 
It should be noted that the MR link is just as troublesome 
since it requires precise knowledge of the elasticity of product 
demand in cases other than pure competition and a perfectly elastic 
product demand. In fact, if the elasticity of the produqt demand 
is sufficiently near unity, an increase in the marginal physical 
productivity of labor may result in a decrease in the demand for 
labor. In other words, if product demand is not sufficiently 
elastic, it may not be wise to expand output much as a consequence 
of lower costs due to productivity improvements per man-hour. lea 
a matter of fact, the de sired voJ ume of steel could be produced 
with fewer man-hours of labor than before. Thus if a decrease 
in MR associated with a given amount of labor is greater than the 
increase in MNPP of this amount of labor, the demand for labor 
will decrease. The larger the increase in AGPP relative to the 
JviNPP, the smaller the increase in the demand for labor as a 
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consequence of the increase in the MNPP. Marginal revenue is a 
function of total output not of total labor input. Hence if 
the differential rate of increase between gross and net product-
ivity is large enougn, the demand for labor will decrease as its 
KNPP increases while MR falls. 
Changes in productivity attributable to an increase in the 
operations rate, i.e., volume of output cause movements along 
the existing MNPP schedule and do not shift the entire schedule. 
This type of change in the productivity ratio signals the prior 
occurrence of an increase in the demand for labor since the increase 
in output is presumably the result of a rightward shift in the 
product demand curve. This kind of productivity improvement is 
best described as the result of a prior increase in the demand for 
labor rather than the initiator of the rightward shift in the 
demand curve for labor. 
To summarize, the impact of productivity improvements per 
man-hour on the demand curve for labor is hazardous to predict. 
Even the direction ot impact is uot certain, much less its impact. 
It is not even safe to say that increases in productivity always 
shift the demand curve for labor to the right. This makes un-
safe the assertion by Eees that projuctivity increases shift the 
demand far to the right and so would have increased wages in the 
absence of the union. Knowledge of the factors which influence 
the outcome is not available in a necessary form for assessing 
eitner the direction of change or the magnitude of the change. 
T h e d a t a t;f a previous section is the best available method 
for measurement. 
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A qualification to the foregoing involves the product demand 
curve. If the product demand curve is rising rapidly to the 
right, the marginal revenue associated with each possible output 
will also be rising and it is likely, therefore, that the marginal 
net revenue product (the demand curve for labor) will also increase 
by shifting upward as well. 
'l'he arguments noted above concerning the difficulties of 
relating productivity gains per man-hour to the demand curve for 
labor seem to be confirmed by some empirical evidence. The 
table below provides the data. 
TABLE 3 
COF<PARISON OF PRODUC'riVITY, AVERAGE COMPEN,SATION AND 
UNIT LABOR COS'rS Il~ l''IFTEEN MANUFACTURING 
INDUSTRIES, 1948-56 PERCEhT CHANGES 
Unit Labor 
Productivity Compensation Costs 
Five Industries With Highest 
Increase in Productivity 
Five Inrtustries With Lowest 
Increase in Productivity 
37 
18 
54 8 
55 31 
Source: Charles Schultze and Joseph Tryon, Prices and Costs 
in Manufacturing, Study Paper No. 17, Joint Economic Committee, 
86th Cong., 2nd. Sess., January 1960, p. 44. 
The table shows that the five industries w ith the largest 
gains in productivity (averaging 37 percent) experienced a 
compensation gain of only 54 percent. The authors pointed out 
that for all the industries studied, the coefficient of rank 
correlation between changes in output per man-hour and changes 
in average wage rates (1948-56) was only 0.21. The table also 
shows the five industries with productivit~T gains of only 18 
percent won compensation gains of 55 percent. 
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Even Rees pointed out that ~f nine industry groups that he 
studied, only three had smaller percentage increases in average 
annual earnings than steel from 1939 to 1948 and only one from 
1945 to 1948. If average hourly earnings are used, from 1939 
to 1948 only five of twelve less highly organized industries had 
smaller percentage increases than basic steel, one had the 
same increase, and six had larger increases. From 1945 to 1948, 
eight of the twelve had larger increases than steel. Yet Rees' 
estimate of productivity per man-hour showed a 30 percent increase 
from 1939 to 1948 while in confectionery, which is weakly organized, 
productivity per man-hour rose only 15 percent and was accompanied 
by a much larger wage increase than obtained in steel. 
Of course, given a long enough period of time one might 
expect a positive correlation between productivity and average 
hourly earnings.l But this may occur simply because productivity 
will rise to meet increased wages through limitation of an expan-
sion in output that might otherwise take place. As Robertson 
put it, "marginal productivity does not determine wages, it only 
measures them." 
:-£XCESS I'ETv.Al~D FOR LABOR 
From 1945 to 1948 Rees presented data which ir1d1cated the 
existence of an excess "demand for labor." This is defined in 
a loose sense to mean the difference between the quantity of 
labor employers would like to hire and the quantity of labor 
lsee, for example, Joseph Garbarino, "A Theory of In tar-
Indus try ·iiage Structure Variation," Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, LXIV (May, 1950), p. 298-99. 
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available at a given wage rate. 1 An excess demand would disappear 
if the wage were raised significantly. 'l'he concept is employed 
because there is much more agreement that demand and supply 
conditions in the labor market are an important determinant 
of wage rr.ovements than there is concerning the relationship 
between productivity and waLe movements, for example. The 
excess demand approach also implicitly assumes that the magnitude 
of wa,~e adjustments will abate as a yet unknown but critical 
level of unemployment is reached.2 
Rees considered the supply of labor to the steel industry 
to be quite tight from 1945 to 1948. Evidence was presented in 
the form of quit rates, total employment figures and shortages 
of specific steel job categories. Employment of "production 
workers and related workers rose from 458,000 in 1945 to 525,000 
in 1948 or 14.5 percent despite the wage increase of 33 percent. 11 3 
Output rose from 57 million tons to 66 million tons, or almost 
16 percent. Hours worked per week were already high, and an 
increased labor supply in the form of increased hours could have 
been forthcoming only in an increased cost of overtime premiums. 
The quit rate per 100 employees in basic steel was 0.4 in 
April of 1940, and the layoff rate was 1.9. In April of 1947 
lThe terminology used is "loose'' because of a host of pro-
blems involved in the construction of a labor supply schedule. It 
is quite difficult to apply to contemporary labor markets the pre-
cise formulation employed by Hicks. (See John R. Hicks, Value and 
Capital: An Inquiry Into Some Fundamental Principles of Economic 
Theory, secono edition, Oxforo: Clarenoon Press, 1946:-p. 63.} 
2see Joseph Garbarino, 11 Unioni sm and the General Wage Level," 
AER, XL (December, 1950) p. 893-96, and Paul Samuelson, "Problems of 
Achieving and Maintaining A Stable Price Level," AER, Proceedings, 
L (May, 1960), p. 186. 
3A. Rees, "Postwar Wage Determination ••• " ..QE. Cit., p. 393. 
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these rates were 2.6 and 0.1 respectively; a year later they 
were 2.1 and 0.2. 1 When quit rates are high, alternative employment 
opportunities are likely to be better. When layoff rates are 
low, employers are reluctant to let workers go because replacement 
is difficult. 
Rees also cited the specific instance of the Youngstown 
Sheet and Tube Company testifying before a Senate Committee 
that it was short 1,000 workers of its normal complement of 
24,000 in the Youngstown and Chicago-Gary areas. 
In other words, all indications pointed toward a tight labor 
supply, i.e., an excess demand for labor apparently existed from 
1945-48. This excess demand was applicable to both sides of 
the market since labor market evidence disclosed to Rees a short 
supply of available workers in steel centers and the demand 
for steel products and thus for steelworkers rose steadily. Yet 
the comparative wage success of the union was disappointing even 
when compared to weakly organized workers or the unorganized in 
competitive industries. 
Economic analysis suggests that the appearnace of a positive 
excess demand, i.e., a rightward shift in the excess demand curve 
will raise the price of labor, whereas the appearance of a nega-
tive excess demand, i.e., opposite shift, will lower the wage. 
The magnitude of the wage change will depend upon the magnitude 
of the initial shift in the demand or supply curve and on the 
relevant slopes of these functions. Economists do not in general 
libid. 
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question the direction of impact of the analysis noted, but diffi-
culties exist when modifications are employed to take into account 
significant peculiarities and imperfections of the labor market. 
Empirical studies provide some interesting general impressions 
concerning these imperfections.l 
These studies emphasize a diversity of ways in which reac-
tions occur to a scarcity of labor and even lead to despair of 
ever finding any meaningful relationship between the wase adjust-
ment process and the employment environment. However, some of 
the factors which impinge on this relationship can be set forth 
simply and systematically perhaps, however, with some loss of 
content. 
Generally, an increase in the demand for labor and a reduc-
tion of its available supply will tend to increase wages and 
the magnitude of the increase will be greater if: 
A) The impact of such a labor scarcity on operations is 
greater and places greater pressure on managers to make an 
adjustment. 
B) The adjustments competitive to a wage increase are less 
desireable or more costly. 
In other words, empirical studies suggest that a positive 
excess demand for labor may be met in diverse ways. One possible 
lSee Richard Lester, Hiring Practices and Labor Competition 
(Princeton: Industrial Relations section, Princeton Urilversity, 
1954) and Richard Lester, Adjustments to Labor Shortages; lilanage-
ment Practices and Institutional Controls in an Area of Expanding 
~olment (Princeton: Princeton Univeristy Press;-1955). 
See a so Charles Myers and George Schultz, The Dynamics of !; 
Labor Market (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951) and Charles 
Myers, "Labor Market Theory and Empirical Research," Theory of Wage 
Determination, ed. John Dunlop, 1957, p. 317-26. 
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adjustment is to vary the quality of workers. Protection from 
labor market pressures may be achieved by this route. If an 
industry is already paying higher comparative wages, it would 
normally be expected to receive higher quality job applications 
and thus face less h~media te pressure to make some kind of a wage 
adjustment in response to tightening labor market conditions. 
On the other hand, if an industry is paying smaller comparative 
wages it would normally expect to receive job applications of 
poorer quality and hence face pressure to make a wage adjustment 
as the poorer quality of the work force raises unit la ~·or costs. 
The "efficiency wage" becomes higher. 
The shortages of labor indicated by Rees combined with the 
fact that basic steel was not among the industries paying high 
comparative wages in 1945, apparently lead to the expectation 
that pressure for higher wages existed in basic steel. Yet as 
Rees showed, the union was singularly unsuccessful. The table 
below presents the data in 1945, 1954, and 1959. 
TABLE 4 
AVERAGE HOURLY .~ARNINGS--SELECTED INDUSTRIES 
Industry 
Shipbuilding 
Petroleum Refining 
Tires 
Automobiles 
Durable Goods 
STEJ:L 
All IVranufacturing 
Meat Packing 
Tin Cans 
Average 
Hourly 
Earnings 
1945 
~1.36 
1.29 
1.27 
1.26 
1.11 
1.08 
1.02 
.95 
.91 
Average 
Hourly 
Earnings 
1954 
~2.08 
2.37 
2.27 
2.19 
1.92 
2.20 
1.81 
1.94 
1.96 
Average 
Hourly 
Earnings 
1959 
~2.60 
2.98 
2.92 
2.70 
2.38 
3.08 
2.22 
2.63 
2.65 
Source: United Sta tea Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 
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In 1945 steel industry average hourly earnings were ranked 
sixth of nine industries, by 1954 steel ranked third, and by 
1959 steel moved to the top of the list. The percentage increase 
in average hourly earnings from 1954 to 1959 in steel exceeded 
that of any group by a considerable amount. This was also roughly 
true for 1949-59. For example, in steel the increase amounted 
to 40 percent from 1954 to 1959 while in all manufacturing the 
gain was 23 percent and only 24 percent in durable good~, Yet 
from 1945 to 1948 Rees showed that steel money earnings decr·eased 
relative to all workers; of twelve industries used for comparison, 
eight had larger increases than basic steel and four had smaller 
increases. And Rees used some highly competitive, weakly organi-
zed industries in his comparison, i.e., cotton textiles, silk 
and rayon textiles, confectionery, non-alcoholic beverages, butter, 
ice cream, power laundries, cleaning and dyeing, wholesale and 
retail trade. 
In other words, the steel industry granted smaller differ-
ential increases when its comparative absolute wage level was 
lower than the comparative increases granted when the steel wage 
level was higher. In addition the pres3ure should have been greater 
in the earlier period than in the latter one because 1945-48 was 
cha racterized by a labor shortage while an excess supply devel-
oped in the 1950 1 s.l This experience indicates that some other 
factors must be sought to explain the differential success of the 
steelworkers from 1947-49 to 1957 and the lack of success from 
1945 to 1948. The expectations should have been completely 
lA later chapter will examine labor market supply character-
istics in detail. 
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opposite to what actually took place, i.e., wages should have 
risen substaLtially from 1945 to 1948. 
tiiRil\G STA1~;.GARDS, RECRUIT;v;"'_NT .E:XPEl\JDI'rURES, ANI> 
~UALI ·~y JJ:., '.rr1E ·:,ORK FORCE 
Also, hiring standards may be loweredl and expenditures on 
recruitment may be increased rather than raising wages to counter 
labor market pressures. ':Vhese techniques are a more subtle f'orm 
of wage discrimination. If the ef'fect is to lower output per 
man-hour, efficiency wages of the new men are raised just as 
surely as an increase in the base wa,e with hiring standards 
unchanged. However, the higher efficiency wages are paid only to 
the new men. Since this is a less overt form of discrimination, 
the senior workers are less likely to get excited about it as 
they would if new ~en were paid more. The added cost of higher 
wages for present employees is thus avoided as employment expands. 
Other employers in the labor market are also less aware of a 
decrease in hiring standards as they are of an increase in base 
wages; hence the danger of a wage war is reduced. 
In addition, it is easier to dilute quality. A personnel 
"1anacer usually finds that the random movement into his office 
perrd ts him to be simply less particular and if he is willing 
to reduce hir•:tng standards far enough, it may always be possible 
to c:et someone. Such a policy may increase the flow of applicants 
as knowledge of tj_e policy spreads among pro spec ti va workers. 
lRichard Lester noted in his 'I1renton Stl,dy that half of tbe 
firns studied lowered their i:lirlng s tar~darlis in response to the 
t:rowing "tightness" of the labor marze t occasioned by the expansion 
in the work forces of several large firms. 3ee R. Lester, Adjust-
~nents to Labor Shortages, 212.· Cit., p. 52. 
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The increased flow coulC"t be every bit as c;reat as that secured 
by raising wages to incrl:lase employment. In addition 1 t is easier 
to reverse lowered hiring standards than to eliminate an increase 
in wages. If employers have reason to believe that the supply 
curve of labor to their industry is considerably more elastic 
in the long run than the short, they would hesitate to raise 
wage rates sufficiently to cover a mcmentary shortat;e and later 
to reduce them. They would be restrained by their fear of 
"cheating the expectations of entrants" to the trade.l This im-
plies an ability to depart from perfect competition on the 
employer 1 s side of the labor market, i.e., that competition is 
insufficient to force payment of higher wages to alleviate 
temporary shortages. Of course, the absence of a union does not 
insure per feet competition in the labor market. 'l'hus the view 
of Rees that bargaining with shortages implies a restraining 
effect upon wage increases need not be true in an otherwise imper-
feet labor market. 
Neither Rees nor Ulman were able to show that wages were 
held down due to quality dilution from 1945 to 1948. !<'rom this 
point of view the inability of the steelworker•s to advance their 
wages is surprising. As indicated earlier, during the post-war 
period, 1945-48, percentage aver:·:ge hourly earnings in steel 
increased less than in eight comparison industries and more than 
in four others. Such weakly organized industries as cotton 
textiles, silk and rayon, confectionery, butter, and retail trade 
achieved superior percentage gains to steel. 
lsee John R. Hicks, nEconomic Foundations of ·ua2;e Policy, 11 
Economic Journal, LXV (September, 1955), p. 404. 
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Evidence indicates that the avenue of qual~ ty dilution as 
a method of avoiding wage pressure is not easily available to 
the steel industry. The jobs are too highly specialized, and 
many steel jobs have no counterpart in industry generally. The 
proportion of skilled workers to the total labor force in this 
industry is quite high. Quality dilution appears to be possible 
mainly at the hj_ring or learner level. In addition such a 
policy may be too costly in the sense that it is se lf-perpe tua ting. 
Management could have trouble attracting high quality workers 
later when the labor market is not so "tight." ''Jlhe reputation 
of the firm or industry could be impaired. Hence the policy would 
be used only as a short-run expedient. 
Th:'~s factor therefore cannot be used as a partial explanation 
of the union's lack of success in steel in winning expected compara-
tive wage increases. Yet in 1956 when the labor supply was no 
longer tight, the steel industry moved workers from job class 
0-1 up and combined them with job class 2. Previous to 1956 
expenditures v1ere increased in recruiting and training a "lower 
type" man at the hiring-in classification.· Competition at the 
m:i .. nimum and common labor rates can be avoided through quality 
dilution. Similar wage rates in labor n~rkets of varying 
tightness and prevailing wage levels are supposedly explained by 
less restrictive hiring standards in tight then in loose labor 
markets. 1 
Again, the surprising conclusions to be drawn here are: 
lMartin Bronfenbrenner, "Potential Monopsony in Labor 
Markets, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, July, 1956, p. 
1577-88. 
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1) There is little or no evidence to indicate that the 
snortages of 1945-48 were met by quality dJlutLon of the work force 
and that this would serve as a partial explanat:ion of the union's 
inability to win differential wage gains. 
2) There is some evidence to indicate that when the labor 
supply was not tight later on, especially after 1954, steelworker 
differential wage success was unparalleled and the higher wages 
seemed to result in some quality dilution. A later chapter will 
supply detailed evidence. 
DJ CEt., TIVE STANDARDS Ali D RELATION TO 
EA&\INGS 
Another method to which an employer might have recourse in 
order to adjust to a tight labor supply concerns piece work. It 
is possible to be less stringent about standards and permit incen-
tive workers to average a larger percentage over base than pre-
viously. In addition a larger proportion of workers may be placed 
under incer1ti ve plans. Thus the need to pay higher base wages 
is somewhat reduced. The negotiatec increases would be less than 
the actual drift upward in wages. ':Vhen the labor supply is tight, 
standards may also be tightened and the upward earnings drift 
stopped. The table below provides the data. 
As the table indicates, the upward earnings drift in steel 
from 1949 to 1959 amounted to 36.5~ per hour in excess of the 
negotiated changes. No other industry came reasonably close 
to this figure except for tires and tubes with 32~. Not only 
that, but the greatest impact was from 1954 to 1959 when earnings 
in steel began to d aria te significantly from the earnings in other 
industries. From 1954 to 1959, the negotiated increase amounted 
TABLE 5 
IECREASES IN 'WAGE RATES AND EARNINGS 
FOH SELECTED INDTJSTRIES, 1949-59 
Basic Stee 1 
Tires and Tubes 
Automobiles 
Petroleum Refining 
Building Trades 
Aluminum 
Aircraft and Parts 
Increase in 
:Negotiated 
hourly Wage 
Rates 
~pl.064 
.86 
.98 
.99 
1.26 
1.17 
• 92 
Increase in 
Hourly 
Earnings 
~?1. 43 
1.18 
1.00 
1.11 
1.28 
1.30 
1.05 
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Difference 
~.366 
.320 
.020 
.120 
.020 
.130 
.130 
Source: Morris Hbrowi tz; "The ~arnir1gs ofJ Steelworkers in·: 
the .Postwar Period," Reprinted from Labor Law Journal, XII, 
No. 5 (May, 1961), p. 417. 
to 61¢ {more than half of the total of ~1.064 from 1949 to 1959) 
while earnings rose by 88¢. Thus the ·upward drift from 1954 to 
1959 was 27¢. Part of this difference was due to a higher pro-
portion of skilled workers, part to fringes and partto incentives. 
In 1954 average base earnings were $1.933 per hour and average 
incentive earnings were $0.313 per hour, or 16.2 percent of the 
base earnings. By 1959 the figures were respectively $2.43, 
$0.501, and 20.7 percent. Thus the incentive yield rose from 
16.2 percent to 20.7 percent. In 1954, 49.2 percent of the 
steelworkers were covered by incentives while by 1959 the figure 
rose to 62.7 percent. 
In view of the magnitude of negotiated wage gains in steel 
in comparison with other industries, it appears that a loosening 
of incentive standards was not necessary to retain or recruit 
workers from 1949 to 1959. Both items changed much more than 
in highly organized comparison industries. Since steel excess 
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capacity was rising in the latter part of the period and total 
output increases slowed down, the excess supply of labor would 
normally be expected to act as a check on the weakening of in-
centive standards. Yet it did not. It would have been logical 
to expect that such loosening of incentive standards would occur 
from 1945 to 1948 when an excess demand for labor existed; yet 
no such showing has been made by either Rees or Ulman. 
BARGAINING POWER 
Concerning the question of bargaining power, there is some 
measure of agreement among economists on three major points: 
1) Demand and supply conditions are an important determi-
nant of the bargaining power of both union and manage-
ment. Bargaining power is loosely defined here as an 
ability to win concessions. 
2) The relative bargaining power of the union will be en-
hanced the greater the demand for labor relative to the 
supply. 
3) The wage adjustment negotiated will be greater the 
greater the relative bargaining power of the union. 
The foregoing generalizations provide a framework for 
considering the behavioral implications of an excess demand 
for labor. Demand and supply conditions in the labor market 
influence: 
1) The union's wage policy 
2) The company's resistance to union wage demands. 
In order to evaluate these factors it is necessary to dis-
tinguish carefully between: 
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1} An excess demand for labor induced from the demand side 
and an excess demand for labor induced from the supply 
side. 
2) A realized excess demand and a potential excess demand. 
Union bargaining power is likely to be greater the tighter 
the labor market in general and the more favorable the employment 
situation in the firm or industry with which negotiating occurs. 
First, the financial capability of the union is likely to 
be higher if employment is high or has been high than if it has 
been low. 
Second, the greater the positive excess demand for labor, 
the less the liklihood that imposing higher costs on management 
will put workers out of work. This question of the extent to 
which union wage policy is actually ir~luenced by possible employ-
ment effects has been a highly controversial one.l However, the 
debate has been concerned with the effects of potential unemploy-
ment rather than already realized unemployment on union wage 
policy. Thus the contention by Ross that union policy formulators 
canrot consider potential unemployment effects because they are 
uncertain does not mean that union policy makers establish wage 
demands without considering existing levels of employment or 
unemployment.and economic activity. 'lihere is certainly a relation-
ship between potential unemployment and realized unemployment. 
Tro pr'OSpects of unemployment may not moderate union wage demands; 
yet the realization of the prospects may subsequently force a 
lsee A. Ross, Trade Union 1Nage Policy (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1948), p. 79 and G. Schultz and C. lllleyers, 
"union Wage Decisions and Employment," .2£• Cit., p. 362-80. 
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lower adjustment. Meyers and Schultz suggest that fears of 
potential unemployment are more likely to modify union wage 
demands at a time when there is an excess supply of labor than 
when there is a labor shortage. Thus whatever the strength of 
the employment effect, it is likely to be less of a deterrent 
to union demands the greater the excess demand for labor. A 
final reason why union demands are likely to be responsive to 
the condition of the labor market is that employers are less 
likely to resist union proposals the greater their own excess 
demand for labor. In other words, union wage policy and employer 
wage policy are not independent of one another; the union presses 
to some extent for what it expects it can get. 
EMPLOT.DR WAGE POLICY Alm Ti-lE LABOR TviARKET 
SITUATION 
The wage policy of employers influences wage adjustments in 
two major ways: 
1) It helps set the union's wage demands. 
2) It affects the translation of union wabe demands into 
new agreements. 
It is reasonable to assume that the employer will be more 
likely to agree to concessions the greater his own excess demand 
for labor. The following reasons explain this behavior. 
1) An excess demand for labor implies a generally tight 
labor market, thus reducing the employer's resistance to wage 
increases because replacements would be harder to obtain in the 
event a strike occurs. The union can make a strike more effective 
when employment is high and alternative temporary employment 
possibilities are greater; thus financial distress on the part of 
28 
strikers is alleviated. 
2) The opportunity cost of foregone profits is likely to be 
greater in the event of a strike when an excess demand for labor 
permeates tne labor environment. \~nen economic activity is· poor, 
the employer may even welcome a strike as a method of depleting 
excess inventories. 
3) Indirect costs in the form of an inability to fill orders, 
~1issed contracts, and customer disappointments, especially when 
customers are dependent upon the producer for essential supplies 
may lead to a reticence about suffering a strike. In some cases, 
even the government may be concerned about defense supplies. 
This is an important consideration in steel. Dependability as 
a supplier is of extreme importance in affecting a rerutation.l 
4} Less resistance is normally expected when an excess 
demand for labor constitutes the environment because it usually 
signals a positive excess demand in the produ.~t market. Hence 
higher wage claims and costs may be passed forward as higher 
product prices. 
5} The magnitude of the wage adjustment is likely to be 
greater if the excess demand for labor is induced from the demand 
side than if it is the result of a shrinkage of the supply of job 
applicants. 
The foregoing arguments imply that the union possessed 
greater relative bargaining power in the period studied by Rees 
than in the later period under investigation here. As indicated 
lsee Leland Hazard, "vVage Theory: A l•ianagement View," 
~ew Conce ts in Wage Determination, ed. George Taylor and Frank 
Pierson ~ew York: McGraw Hill Publishing Co., Inc. 1957), 
p. 32-50. 
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earlier, evidence suprlied by Rees concerning quit rates and 
layoff rates, the rise in steel employment, specific shortages 
of steel labor categories, a workweek which could be increased 
only at the additional expense of overtime payments, and a rising 
product demandl suppo~the thesis that union bargaining power 
was relatively enhanced while employer reticence to grant wage 
increases of considerable magnitude should have been lessened. 
Yet the comparative economic success of the union was singularly 
disappointing when compared to rises in the cost of living and 
wage gains achieved by unorganized workers in compe ti ti ve indus-
tries. The steelworkers barely kept pace with rises in the cost 
of living and did not even do as well as workers in a wide 
group of comparison industries. 
However, in the period of moderate inflation which followed 
1945-48, and especially after the Korean War, the steelworkers 
were much more successful in wirming wage gains plus fringes 
than almost any other industrial group, whether organized by 
unions or not, whether competitive industries or not. i'his 
achievement was experienced in a labor market situation of excess 
labor supply as evidenced by some of the type of data utilized 
by Rees. The only exception to this concerned the product demand 
for steel which was steadily rising until a plateau seemed to be 
reached in the latter part of the 1947-49, 1957 period. Thus 
1In 1945 finished steel output was about 57 million tons 
at an average base price of 2.4¢ a pound and by 1948 output rose 
to 66 million tons despite an increase to 3.4¢ per pound, or a 
price increase of 42 percent and output increased about 16 per-
cent. The consumers price index rose about 33 percent as a com-
parison. These figures understate the increased demand for 
steel since a widespread grey market existed. 
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the answer to the riddle must be sought elsewhere. 'rhe character 
of the labor market apparently failed to be as significant as 
theory would suggest. 
COST OF' LIVING 
The influence of the cost of living on the wage determination 
process is usually stated in the following we.ys: 
1) Higher living costs create discontent among workers and 
dissatisfaction among their wives. Workers rega):>d the cost of 
living as a serious determinant of the fairness or unfairness 
of their wages. 1 
2) This discontent can result in poor morale or a reduced 
labor supply as the real wage falls. The latter effect is uncer-
tain since it is uncertain that a labor supply schedule has a 
positive slope throughout. In other words, if the income effect 
of a falling real wsge is more significant than the substitution 
effect, the supply of labor would increase while it would decrease 
in the opposite circumstances. 
The morale effect, therefore, appears more convincing. 
Reynolds and Lester2 both claim that employers will raise wages 
to retain or insure a satisfied work force. Paying to avoid 
discontent occurs for both economic and non-economic reasons. 
The extent of the adjustment depends,of course, upon the economic 
posi.tion of the employer. The advent of a union increases the 
liklihood that discontent about rising living costs will be 
lsee Lloyd Reynolds, '.I'he Structure of Labor :ivle.rke ts, 1951, 
p. 99-100. 
2see R. Lester, Adjustments to Labor Shortages, Q£. Cit. 
p. 61. 
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translated into wage increases. An outlet appears which activates 
repressed grumbling and the union provides the workers with an 
instrument called an organized strike. The union also channels 
and directs dissatisfaction b~: constantly informing workers about 
decreases in real w£<ges. 'rhe change is also a m:Jasureable one. 
Vagueness is translated into precision. 
~mployer resistance should not be any different than in any 
other case--except that increases in the cost of living may signal 
changes in profit prospects or the demand for labor. hesistance 
by employers is likely to be relatively suppressed when the cost 
of living is rapidly rising. 
It appears to be quite surprising that in the period of 
rapid inflatior: studied by Rees that wage increases won by the 
steelworkers just barely kept pace with increases in the consumers 
price index. '.lhis is especially so in view of the shortages of 
labor cited. The excess d.emand for labor appeared to be significant. 
In other words, the union won no more than what they would have 
gotten with wage escalation clauses written into the contract. 
Their achievement was a minimum one since unorganized workers 
would normally expect to get at least tlus amount. Since price 
inflation may occur continuously while wai.::e contracts are signed 
for a period of time, it is possible that the lag in adjusting 
wages to rising living costs is one which the union could not 
significantly reduce. However, one.might also expect that 
discounting future rises in the cost of living would lead to 
pressure for larger wage adjustments when an or:i..ginal contract 
was signed. 
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Yet in the later period under investigation here, it is 
significant that the consumers price index rose from an index of 
113.5 in 1952 to 114.5 in 1955, to 120.2 by 1957 (1947-49 = 100). 
i.~uch of this period was characterized by an excess labor supply 
1.n the steel industry, yet the union won wage gains exceeding 
virtually all manufacturing groups. 
Thus it appears that some tentative conclusions may be 
drawn: 
1) From 1945 to 1948 the steelworkers union failed to 
increase the real wage because contracts are typically signed 
for a year while consumer prices rose steadily. Escalator clauses 
corrected this deficiency later. 
2) From 1945 to 1948 competitive industries adjusted wage 
levels upward much more quickly and granted wage increases which 
raised the real wage. Apparently, in a period of rapid inflation 
competitive industries adjust more precisely to rising product 
demand curves which provide the wherewithal for raising wages. 
The increased wages are necessary to either retain a work force 
or recruit one since from 1945-48 evidence indicated the existence 
of a tight labor supply. For whatever reason, the steel industry 
was not able to adjust as readily to a rising steel product demand 
to provide the means for raising real wages. The existence of 
a grey market in steel from 1945 to 1958 demonstrates this. 
3) In the period of moderate inflation which followed 
the immediate post-war years, the steelworkers won wage increases 
which considerably exceeded the rising living costs and widened 
the differential between steel wages and the wages of other groups. 
This achievement occurred in the presence of an excess supply of 
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labor. According to the theoretical explanation concerning the 
effect of a rising cost of living on wages, one might logically 
expect employers to increase wages wnen the consumers price 
index rises even if an excess labor supply characterized labor 
markets. But under such circumstances one would not expect wages 
to rise for steelworkers by over four times the rise in the cost 
of living, and especially so if other comparison groups are far 
less successful. Again, the answer to this phenomenon must be 
sought elsewhere. 
SUMMARY 
1) From 1945 to 1948, Rees demonstrated that the steel-
workers union failed to win wage and related advances in excess 
of what the workers would have won if unorganized--and perhaps 
the existence of tne union even served to retard the advances which 
would have otherwise been granted. 
2) The period was charFJ.cterized by rapid inflation and a 
tight labor supply. Steelworker hourly earnings barely kept 
pace with rises in the consumers price index and did not rise any 
faster than a wide group of comparison industries, many of which 
were competitive in product markets and either weakly organized 
or not organized at all. 
3) Possible explanations of this failure involve a consider-
ation of various outlets which could moderate the wage pressures 
accompanied by an excess demand for labor. Among these outlets 
to reduce enhanced union bargaining power are such factors as: 
a) Quality dilution of the workforce. 
b) Raising incentive earnings through looser administration 
of incentive plans. 
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c) Paying high wages to begin with, thus the necessity for 
raising wages to retain workers is reduced. 
d) Spending more on recruitment of workers. 
e) Paying overtime rates. 
f) Productivity increases being run-off into a larger 
proportion of workers under piece work. 
Yet a perusal of these factors suggests that the steel industry 
did not take advantage of this wide variety of subtle means to 
diminish wage pressure under excess demand conditions. 
4) However, after the period studied by Rees the labor 
market could not be considered as tight at all. An excess supply 
developed as evidenced by very small increases in total employment 
as output rose, quit-rates and layoff rates, wage rates for specific 
job categories in steel compared with those of competing indus-
tries iL steel labor markets, a declining workweek, and unemploy-
ment rates in steel centers. Yet in this period of moderate 
inflation, the steelworkers union managed to raise wages substan-
tially in excess of average gross productivity increases, or cost 
of living advances, and significantly in excess of a number of 
comparison industries, some of which are highly organized. In 
addition, thare was some quality dilution in the workforce and 
a larger percentage of workers placed under incentive; thus 
actual average hourly earnings rose considerably above the 
negotiated increases. 
5) A partial possible explanation of the foregoing phenomena 
is often laid at the door of productivity. There seems to be 
some evidence, however, that inputs of raw materials in either 
physical terms or as expenditures rose per man-hour of labor input, 
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If to the man-hours of labor input one also adds the increasing 
proportion of salaried mar:-hours, it appears that gross average 
productivity per man-hour may have risen, but average net physical 
productivity may have even fallen. At any rate prediction or 
measurement of movements of the latter appear to be extremely 
difficult, and this fact carries over to attempts to determine 
marginal productivity. Thus the productivity explanation is 
not a safe one. 
6) A remaining possibility lies in the question of marginal 
revenue. If the steel product demand schedule were shifting 
upward to the right significantly, then a higher marginal revenue 
schedule would follow. If the rise were substantial, then the 
marginal net revenue product of labor, i.e., the demand for labor, 
could conceivably increase in the face of downward movements in 
either the marginal net physical product or average net physical 
product of labor. 
7) Thus the question of the union 1 s comparative-differential 
wage success or failure may be closely related to steel product 
pricing practices. Rees finally turned to this explar£tion--
supporting it is part w:1 th auxiliary material. .For example, the 
following inter-related reasons have been given for the 1945-48 
period in which the steel industry failed to raise steel prices 
to the extent indicated by a grey market in steel products. 
a) The Social Pressure-Conscience Explanation: It asserts 
that businessmen are impelled to pay heed to some gener-
ally held conception of proper entrepreneurial behavior. 
The twin objectives of acceptance by society and avoid-
ance of punitive regulation compels such concern. 
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Prices in such an important industry have to be justified 
because the industry lives in a goldfish bowl. A rise 
in the demand for steel is the least satisfactory 
explanation for raising steel prices, especially when 
ir~lation is rapid. Public protest to congressmen 
becomes more pronounced when the public is intolerant 
of what seems to be industry profit greed. Rees placed 
nis main emphasis on fear of the government as the price 
restraining factor. Senator Kefauver's shadow is a long 
one. 
b) Time Horizon Uncertainty: This explanation emphasizes 
that advantage of a rapidly rising demand curve will 
not be taken to raise steel prices if the rise is expected 
to be temporary. A later reduction in pro.t'i ts is 
measurable and apparent to everyone, including stockholders, 
and conffitutes prima facie evidence of poor management. 
Yet a failure to increase profits as much as demand 
conditions indicate is much less perceptible. Management 
is not likely to gamble a satisfactory earnings record 
(Rees pointed out that profits rose 190 percent per ton 
from 1945 to 1948) by a decision that could mean only 
temporary higher profits. It was widely believed that 
the high demand fo the immediate postwar period would 
eventually be satisfied. and _demand schedules would fall 
eventually. '11his explanation is coupled with the view 
that any advantage taken of the rising steal product 
demand would have to be shared with the union and that 
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wages are inflexible downward. If such a serious threat 
if off~red to the long-run profit position, short-run 
profits will not be maximized. In other words, unfavor-
able surprises are weighted more heavily than favorable 
ones. Losses have more of a tendency to spiral than 
t:;ains. Profits are maximized under the restraint of 
maximizing security. 
c) Other Complementary Reasons: There are other reasons 
given as well for the failure to raise steel prices to 
clear the market from 1945-48. It is often asserted 
that chan_::;:.e s in cost are more :r:;ermanen t (as noted above), 
more measureable, ru1d not so capricious as changes in 
demand. ;rhe variables determinine; costs are more 
under control and can be better estimated than the 
variables.affecting elasticity of product demand and 
demand cllanges. 1.Jnder :;om8 circumstances_ price changes 
may b9 interpreted as ag~ression. Also, a change in 
price takes time to affect volume. Total profit der er.;.<is 
upon the profit per unit and the volume. An increase 
in price may raise profit per unit, but it may pull 
volume down. '.l.'he change in profit per unit is more 
cer•tain while volume changes are slow and hard to pro-
diet. It requires knowledge of ti~ precise elasticity 
of demand, the extent of a demand shift, and how a demand 
shift affects elasticity. If the foregoing uncertaintius 
were strongly felt by ti1e steel industry from 1945-48, it 
is conceivable that stronger efforts would be made to 
check t~e union and control costs .. 
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This dissertation does not take issue with the immediately 
foregoing explanations of steel price behavior. 'rhey represent, 
however, a less rigorous level of discussion; the basic diffi-
culty is that without some notion of the probability that industry 
attaches to alternative outcomes, any statement a.s to tne safest 
r:rice policy would seem to be unobtainable. For exa:::nple, the 
explanation winch stresses an expected downward shift in the 
steel product demand schedule after war shortages vrere satisfied 
does not seem satisfactory in view of the fact, stressed by 
Ree s, t~1a t durinL the 1946 strike :nanage:·11e nt Ofenly stated that 
the wage increase which it could of' fer was dirac tly related to the 
price in ere j se that it recei ved.l Sue h behavior is hardly indi-
cative of a fear th~t wages were inflexible downward while 
product demand was expected to fall. On January 15, 1946, U.S. 
Steel raised its wage offer from 12~ cents to 15 cents when 
President Fairless was ir1ormed that the goverr@ent would sanction 
a price increase over ,;,A a ton. Eventually ~5 a ton was arrived 
at, and wa~es rose 18~ cents. 
The fear of government action and public relations consit-
tute a more satisfactory interpretation of failure to raise price 
sufficiently to clear the grey lnarke t w:-dch persia ted well into 
1948. ~he industry was attacked by the Federal Trade Commission 
on its basing point practices, blamed for inflation by a special 
study by the President's Council of Economic Advisors, investigated 
by Federal Bureau of Investigation a[;ents sent by the Justice 
Bepartment to sixteen steel offices, and even castigated by 
Senator Taft for its profit position. Yet in the face of assert-
ing that t~1e 60Verrunent acted to dampen steel price increases 
lNew York Times, September 15, 1945, p. 2. Benjamin Fairless 
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to less than market conditions indicated, it is also clear that 
t!us political visibil~ty was less obvious when costs went up 
as wages rose. Increased cost a~ a source of price advances is 
a generally more palatable dlet for both t~J.e government and the 
public. 
The difficulty of attaching a predictable weight to the 
effect of the government in steel pricing pollcies requires that 
an analytically more :meaningful a:pproach be developed for 
discussing the ability of the steelworkers union to win or fail 
to win differential advantages. This is the purpose of this dis-
sertation. 
The discussion may be carried on in terms of the steel 
industry's adjustment to a rising product demand as a source of 
wage advantage under varying conditions of capacity utilization. 
For example, during the 1945-48 period the operating rate remained 
steady at close to 100 percent of capacity. Actual costs per ton 
fell substantially below the standard costs of around 70 percent 
of capacity used for price setting and to establish a profit 
target. Profits rose, according to Rees, by 190 percent per 
ton. 'ro increase steel prices under such circumstances to per-
mit adjustment to a rapidly r:tsjng product demand curve during 
a sizeable inflation might clesr the grey market for steel, result 
in a flow of overt riches, yet do little to increase steel output. 
F'ull advantage may not be taken of a higher demand curve which 
could support higher prices and profits. Various motives may 
made substantially the same claim in 1945. On November 22, 1945, 
Fairless said that, "Once OPA was out of the way and we can arrive 
at a fair price for our product, I am certain that labor and 
management can cet toe;ether op a fair :wage;" 
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exist. Higher prices and profits provide the smaller firms 
with the wherewithal and encouragement m integrate and expand. 
Or a full monopoly price may attract new-comers. In 1948, for 
exa:-aple, when the grey market still operated in certain steel 
categories, U.S. Steel reduced the price of finished steel 
and increased that of semi-finished. u.s. Steel apparently prefers 
to bear down on costs and to employ price policy as a weapon. 
Its modernization program permitted this phenomenon. Since the 
smaller companies in the main sell finished steel and buy semi-
fj_nished, they were obviously squeezed. In an oligopolistic 
indus try, sue h as steel, characterized by price leadership, 
concern over the vigorous growth of the sem1-integrated producers. 
may not lead to short-run profit maximization. The officials 
of National Steel confirmed this by stating that the role of the 
smaller companies in pricing is to press the giants to raise 
prices high enough to assure an adequate supply of funds for 
expansion.l When a smaller co~pany leads in announcing a price 
hi 1 ·e, it is an indication of the amount desired to generate funds 
for expansion. Failure to confirm it by U.S. Steel lessens the 
ability to expand of smaller firms. Luring the grey market of 
the postwar period the smaller companies nibbled away by charging 
premiums to exploit customer shortages.2 A certain amount of 
this nibbling away appears to be permitted by the giants. Yet 
actual price change lac;s considerable behind the upward shifting 
product demand. 
u.s., 
lsee Business ·;:eek, July 5, 1958, p. 50. 
2stud~ of Monopoly Power, Part 4B, Steel Exhibits, p. 629-36, 
Blat ong., 2nd Seas., 1950. 
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Since Rees has studied the acluevements of the steelworkers 
in a period of rapid inflation and concluded that the failure 
to win differential wa~e advances was due to steel product pricing 
behavior, this dissertation is interested in the success of the 
union during a period of moderate inflation. It is believed 
here that pricing behavior again provides the major key but that 
such behavior can be reduced to a more predictable basis than the 
influence of government cited by Rees. The oft-raised question 
concerning the impact of the union has usually been couched in 
a dichotomy of periods of boom or contraction. Moderate infla-
tion cannot be scientifically defined. However, much evidence 
could be I~rshalled to demonstrate that a large number of economists 
would consider an average rise of about two percent per year in 
the consumer price index, excluding wide deviations from this, 
to be moderate.l Thus the experience from 1947-49 as a base to 
1957 or 1958 accomodates this definition. 
STATE:vlEN T OF' hYPOTHESIS 
In the 1947-49--1957 or 1958 period of moderate inflation, 
the steelworkers union won sizeable differential W8ge concessions2 
lsee s. P. Sobotka, "Union Influence on V;ages: The Construction 
Industry," Journal of Political Economy, LXI (April, 1953, p. 137-43. 
Thls study showed a strong union effect on wAges in periods other 
than 1914-20 and 1939-48. 
Levinson, for example, supports Rees by finding that the 
union had no impact on wcges fi•om 1914-20 or in 1939-47, but he did 
find an impact in the period of price stability from 1923 to 1929. 
See Harold Levinson, "Unionism, Wage Trends, and Income Distribution 
1914-1947, Michigan Business Studies, X, No. 4 (Ann Arbor: Univer-
sity of Michigan Press, 19510, p. 47 and p. 66-7. 
2By "differential concessions" it is meant that steelworker 
gains can be expected to exceed most other industry groups, organized 
or not. 
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which consic;erably exceeded produc ti vi ty increases, p~.;.shed up unit 
labor costs, and were accompanied by an excess labor supply. 'rae 
raajor sources of this success involve: 
A) An upward shifting steel product demand curve wi1.ich per-
mitt~d sizeable price increases and an inelastic product demand 
whic:1 :mableci pl'ice incr·eases to be _forthcomin:; when de.nand failed 
to ~naintain its shift to ti'le northeast on a diagram. The reluc-
tance to raise prices (and wages) in the 1945-49 period of excess 
product dern.and stew..med from (1) a feGr t~1at the rate of increase 
in product de1,1and would not be maintained and would result in an 
inflexible downward nigh cost structure; and (2) that profl ts were 
already lar~Se due to a high rate of capacity utilization, and 
complete adaptatioL to a rapidly rising excess product demand 
would have induced new entrants along with providing internal 
funds for financing integration by the existin[ non-integrated 
firms. A natural corrective to higher steel prices increased sub-
stitution of s tee 1 products by corr.pe ting :materials of other indus-
trias, i.e., rlas tics, alum:i num, concrete and wood, was not very 
effective in retarding tne steel price gains. 
B) An upward shifting steel profit target which generated wage 
de'1lands. 'l'he profit target shifted up when the operating rate fell 
as capacity increased faster trwn output and eventually output fell. 
Thus when actual costs exceeded standard costs, the chan~~e in vol-
urne was seen as altering long-term profit prospects; this antici-
pation led to an increase in the mark-up to produce the desired 
rate of return. The desired rate itself was revised upward as modera1 
inflation continued because higher profits were claimed to be nec-
essary as inflatio11 rendered depreciation allowances inadequate. 
C) The oligopolistic character of the produ0t market 
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accompanied by closed entry prevented new entrants, attracted 
by higher prices and profits, from taking advantage of an excess 
labor supply to produce steel and lower costs and prices. In 
t~is type of product market a lag persists between an increase 
in demand and the price adjustment of the oligopolist. Galbraith 
aptly termed this difference an "unliquidated monopoly" gain. 
In the moderate inflation studied here, steel demand moved per-
sistently up and to the right until about 1955. Incomplete 
adaptation of oligopoly prices in a constantly changing situation 
resulted in prices failing to reach profit maximizing levels. 
Price adaptation is by deliberate and discrete steps. Hence 
prices can be raised at any time to enhance profits, especially 
when the operating rate falls as capacity expands faster than 
output, and part of the gain is shared with the union. In the 
rapid inflation studied by Rees, adaptation was even less satis-
factory and perhaps impossible because an operating rate close 
to capacity resulted in actual costs falling below standard costs 
a~d a high profit rate without price increases. In order to test 
the hypothesisl the following procedure will be adopted: 
lThis dissertation is not concerned with factors other than 
the important "economic realities." It is the latter according 
to Dunlop which ntend to set practical limits to bargains." The 
"important realities" concept suggest.! that wage settlements in 
the long-run will not diverge markedly from these npractical 
limits." It is recognized that internal union factors such as 
leadership characteristics, financial strength, bargaining power, 
age, etc., and external factors such as the "orbits of coercive 
comparison" of Ross influence settlements. But the role of the 
union here is confined to influencing where, within the limits 
of the economic realities, the settlements actually fall. If 
the limits are broad, the role of the union is more powerful. 
In order to be successful, however, the union must have something 
. to bite on--so to speak--and this is provided by the statements 
in the hypothesis. The hypothesis suggests the conditions under 
which the bite becomes bigger. In this study the union is assumed 
Chapter Two considers the labor market by developing data 
concerning the growth of an excess labor supply. Factor demand 
and supply are both examined. 'rhis chapter also establishes 
the differential success of the steelworkers over selected per-
iods making the relevant comparisons with other industries. 
Chapter Three considers the ma.gni tude of the rise in waeces 
compared with productivity gains to show the size of the rise 
in unit labor costs to account for salaried workers and recalcu-
lates a new realized steel price index in order to compare the two. 
It is alleged that existing Bureau of Labor Statistics Indexes 
are inaCiequate for this purpose and requil'e correcting. 
Chapter Four discusses other costs of producing steel such 
as materials, taxes, interest, and depreciation. A study cannot 
be complete without examining the course of movement of these 
other costs a~d their contribution to price changes in steel. 
Since the upward shifting profit target of the hypothesis is 
claimed to be due to depreciation allowances having become inade-
quate in inflation, this assumption is investigated in detail. 
Chapter Five examines the steel pricing process by showing 
steel price changes in perjods of high utilization of capacity, 
moderate utilization of capacity, and when much capacity is 
idle. The oligopoly adjustment to upward product demand shifts 
is studied along with the adjustment to a demand wluch fails to 
continually shift up. The chapter also demonstrates the magnitude 
of the revision upward in the profit target as stated in the 
hypothesis. 
to strive for 11 more and more" all the time, being limited only by 
the economic realities. 
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Chapter Six attempts to show that inter-industry competition 
b:y- plastics, aluminum, wood, and cement has not retarded steel 
price rises. An attempt is also made to estimate the amount of 
steel replaced by these substitute materials and to develop 
some criteria for judging the conditions under which inter-
industry competition might be keener. In other words, this chapter 
in effect considers whether an upward shifting steel demand 
schedule and higher steel prices induces substi tutlon by other 
materials and thus increases the elasticity of demand for steel 
as it shifts up. 
CHAPTER II 
THE LABOR MARKET 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the state of 
the labor market in steel during the period of moderate infla-
tion selected to verify the judgment of that portion of the 
hypothesis which claimed that the steelworkers' union is able 
to extract economic concessions significantly in excess of the 
gains achieved by most other comparison groups. In addition, 
the magnitude of this achievement is not diminished or eroded 
away by the existence of a surplus labor supply available to 
steel firms. 1 It is also the intent of this chapter to show 
that steel wages continued to rise in the latter part of 
the period when the demand curve failed to continue its former 
steady upward rise. 
Therefore, the procedure adopted in this chapter is to 
probe the data of the labor market as follows: 
1) The magnitude of the steel wage gains will be compared 
with the increases achieved by workers of other indus-
tries. In addition the increases will be broken down 
into various periods such as 1946-49, 1950-54, and 
1955-58 in order to indicate that the deviations in 
the degree of steelworker differential success increased 
lSee No. 1 in the outline statement of the hypothesis in 
Chapter I. 
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in the later years when labor surpluses appeared larger. 
2) The factor supply will be shOwn to be plentiful, i.e., 
elastic to the steel industry. For this purpose 
recourse will be had to the following: 
A) Classifications of unemployment rates in major 
steel industries 
B) Quit rates and layoff rates 
C) Total employment and hours of work per week 
D) Comparisons for specific occupational categories 
and increment increases in job classes 
E) Changes in the composition of skilled workers 
in the steel industry. 
3) The factor demand will be studied by examing: 
A) The size of the gain in productivity per man-
hour. 
B) The strength of product demand and its influence 
on factor demand by data concerning: 
1} The change in output, capacity and utiliza-
tion rates. 
2} The ratio of unfilled orders to sales. 
4) Lastly, some consideration is given to the influence 
of government in the settlements that have been made. 
Inter-Industry Earnlngs Comparisons 
The table below presents the percentage increases in 
annual averages of hourly earnings, including overtime for 
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the steel industry, all manufacturing, durable goods, 
automobiles, machinery except electrical, and electrical 
machinery. The table shows that the steelworkers succeeded 
in doubling their wages from 1947 to 1958 while the compar-
ison industries were only three-fourths or leas as success-
ful. 
TABLE 6 
WAGE INCREASES IN MANUFACTURING A~D SELECTED 
INDUSTRIES, PERCENT INCREASES OF ANNUAL 
AVERAGES OF HOURLY EARNI~GS 
INCLUDING OVERTIME 
Industry 
Steel 
All Manufacturing 
Durable Goods 
Automobiles 
Machinery Except Electrical 
Electrical Machinery 
194'7-1958 
100.1 
66.4 
76.4 
71.4 
75.0 
68.0 
Source: 0. Eckstein and G. Fromm, "Steel and the Postwar 
Inflation," Studt Pa§er No. 2, Joint Economic Co~ttee, u.s., 
Government Print ng ffice, November, 1959, p. 22. 
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Among the industries listed are those with the highest 
weekly and hourly earnings as of 1958. Other data contribute 
to the same conclusion. Of 17 industries studied in 1947, 
nine had greater average hourly earnings than steel, while in 
1958 only three of these earned larger amounts. (See TABLE 
below) The table below presents the percentage gains for each 
industry. The steelworkers' increase of 100.1 percent com-
pares with a median gain of about 80.3 percent for all eighteen 
industries. 
TABLE 7 
AVERAGE HOURLY 3ARNINGS DWLU:CING OVERTIIviE, 
SELECTED FER10DS, DOLLARS PER HOUR 
Percentage 
Industry 
ii:ining 
Bituminous Coal 
Building Construction 
Special Trade Contractors 
Shipbuilding and Repair 
All Manufacturing 
Durable Goods 
Non-Durable Goods 
Malt Liquors 
Apparel and ..t.<;inished Textiles 
Metal Working Machinery 
Synthetic Rubber 
Petroleum and Natural Gas 
Petroleum Refining 
Tires and Innertubes 
Air Craft and Parts 
Blast Furnaces, Rolling Mills, 
Steel Works 
;Jotor Vehicles and Equipment 
1947 
1.511 
1.636 
1.681 
1.772 
1.458 
1.237 
1.292 
1.171 
1.459 
1.125 
1.386 
1.431 
1.473 
1.566 
1.604 
1.378 
1.439 
1.473 
1958 
2.56 
3.02 
3.10 
3.22 
2.58 
2.13 
2.28 
1.94 
2.83 
1.51 
2.56 
2.75 
2.69 
2.83 
2.74 
2.51 
2.88 
2.55 
Source: U.S., Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Increase 
92.7 
84.6 
84.5 
81.9 
76.7 
71.8 
76.7 
65.8 
93.8 
33.6 
84.1 
92.3 
83.0 
80.3 
71.2 
81.9 
100.1 
73.4 
The steelworkers' average wage and benefits have improved 
considerably relative to other workers. In 1940, about 15 
percent of manufacturing workers were in industries having 
hourly earnings higher than steel. But by January of 1959 
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only 0.15 percent of all manufacturing workers had higher hourly 
earnings than steel. The table below provides additional infor-
mation. 
TABLE 8 
POSITION OF THE 8TE:t!.:LWORKER COiviPARED hiTH OTHER MANU-
FACTURING WORKERS- ... PERCENT OF MANUFACTURING EIV1PLOY-
1Lb..1'JT IN INDUSTRIES HAVING AVBRAGE HOURLY ~APJHNGS 
ABOVE THOSE OF' A STE~~ WORKER 
Year Percent 
1940 15.ooa 
March, 1949 14.22 
February, 1954 8.99 
January 1959 0.15 
Source: C')mputed from BLS Employment and Barnings Series. 
aEstimate based on correlation of 1940 earnings data with 
1947 employment distribution. 
The ratio of steel average hourly earnings to all manu-
facturing was 1.16 to 1 in 1947 and 1.35 to 1 in 1958. In 
absolute cents per hour, steel wages exceeded manufacturing 
wa£res by 20.2 cents in 1947 and by 84 cents in January of 1959. 
If other benefits are included, such as pay for hours not 
worked, pensions, insurance, social security, and supplemental 
unemployment benefits, it appears that the steelworkers' economic 
advantage increases. Any increase in payroll outlays (i.e., 
in average earnings) will somewhat automatically increase payments 
f o r· -.employee benefits since costs for some such items are 
based on payroll costs. Holiday pay and vacation pay are examples. 
JrAB~E Eighteeil'3<1 shoW! that from 1947 to 1957, the cost of employee 
benefits multiPLied about four times for every man-hour worked 
while in all manufacturing this cost has about tripled. 
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Arguments have been advanced that explain the favorable 
record as a "catching up" process after w~orld .Jar II, during 
which steelworkers' wqes were more effectively controlled 
than those of many other industries. But a catching-up process 
necessarily presupposes tha~; some previous period was normal 
and hence the results depend upon the selection of the base 
period. 'I1he figure below presents the average ~'lourly earnings 
of steel works to all manufacturing. 
FIGUR~; 2 
RA'l'IC': AVERAG-E HOUHLY .::::ARl'll1~GS OF STH:EL ~~ORKS ANL 
ROLLI J\ G IIU J_,L ::i TO ALL M.Al\TUPAC TO RH G 
I.'< 
l 
II ~- r-~-+--r--- --- ---+------'--+ t.t. 
i 1 : : i 
l l I I ' f, 0 ~---t-4-_ .....____. ___ ..._ __ _.. ·--+---- J· D 
rtt~· t"t.H" tH• t4Jf tl11( 0 l'ie(f" 1qp lfrT 111~11 
Source: u.s., Bureau of Labor Statistics, Various Years 
I'he figure shows that from 1932 u:ctil 1939, steel wages 
rose considerably more than the average but lagged during 
Horld V•Jar II. However, for tne period 1929 to 1947 the change 
was about equal to that of all industries. In other words, 
if 1929 is the base normal year, by 1947 other industries had 
caught up with waGes in steel; the catching-up process taking 
place from 1939 to 1947. If 1939 is selected as the base normal 
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year--and this defines normality to be when steel wages were 
highest in relation to all other manufacturing wages--then by 
1958 the "normal" relationship was restored; and by 1959 the 
steelworkers had forged ahead to a position superior to that of 
any other previous period in history. 
Although a study of relative earnings gives perspective, 
hourly earnings fluctuate for many reasons; and the f?ragoing 
analysis needs to be supplemented by a study of wage adjustments. 
Such a presentation indicates in what periods steel adjustments 
ran parallel wtth workers of other companies and industries and 
the periods in which steel earnings advanced sharply in relation 
to all other industries. The tables below attempt to classify 
firms as to whether they were in industries of high or low 
concentration and to indicate the wage increases won in various 
selected years from 1946 to 1958. 
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TABLE, 9 
1946-49 
Co:·tpany or Indus try ~lee ti ve Bargainir.g 3e t tlamen ts 
EL::h Concentration ~:ianufact- 462¢ plus 5¢' in January, 1947, 
~ricg: as result of job classification 
1 ni ted States Steel (key) studya 
General Iviotors (key) • • • 44-~ plus 6 holidaysb 
Pord (key) • • • • • • . • 42;¢ plt<s 6 holidays 
Chrysler (key) • •. • • •• 43¢' rlus 6 holidays 
:nternational Harvester 40~¢ plus 6 holidays 
F;ubber ( 4 companies) • • • 41¢ plus 6 holidays 
8-eneral Electric ••••• 42( plus 6 holidays 
Armour • • • • • • • • • • 42:2 cents plus 8 holidays 
Aluminum Co. (steelworkers)4.4¢ (est., actual increases usually 
involved range of rates) plus noncon-
tributory health and welfare 
Anaconda Copper. • • • 42¢ plus 6 holidays 
40jz' plus 6 holidays previously in effec 
plus noncontrlbutm:y h::lal th and welfare 
~artin • • • • • • • • • • 33( plus 
l'.orth i~merican • • • • • • 332 cents plus 6 holciiays 
0e thle r1em ShipbuilC.ing • • 37 cents 
Lockheed • • • • • 
Facific Shipbuilding ••• 41¢ (new construction) 
Sinclair Oil ••••••• 67~ cents plus 6 ho1idaysc 
A.nerican Vicose. • • • • • 45¢ plus 6 holidays 
JDw Concentration ~anufact­
uring: 
Ft;ll :t'ashioneci Hosiery •• 35;\;- cents plus 5 holidays 
'-' orthern Cotton Textiles • 42~ plus 6 holidays 
American lt1'oolen •••••• 45jz' plus 6 holidays 
''en's Clothing •••••• 40¢ I_ 6, hol:idays previously in effect 
:.omen's Clothingd ••••• 42jz' I 6~ nolidays prevj_ously in effect6 
In terna ti onal Shoe • • 36( ,Plus 6 ho1idavs 
:assachusetts Shoe • • 32-2¢ plus 6 holic~~'S 
1 __ onmanufac turing: 
Anti1raci te • • • • • . • • 49}¢ f 
.i:-31 tuminous Coal. • • • • • 46¢ 
Railroad 'rrainmen. • • • • 44¢' 
?ailroac' l~onoperating ••• 41¢ 
Atlantic Longshoring . e3¢' 
Pacific Longshoring. • •• 67¢ 
Source: U.S., :SLS,· Wage Chronology Seri-es;_ data published 
by the-Bureau of ~ational Affairs 
'· -
&Additional 5i increase in Jan. 1947 as result of job classifi-
cation study. · 
bDeviation of one cent from pa:tern as result of annual 
improvement factor--cost of living adjustments, 1948-49. 
CJ:ncludes 25 cents negotiated in late 1945 prior to l946p:lttern. 
_d~,ew York C:i ty coat and s1.1i t industry. 
epaid holl Ciays arplicable to time workers only. 
fTr1e effective hotrly increase was much greater than shown 
because o.f the in:roduction of pay for travel time and the reduction 
of the worksheet witl10ut reduction in total pay. 
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'rABLE 10 
Company or Industry 
uuz:n Concentration )tianufa.c t-
uring: 
Vnited States 3teel (key) 
Ceneral T:o tors (key) 
l?ord- Chrysler (key) 
International Harvester 
Rubber 
General Electric 
Armour 
Aluminum Co. of America 
Anaconda Copper 
Lockheed 
:. artin 
l\:orth American 
Bethlehem Shipbuilding 
Pacific Shipbuilding 
1950-54 
Collective Bargaining Settlements 
45}~ plus noncontributory pensions 
plus contributory r1ealt~ and welfare 
plus 6 holidays 
44¢ plus noLcontributory pensions plus 
contributory health and welfare 
43~ plus noncontributory pensions plus 
contributory health and welfare 
41~ plus noncontributory pensions plus 
'contributory health and welfare 
43}~ plus noncontributory rens!ons 
plus contributory health and welfare 
43~ plus contributory pens:!_ons plus 
contributory health and welfare plus 
one holiday 
44!~ plus noncontributory pensions 
plus noncontributory health and 
welfare 
49}~ plus noncontributory pensions 
plus 6 holidays 
48~ plus noncontributory pensions 
plus contributory health and welfare 
46¢ plus noncontributory pensions 
previously in effect 
53~¢ plus noncontributory pensions 
plus con tributary health and welfare 
52~~ plus noncontributory pensions 
plus contributory health and welfare 
previously in effect 
52i¢ plus noncontributory pensions 
plus contributory health and welfare 
plus 6 holidays 
61¢ (new construction) plus non-
contributory health and welfare 
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TABLE 10 (Continued) 
Company or Industry 
Sinclair Oil 
American Vicose 
Low Concentration ··.'ianufact-
uring: 
Full Yashioned i-Iosiery 
f'Orthern Cotton 1'extiles 
American Woolen 
>len Is Glothing 
Vi omen 1 s Clothing 
International Shoe 
~.:assachusetts .3hoe 
ronmanufac turing: 
An thracl te 
Bituminous 
1950-54 
Collective Bargaining Settlements 
43¢ plus contributory pensions pre-
viously in effect plus contributory 
health and welfare plus one holiday 
25¢ plus contributory pensions pre-
viously in effect plus noncontributory 
health and welfare previously in effect 
No change (est., actual increases 
usually involved range of rates) 
plus noncontributory pensions plus 
noncontributory heal t~ and welfare 
previously in effect 
17¢ plus noncontributory health 
and welfare previously in effect 
16¢ plus noncontributory health 
and welfare previously in effect 
25¢ plus noncontributory health and 
welfare previously in effect plus 
noLcontributory pensions previously 
in effect 
28i plus noncontributory health and 
welfare previously in effect plus 
noncontributory pensions previously 
in effect 
20~¢ plus noncontributory health 
and welfare 
18¢ plus noncontributory health 
and welfare previously in effect 
plus one-half holiday 
57¢ plus noncontributory pensions 
previously in effect plus noncon-
tributory health and welfare pre-
viously in effect 
53¢ plusncncontributory pensions pre-
viously in effect plus noncontributory 
health and welfare previously in effect 
Company or Industry 
Railroad Trainmen 
Railroad nonoperating 
Atlantic Longshoring 
Pacific Longshoring 
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TAELE 10 (Continued) 
1950-54 
Collective Bargaining Settle~ents 
34~ cents (roadmen)a 
49f (yardmen)a 
252 ~ plus contributory health and 
welfare plus holdaysa 
54~ plus noncontributory pensions 
plus noncontributory health and 
welfare 
39¢ plus noncontributory pensions 
plus contributory health and welfare 
Source: u.s., Bureau of Labor Statistics, Wace Chronology 
Series; and data published by the :-dureau of National Affairs. 
arn the railroad industry, contributory pensions and some 
noncontributory s1c>~ness benefits are provided by Federal legis-
lation rat:J.er than through collective bargaining. 
TABLE 11 
H155-58 
Company or Industry Collective Ba1·e_~aining Settlements 
High Concentration Manufacturing: · 
United States Steel~1<:ey) • 59?:!¢ plus supplementary unemployment 
benefit plan plus one holiday 
General Motors (key) ••• 47-?t¢ plus supplementary unemployment 
benefit plan plus one holiday 
International Harvester •• 49¢' plus supplementary unemployment 
benefit plan plus one holiday 
Rubber • • • • • • • • • • 43¢' plus supplementary unemployment 
benefit plan :rlus one holid~y 
Qeneral 2nectric • 40¢' estimated 
Armour • . . • • 54¢ 
Aluminum Co. of America •• 63¢ plus supple·mentary unemployment 
benefit plan plus one i.1.oliday 
Anaconda Copper. • • • 37 rj plus one holiday 
• 39¢' plus one holiday I,ockheed . . . . . . . . 
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TABLE 11 (Continued) 
1955-58 
Company or Industry Collective Bargaining Settlements 
lartin • • . . . . . . . . 41~ (est., actual increases usually 
usually involved range of rates) 
r orth American • • • • • • 36~ plus one holiday 
Be tnle hem ·-'h.ipbt i lding • • 66~ plus one holiday 
Pacific Shipbuilding • • • 51~ plus 6 holidays 
Sir,clair Oil •••...•• 41~¢' (est., actual incr·eases usually 
involved range of rates) plus one 
holiday 
American Vicose. . . . . . 13~¢' 
Low Concentration ?vlanufacturing: 
}ull Fashioned rlosiery • • Association bargaining discontinued 
after 1954. 
Northern Cotton Textiles 
(Eerkshire-Hathaway) •• 7~¢'a 
American 'doolen. . . . Out of business after 1954 
=;en 1 s ·Clothing • . . . 12~,¢' plus one holiday 
\Wmen 1 s vlo thing • • • 14¢' 
International .Shoe • . . . 14~¢ plus noncontributory pension 
l'':assachusetts Shoe • . . • 18~ plus one-half holiday 
Nonmanufacturine: 
Anthracite • • 
3ituminous . . . . . . 
Railroad Trainmen. . . . . 
Railroad Nonoperating. 51~¢' 
Atlantic Long:shoring • . . 31~ plus 5 holidays 
Pacific Longshorlng. • 42¢' 
Source: U.S., BLS, Wage Chronology Series; and data 
publisned by the Bureau of National Affairs. 
aAssocla tion bar·gaining discontinued after 1954. The Berkshire-
Hathaway Co. was substituted because it has ~een a major concern 
ir~ the previous association. 
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The results of the tables are quite striking. In the 
postwar (1946-49) de~nd inflation there were a total of three 
rounds of wage increases, with the 1 key 1 bargains usually 
attributable to steel or automobiles. rl'he key bargains varied 
between 42}- and 46~ cents. Ir1 manufacturing only Sinclair 
Oil, wlth 67·!3 cents, exceeded steel and automobiles; while 
in non-manufacturing only lon2;shorin6 at 63 cents (Atlantic), 
67 cents (Pacific) and anthracite coal at 49i cents did better. 
Yet wi tr1 fdw exceptions, other :nanufac turing inO.us tries or 
co'Y.panies, regardless of' t:n.eir product market characteristics, 
followed this pattern with deviations of only a few pennies. 
Tr1e period from 1950 to 1954 shows that some important 
deviations were beginning to appear. The automobile industry 
acopted an automatic cost-of-living annual improvement factor 
approach (plus pensions anC. welfare) throughout. The steel 
industry negotiated new contracts annually or semiannually. 
~:he latter approach yielded a small advantat e over these years. 
l:5u t to1e most important fact is that the non-concentrated sa d:ors 
such as textiles, clothing, shoes, etc., fell considerably 
below the pattern level. 1'he company falling far below--
American Vicose, manufacturers· of rayon--was subjected to 
severe competition from new synthetic fibers. 
In other words, the industria s in :nanufacturing that 
were under severe competi tlon in the product ·narket and were 
svbject to curta:!.led profit levels were not able to match the 
pattern established by the more concentrated industries such 
as steel. However, not all concentrated industries are associ-
ated with high profit levels. In certain areas of concentration 
59 
C.emand was falling and also profits. Railroading and anthracite 
mining appear to be examples. In these two areas employment 
anC. output were declining. Yet these industries were ahle to 
~eet or even exceed 'he pattern.l 'l1he crucial factors operating 
ir- t ~ese two indus tries were th.at the unions were sufficiently 
powerfvl to control the supply of labor to virtu.ally the entire 
1nd1JS tr;; and a lack of entry of potential new firms into the 
pro duet rnarke t also existed. 'fhe su:r:ply of lallor was not st:ffi-
centlyaJastic to limit union power. 
Ir~ the period 1950-54, aluminum, copper, aircraft,, and 
s :1ipbt:i lding exceeded the key U.S. Steel settlements. It s hOil.d 
be noted tnat the U.S. Steel workers are organized. in taese 
fields except for aircraft and copper. Some of tne shipbuilding 
companies are subsidiaries of steel firms. 
From 1955 to 1958 further deviations occurred. Textiles, 
clothing, shoes continued to reach· settlements far below those 
granted. in concentrated inous tries. A-l1lerican l;oolen went out 
of business after 1954, and an employers 1 association bargaining 
unit discontinued operations. Antr1racite coal fell far behind. 
L'e spite their adverse economic conditions, railroads and bi tum-
inous coal ··11et or exceeded tne pattern. Even in tne concentrated 
;ndustries, greater disparity developed although the bulk of 
tile settlements still ranged between 40 and 50 cents per hour. 
lin mining, perhaps the most important factor permitting 
wage increases of the magnitude indicated was the extremely 
rapid rise in physical productivity per :nan-hour. 'I'ne net tons 
per man per day ~ose from 6.42 in 1947 to 10.59 in 1957, or 
aJ :aost 65 percent. Employment fell from 419.2 thousand to 2;28.6 
t1.ov.sand in bituminous coal. Minerals Yearbook, 1957, p. 50. 
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'~'he inelastic labor supply and product monopol~r in steel, 
::1owever, permitted tn.e steelworkers to achieve 59f: cents per 
hour gains plus sup::,,lemen tary unemployment benefits and one 
extra paid holiday. ALCOA granted 63 cents plus the same fringes, 
and Atlantic Coast Shipbuilding. (Bethlehem Steel Company) 
a[reed to 66 cents plus one imliday. 
In the summer of 1955 tne key bargain-was negotiated 
in a uto:nobiles whlch was enjoying its second most profitable 
post-war y0ar witn sales of over 7 million units. Profits 
after taxes rose to 21,1 percent on equity. 'r:1.e large 
volume of sales with h:i.gher prices, was achieved by raising 
ins•all:-uent terms to 36 :nont11s. l'ne monthly payments rerr~ained 
constant, but about one-half of all new cars were sold on 
t":1ese terms.l 'I'he future market was bounC. to be affected. 
,.itc1 t:1is level of profits anc proc5vction as a backdrop, a 
tr1ree year contract was signed. embodying an aLnual improvement 
factor of 2~ percent (about s:i.x cents), an automatic cost-of-
l:ivinc~ clause, and fringes estimated at 12 cents .r:er hour. 
s:1ortly afterward, under a ·wa~~e reopener expiring in 1956, tne 
steel industry negotiated an increase. Profits after taxes 
were close to record hir;hs--13.5 percent on equity in 1955, 
12.7 rercent in 1956, and 11.4 percent in l\:J57.2 Jnly in the 
1J50-51 Korean 'i•ar boom were t[ley slif')ltly higher. In 1956 
t1e key bargain was in steel. Production and employment were 
lu.s., Congress, Joint Eco11omic Cormnittee, Staff Report on 
.::;r,tpl~yment, Growth., and. Price Levels, 86th Cong., 1st Sess, 
:::ece:nber 24, 1959, ~.::'A..GLS 5-16, p. 154. 
2Ibid •.. 
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up from tll.e 1954 recession anG. the profit level was nigh. 
l :~,le pat tern effect of tr1e previous years settlement in au to-
noblles was still strong. A ti~ee year contract called for 
a to tal benefit of' about 20 cents per hour and included a sup-
plenental unen:t:loyment co~nr;ensation be.c:::aflt plan, an automatic 
cost-of-living ad,iustm.ent, a nine cent annual lmrrove,nent factor 
in 1957 and 1058, and ot~illr fringes. In both 1957 and 1J58, 
c'iesrite a marked decline in output and employment, wa:_se increa='es 
were automatic in several baste sectors of the economy. 
'i,nile no one explanation underlies the advance of wages 
cited, tr1e followin~ ger,eralizations aprear to be indicated: 
1) up to 1951, excluding 1949, tt-1e general level of 
e:nplcy-rnent and rrofi ts were i1ie,n enough in almost all incius-
tries to parmi t wat:_e increases. Var·ia tion in th.e pat tern was 
Lot narked. lressures of dernand per,nitted this development. 
2) After 1951, variations took place. ·:rne concentrated 
inG.ustries achieved profit levels which attracted uLion wage 
demar1ds. In steel especially, an upward shift in t:1e profit 
target brougnt about an embarrassment of ricr1es to stimulate 
union demands. An elast·i c labor supply did not erode away t~1.e 
unior: sains. Potential new entrants do not arpear to have 
be:3n attrr{cted by l1igher profit levels in steel. In the 
declining inc.ustries of coal m:!ning and railroais, tJ.l.e unions 
succeeded in 1-:1atchir.J.g t\·1e key bargains because aL elastic 
la'~or suprly was not a problem; , t ne r e i s 1 j t t 1 e p o s s i b i 1-
ity of new non-union firms establishin~ themselves, and in coal 
the productivity incre,Jses per :nan-i1our wcra substantial. In 
t~J.e competitive sectors, tae gains in wages weY'e much smaller. 
62 
3) In 1954 and a,~ain from 1956-1958, the role of coll-
ec ti v~ bargaining was s tro.:.g.er. >8f: e s were ri(::id downward 
in 1354 and were raised by automatic increases in the latter 
years. ;i'he continuing· upward w ,ge movements of 1957-58 were 
in t~e face of hie,her unem1loyment and dec llr.inc production 
wor:-:er em:rloyment. froductJ on worker em; loyment had not even 
recovered 1 ts 1953 level in tne strong upsurge of 1955. In 
the 1956-58 period, output inc:r·eased very slowly along with 
proC'.uctivity. 'i:1e wace advance, therefore, does not appear 
to be adequately explained by de:nand forces for ei t·1er labor 
or for output. 
4) A strong collective bargaining position more aciequately 
ex:;;lains the Waf,e cn.ovement from 1954 on. In 1954 wages were 
inflexible downward. In 1955 automobiles led t:1.e advance, 
while in 1956 the ste·:;l industry signed a three :year agreement. 
::;:·hese two :najor industries from which the wage patte1~ns of 
t~e re riod emerged were lnc:us tries w::1ose product market 
concH tions v,•ere S1lch that co!npe ti ti ve conditions were weak, 
1--rofi. ts \'Jere high, and an ability to negotiate substantial 
wage incJ•eases jnto the f'..:ture was assured without serious 
concern for tne adverse effects of competition. Where the 
econo;nic environment was unfavorable in terms of actual or 
poter1tial competition, t~1e pattern tended to break down, especially 
after 1950. 
5) In st:::el a {_row:i.nc s~ift frorr. production to non-pro-
duction workers also contributed to rising unit costs in 1957 
and 195E~.l Ravin[<: market power, the ste•Jl lndu.'3try compensated 
1· ... ·,1e ratio of production worker hours wor':ed to salaried 
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by raising :pi'ices in each year. ,,:;ubstitution of salaried 
_rel'Sonnel for l101.:rly rated workers ~nay be attributed in part 
to union wace policy and the strengt'1 of the union. 
wor1·:ers r1ou:ros worked was 5.1 in 1947 and 3.7 in 1957. Ji' 
total labor costs, lECh.1clnt;'; both hourly and salaried :rer-
sonnel, a'oout 84 percljnt was attributable to production 
wor~ers in 1947 and only 77 :rercent in 1957. Ingot rro-
~uction rose about from 77 ~illion tons in 1947 to 107 
:'lillian tons in 1957, or ~3 pei'cent, whlle production worker 
;ilan-hours rose from 1281.3 m1llion man-hours to 1284.3 :nillion 
man-':.'.lours. i'he latter represents a very small change of 
about two-tenths of one percent. Yet salaried worker man-hours· 
rose from 255.7 million to 344.1 ilillion, or 31 percent. 
:~ince av-ara;=~e hot:.rly earninss rose 100.1 percent w:1ile output 
rer man-hour rose 2EL2 rercent, lat,or cost per unit of output 
rose s·~~bstantially. Co.;:puted from A.'11er·ican lron and Steel 
Institute A.~nual Reports. 
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Supply I•actors in the Labor 1v:l.arket 
Tightness of the labor market in the areas in which steel 
competes does not offer a satisfactory explanation of the rise 
in steel wases. Falling emplcyment accompanied by rapidly 
rising wa::.e rates can be explained by demand factors when the 
absolute wag:e level is low. If a labor shortage were getting 
worse, it would be possible for low w[we industries to lose 
wor1mrs to bet~~er paying industries even thougi:1 the gap in wages 
were narrowing. 'l'his explanation is inadequate for steel because 
steel waces have been shown to be much higher thar" other wae:es. 
'c'he taole below classifies the labor ·marl{ets in which steel 
plants are located. 
The table shows that Pittsburg, employing about one-third 
of all the steelworkers, was an area of moderate or substantial 
unemplo~·'ment of 1a bor surplus over the period. In general, it 
appears that these steel centers had the same or lower classi-
fications than the country as a whole, except in a few instances, 
most of tne ti.:.Te. l''rom 1947 to 1953, employment of production 
workers in steel rose 8.1 percent, exactly equal that in manufact-
uring~s a whole; yet hourly earnings in steel rose 50 percent 
compared with 43 percent in manufacturing. Since steelworkers 
are already high paid, it should be no --_ed th.a t when the percentage 
differential widens, the steelworker is much better off. In an 
economy of fluctuating price levels, only equal percentage 
cl1.anges in all prices and asset values w:i_ll leave everyone in 
the same relative position as before, as long as the money 
illusion is absent. 'rhe living standard gap widens for workers 
in different :;nc'ius tries when percentage differentials remain 
1) 
2) 
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constant because the absolute differential changes and repre-
sents more in real terms at a higher watTe and price level. 
TABLE 12 
CLASSIFICATION OF' LABOH l\'l.ARI\E'l'S IN 
STEEL CE~TERS, 1955-1958 
1955 1956 
July Nov. July Nov. 
Birmingham c c c c 
Chicago c B B B 
Buffalo c c c c 
Cleveland B B B B 
Youngstown B B B B 
Allentown c B B B 
Johnstown F E D D 
Pittsburg D c c c 
Baltimore 
Wheeling c c B B 
Steubenville c c c c 
Detroit c c D D 
u.s. I,abor Force 
As a Whole: 
Percent Unemployed 
Labor Force 
I~ey: 
3.7 3.6 3.9 3.9 
c c ,.., c \J 
A--Overall Labor Shortage 
B--Low Labor Supply 
C--T.'lodera te Labor Surplus 
D--Relatively Substantial 
Labor Surplus 
E--Relatively Substantial 
Labor Surplus 
F--Relatively Substantial 
Labor Surplus 
1957 1958 
July Nov. July Nov. 
c c D D 
B B D D 
c c F F 
B B D D 
B c E E 
B B D D 
D D F F 
c B E 
B D D 
c F F 
D F F 
4.2 5.1 7.3 5.9 
C C D C 
Percent l.lnemployed: 
Less than 1.5 
1.5--2.9 
3.0--5.9 
6.0--8.9 
9.0-11.9 
12.0 or more 
Source: 0. Eckstein and G. Fromm, op. cit., p. 18. 
Q.uit Rates and Layoff _Rates As an Ir.1dication of t[le_Stata of the 
I1abor l.:arke t 
Another piece of ev~_dence may also be employed to illustrate 
that rising steel wa~~es could not have been completely explained 
by inc rea sed demand for workers. ~'his evidence involves quit 
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rates and layoff rates. Indication of the state of the labor 
market is provided by turnover data. •· !.'1.8 r, there is substantial 
unemployment, quit rates are low and layoff rates are high while 
the reverse is true when labor is scarce. 
TABI,E 13 
ANl\UAIJ AVERAGBS OF Q;UI T HATES AND 
LAYOFF RA'l'ES PER 100 E~·:!PLOYE.r;S 
Il' STEEL 
Quit Layoff 
Year Rate Rete 
1947 2.6 0.1 
1948 2.1 0.2 
1949 1.5 2.4 
1950 1.9 1.1 
1951 2.4 1.2 
1952 2.3 1.1 
1953 2.3 1.3 
1954 1.1 1.9 
1955 1.6 1.2 
1956 0.9 0.3 
1957 0.9 0.3 
1958 0.4 3.3 
1959 0.7 2.3 
Source: U.S., Bureau of Labor Statistics--Various Years 
In 1947 and 1948, the high postwar demand for steel and 
prosperity in general led to a high quit rate as alternative 
e·:nployrnent opportunities were a ttrac ti ve. 'l'he layoff r~ te was 
low. In the recession of 1949, the layoff rate rose from 0.2 
to 2.4 while the quit rate fell from 2.1 to 1.5. 'l'he :J<orean 
V1'::1r Feriod raised the demand for labor and the layoff rate fell 
while the quit rate rose. Steel employers were hesitant to 
fire workers when alternative opportunities improved, and tightened 
the supply of available labor. 'l'he evidence seems to disclose a 
falling quit rate (except in highly praperous years such as 1955) 
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ar::c' a r1sing layoff rate. In other· words, the steel industry 
{las recently experienced a surplv,s of labor at current wage 
rates. Such a surplus should cause a bidding down of wat:_~e rates 
in the absence of collective bargaining. '.J.'he elastic supply of 
labor does not appear to influence the union's wage policies 
too ~uch. Une might expect th~t the entrance of new firms in the 
steel industry would be encouraged by the elastic labor supply, 
and thus ability to produce at low cost. Eu t the entry barrier 
of high capital costs p;·even ts this, and the union need not worry 
about erosion of bargaining power on this score. Except for 
the early years of the period (excluding 1949) the evidence 
points out that a surplus of labor existed soon after wage rates 
were negotia~ed, indicating that negotiated rates were probably 
above those which would have IJ'L' availed in the absence of the 
union. .L'!1.e union defini tely-rossc ssses unusual bargaining power. 
Total E~ployment and Hours 
Total employment and average hours per week per employee 
figures do not su&>~'est that the labor supply over the period was 
ti£ht either. The table below summarizes steel employment and 
hours along v,;i th a production index. 
Except for 1949 and 1952, when employment was down because 
of strikes, and 1954, a recession year, the figures in the table 
beJow show that steel production worker employment has been quite 
stable. T~e 1956 strike resulted in only a small decrease in 
average annual employment for the entire year. In 1955 when 
production was at its peak (39 percert higher than in 1947), 
employment w::.s only 27,000,or 52· percent,greater than in 194-7. 
Year 
1947 
1948 
l949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
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TABLE ·14 
STE.2:L PRODUCTIJ£, hOR:K.ER Ei·;IPLOYNLENT AlilD HOURS, 
AND INGOT OU·rPD'l1 1947-1957 
Production 
Ingots and 
Average 
Average Castings, 
Hours Per Iiallions 
Employment Index Week Per of Index ( Tho'L~sands} 1947-:wo · .I:!.mployee Tons 1947=100 
517.6 100.0 38.6 84.9 100.0 
536.8 103.6 39.1 88.6 104.4 
476.7 92.1 34.5 78.0 91.9 
532.9 103.0 39.0 96.8 114.1 
560.2 108.2 40.2 105.2 123.9 
486.5 94.0 35.8 93.2 109.8 
559.6 108.1 39.4 111.6 131.5 
492.5 95.2 36.1 88.3 104.0 
544.6 105.2 39.2 117.0 137.9 
532.9 103.0 38.6 115.2 135.7 
537.9 103.9 37.2 117.7 138.6 
Source: U.S., Bureau of Labor Statistics--Various Years 
If the 1952 strike year and the 1954 recession year are excluded, the 
column of average hours per week per employee shows a declining trend 
This suggests that a rise in output and steel demand for labor 
can be met b~T increasing the work week, insula tj_ng the indus try 
from labor ~~rket pressures to a certain degree. 
The table shows that the peak employment year, 1951, was 
only 8.2 percent above 1947. Fluctuations in employment have 
generally followed production trends, but increased productivity 
has parmi ttea a steady rise in output with practically no increase 
in net employment over the ten year period. 
Even with less favorable W:'lf:e rates, it is doubtful that 
the steel~ndustry would have encountered significant hiring 
problems in view of tne relatively small increase in employment 
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since 1947. In addition to relatively high wage rates, other 
considerations in the ability of steel plant wage structures to 
withstand pressures of the labor market include a high proportion 
of specialty jobs with no counterpart in manufacturing generally, 
a policy of filling all openings above common labor by promo-
tion from within or apprentice training, and a marked attachment 
of workers to particular employers.l Despite strong industry 
and union pressures toward a national rather than a local labor 
:narket wap·e rate orientation, steel plants must still compete 
in interindustry markets for unskilled labor and skilled main-
tenanca workers in particular occupations. .i'his problem has 
been met by the 1947, 1948, 1950, 1952, 1955 and 1956 settlements 
which coupled general wage increases wi.th increases in the incre-
ment btStween job classes. Skilled production and craft workers 
have thus received substantial adjustments above the general 
incr'eases. By the e!J.d. of 1957, macrrl.nists in job class 16 had 
received increases totaling 38.5 cents more than employees in 
job class one. The result has been to improve or maintain t~ 
position of steel for craft jobs relative to the prevailing levels 
paid by other manufacturing plants in steel areas. 
The min:~ mum and common labor rates have not fared as well 
as comparable rates in other 'industries. ..1.'he ccmpanies adjust 
for this by recruiting a "lower type" man at the hiring in 
classification rather than go above the evaluated rate to compete. 
lsee Richard Lester, "Hiring Practices and Labor Competition," 
Industrial Relations ~ection, Princeton University, 1954; and 
Lloyd Reynolds, Labor ~conomics and Labor Relations (New York: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1954), Ch. 19 and 20. 
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To go outside the job evaluation system would create problems 
for the direct line of promotion in job classes three to five. 
In 1956 job classes one and two were combined and in addition, 
rapid promotion was promised. 'l'he recruitment problem was allev-
iated in this fashion.l 
'l'he following table shows the record for adjustments. 
TABLE 15 
S'l'E8L IN LU $'rRY \~AGE AD.n.J STMEN TS, 
1947-1958 
General Increment Increase 
Effective Date Increase From To 
Arril 1, 1947 12.5¢ 3.5¢ 4.0¢ 
July 16, 1948 9.5 4.0 4.5 
I:ecember 1, 1950 12.5 4.5 5.0 
T"~arc h 1, 1952 12.5 5.0 5.5 
Ju:o.e 12, 1953 8.5 No Chanf~:e 
July 1, 1954 5.0 I\lo Change 
July 1, 1955 11.5 5.5 6.0 
August 3, 1956 7.5 6.0 6.3 
July 1, 1957 7.0 6.3 6.5 
July 1 1958 7.0 6.5 6.7 
-, 
Source: Chartin~ Steel 1 s Progress, Amer,ican Iron a:nd Steel 
Institute, 1960, p. 5 • 
Comparisons for Specific Occu.pational Categories 
For specific job categories which could possibly be in 
tight supply in steel, local labor market areas, the record does 
not support st:ch a claim. The table below compares steel wage 
rates in 1952 with straight-time . avet'age hourly earnings for 
1:,1artin Bronf'rmbrenner advances the thesis that similar wae;e 
rates in labor markets of varying tightness and prevailing ~age 
levels may be explained by less restrictive hiring standards-in 
tight than in loose labor marke ta. "Pote~tial llfonopsony in Labor 
Markets," Industrial a~d Labor halation~ rieview, July, 1956, 
p. 157'7-1588. 
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key occupations in manufacturing in eighteen steel producing 
centers. 
1'ABLE 16 
STJ.•':!hiARY COiVIP AEISON OF S'rEB;L WAGE RA'l'ES, E.B'PECTIVE lVlARCH 15, 
1952, WITH STRAIG.HT-TH1E AVERAGE HOf!RLY J£AR.l~n:GS FOR 
SELECTED OCCUPA'llJ:ObS DJ iviANUFACTURil.\!G IN EJGrlTE~N 
S'J'EEIJ PRODUCii~G CITIES, DEC2:IU3ER 1951-l\iOVEl-.iBER 1952 
Occupation 
Carpenter 
Electrician 
Number of 
Straight-Time Average 
Hourly Earnings Above 
Steel Standard Hourly 
Wage Rates 
Engineer, Stationary 
F'ireman, Stationary Boiler 
Helper, 'rrades 
4 
0 
1 
4 
5 
ILachine Tool Operator 
i.iachinist 
~echanic, Maintenance 
r,~echanic, Automotive 
T.allwright 
Oiler 
Painter 
Pipefitter 
She :3 tme tal Worker 
'I'ool and Die .Maker 
13 
0 
9 
1 
1 
7 
8 
5 
1 
0 
Cities With: 
Straight-Time Average 
Hourly 1:i;srnings the sam 
as or below Steel Stan-
ard 3ourly Wage Rates 
13 
18 
15 
14 
11 
2 
17 
9 
17 
16 
11 
10 
12 
14 
17 
Source: Standard Hourly 1:'Ja; e Rates are from the August 15, 
1952, agr~ement b3tween U.S. Steel and the United Steelworkers 
of America; remaining d.ata is from BLS Bulletin No. 113, "'i»ages, 
and Related benefits, 40 Labor J-::arke ts, 1951-52, and Bulle tin 
No. 116, "wages and Related Benefits, 20 Labor karkets, 1952-53." 
Note.:: 
The total number of cities do not add up to eighteen because 
individual occupations were not reported in all cities. 
'I'he table above shows that for key maintenance jobs as 
electric:tan, stationary engineer, machinist, automotive mechanic, 
nlJlwright, sheet metal 1NOrker and tool and die maker, steel 
rates were either the same as or higher than those in every city 
.. 
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surveyed or were exceeded in only one city. 'Hlis is all the more 
si(jnificant when it is considered that standard hourlv wac·e rates 
~ '-' 
:~n stee 1 are being compared with straight-time average hourly 
earnings, whichmay include incentive earnings. ln only two 
jobs, machine tool operator and maintenance mechanic, did 50 
percent or more of the cities exceed steel industry rates. 
In 1952 a general increase of 16 cents per hour with no 
chanbe in the increment between job classes would have brought 
steel maintenance rates well above the average for similar 
occupations in almost all steel centers. Yet the increment 
waze adjustment gave skilled craftsmen in job classes 13 to 16 
total increases of 18.5- to 20.0-cents per hour. 
In 195.5 under someNla.t similar market conditions, the steel 
settlement provided for a general increase of 11.5 cents and 
an incrernent increase form 5.5- to 6.0-cents, when an across 
the board raise of 15 cents per hour wovld have sufficed to 
bringsteel craftsmen into a favorable position with others. 
In other words, the settlements indicate the importance 
of factors other than the labor market in the determination of 
steel wage patterns since 1947. The inciustry adopted standard 
nourly wau3 rates which v.ere either above rates for comparable 
jobs in most steel producing areas or sufficiently close to pre-
veiLing rates to minimize labor market pressures. .i.'he position 
of certain !l1Brket oriented jobs relative to other industries was 
furthur impoved by increases in l2ter years. 
Certain pressures help to contribute to lessening the 
pressures of local labor market conditions. 0 ne of these isbug~s 
the company level and not the plant level. A local plant cannot 
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take advantage of relativ~ly low comparable rates in a given 
community. Higher management seems to consider that the resulting 
ur:favorable industrial relations climate is not worth the savings 
in cost. In addition, the union would be more tempted to take 
advantage of a more favorable labor market elsewhere where it 
was stronger and try whip-sawing tech:J.1.iques. Of course, the 
opposite also holds true, i.e., the steel companies cannot pay 
higher rates in labor market locations when the competitive 
situation demands it.l 
Another factor contributing to this type of behavior is 
the product market. ~·with a market for steel products which is 
national in scope and with prices which change more or less 
simultaneously, a strong premium is placed on the maintenance 
of intercompany stability in wa[:e costs winch represent roughly 
35 r:ercent of the total cost. Steiber states that 
labor market pressures play a relatively hnimportant 
role in the administration of the steel industry job 
evaluation program. uccupational shortages have been 
met in the steel industry by apprentice training, 
temporary use of helpers, overtime work, and lowering 
~1.ir lng standards where necessary to recruit workers 
at the applicable job evaluated rate.2 
lsee Jack Steiber, 'I':n.e Steel Industry Hage Structure(Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 321. J. R. Hicks 
nas also suggested that employers who have rea·son to believe 
that tae supply curve of labor is considerably more elastic in 
the lonr run ther, the short run would hesitate to raise wage 
rates suffic:' ently to cover a mor:tentary shortar_·.e and later to 
1•eeuce it. They W01J.ld be restrained by their fear of "cheating 
the expectations of entrants to the trade." J. R. ~"i:tcks, 
"Economic Foundations of \~.o ;;e Policy, 11 Econo,nic Journal, LJJ! 
(September, 1955) p. 404. 
2steiber, Op. Cit., p. 144 and 150. 
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Company officials claim that they do not try to attract 
labor by offering higher rates for two reasons. 
1) The maintenance of the job evaluated wage structure 
in lndividual plants a11d companies is considered to be more im-
portant than outside recruitment. 
2) Officials feel that steel wages are sufficiently high 
to compete for available craftsmen, though not necessarily high 
enough to attract workers already employed at :.1.igher rates.l 
Changes in the Composition of Skilled -~workers in the Steel Industry 
The number of skilled workers in the steel industry has, 
of course, increased with the ::narch of technology. For production 
workers, the steel industry has established 32 job classes under 
the job evaluation program. Job classes one and two, which 
have been combined recently, are tbe common labor and learning 
job classes, while job class 32 contains tne most highly skilled 
workers. A substantial number of workers are to be found in 
every job class up to job class 16. One-half of the v.orkers 
are in job class eight or higher. Less than three percent 
of the workers are contained in job class 17 to 32. The 
weighted averac:e job class l:las remained close to 8.18. This 
weighted fi~ure was worth about ~1.965 per hour in 1955.2 
'l'he following table presents the percentage distribution of 
production workers in various job clas .3es for three selected 
years. It indicates that skills have increased With an increase 
in employment in the higher job classes. 'l'he changes, however, 
co not appear to be especially significant. A smaller proportion 
lsteiber, Op. Cit., p. 144. 
2steiber, Op. Cit., p. 284 and 247 for the average weighted 
job class for each of sixteen steel companies. 
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are now in the lowest job classes, the middle job classes 
changed slightly, and a hi[her proportion are in the highest 
categories. 
PE:CEI\:TAGE DISTRIBUTIOl': 0P PRODT.'CTIOI\ ~vORKERS 
Ih VAR:LOUS .JOB CLA.-:S~S, SELECTED YEARS 
1947 1954 1959 
Percent Percent Percent 
.Job Classes 1-4 25.2 23.4 20.9 
.Job Classes 5-10 48.2 48.8 48.9 
.Job Classes 11-32 26.6 27.8 30.2 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Computed from Americar:c .~.ron and Ste e 1 Institute 
Annual Reports for selected years. 
From 1954 to 1959 the incr<:J ase in employment in the higher 
,iob classes also increased earnings by roughly 2i cents while 
for tne whole period, the figure is close to roughly six cents. 
I'hereforG, chan&:es in earnings dtB· to chan- es in the skill 
:nix !18. ve been a very -small proportion of the to tal change in 
·,~arnings over the period. A more highly skilled work force 
cannot account for the relatively faster increase in earnings 
in steel in comparison to other industries. 
Lemand Fe_c tors for Labor 
Demand conditions may be in:~erpreted as "pulling up" wages if 
steel companies engage in "permanent high plateau" thinking by 
signing contracts repeatedly in periods of economic expansion. 
But even on this interpretation the behavior of steel wa:~es did 
not accord with competitive market theory. It was the state of 
the product market, not the labor market, which was the crucial 
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factor in the steel case. Also, if prices and wa2·es behaved 
according to market principles, the gains would have been reversed 
after the overoptimistic evaluation of the state of the w.arket 
was proved wrong. 
Eerlier studies by Hees and Ulman do not necessarily 
contradict the argument above. Rees stresses demand factors 
and minimizes t:ne impact of· the union, but he confined his 
study to 1945-1948, a period of rapid inflation and a black 
m8rket for steel. Ulman questions Ree's study by referring to 
the 1946-1956 record and stresses the positive impact of the 
u.nion on wages. In this study the effect of the combined 
mar:!:~et power of the union and the management is stressed.l 
Since the demand for labor is a derived demand, the state 
of demand in the product market must be studied as well as the 
p~1.ysic8l productivity of the work force. An increased product 
demand may be taken in the form of increased output with prices 
unchanged as long as idle capacity permits, or may be taken as 
incre~sed prices with output unchanged, or a combination of 
·:)oth. The character of the product market and the effect of 
union bargaining power on wages and costs will help to determine 
the form. In addition to physical productivity, indications of 
the demand for steel are provided by changes in total output, the 
rates of utilization of capacity, and the backlog oft orders. 
Each will be taken up below. 
lsee Albert Ree s, "Fos twar W8p:e Determination in the :Jas ic 
Steel Industry," Amerjcan :Sconomic Review, June, 1951, p. 389-
404; and Lloyd Ulman, "The Union anQ \iJa[:_,es in basic Steel: A 
Connnent," Ibid., p. 408-426. 
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P~wslcal Productivity 
In basic steel, in 1947, an average of about 77 million 
ingot tons of steel was produced by 1,281.3 millj_on man-hours of 
work by prodt'ction workers and 255.7 million man-hours of work 
by salaried personnel. By 1957, 107 million ingot tons were 
produced with 1,284.2 million man-hours of work by production 
workers and 344.1 million man-hours contributed by salaried 
pe1,sonnel. J.n other words, total physical output increased 
about 33 percent and vvas achieved with no change (about 2/10 
of one percent) in the work requirements of production workers 
while tQe hours worked by salaried personnel rose 31 percent. 
If production worker man-hours alone are used, the gain in 
P'-wsical productivity per man-hour is about 29.2 percent. If 
both sets of workers are ::.ncluded, the gain in physical product-
ivity is about 19.4 percent.l The rise in productivity, of 
course, elves the union a source for bargaining for wage and 
related advantages. 
As developed in previous sections, the supply of labor 
over th..i..s period to the steel industry appeared to be elastic, 
and it is likely that an even greater output increase than the 
33 percent achieved would not have required ris~ng wage rates, 
in the absence of a union :1n order to recruit workers. .;:,ince 
the averaLe realized price per ton of steel was ~~96.24 ( 1947-
49) and t:l43.69 per ton in 1957, the increase of 49.5 percent 
in the price of steel served to depress output and consumption 
lData computed from American Iron and Steel Institute 
Annual Reports, various Years. 
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below what they misht have been.l Luring the latter part of 
this period, the trend in percent of capacity utilized was down 
and the idle capacity was sufficient to permit sizeable output 
increases. 
Since the increased output of some 30 million tons was 
sold for an average price per ton that rose from ~~96.24 in 1947-
49 to $143.69, or 49.5 percent, it would appear that the demand 
curve for steel products was shifting up and to the right. 
'Jther factors influencing demand are difficult to hold constant; 
but since neither the Consumer·s- Price Index r:or the -.,holesale 
Price Index rose by half the percentage increase in steel 
prices, a strong presumption exists that the demand for steel 
rose. 
Bconomic theory would indicate that, under competition, 
the increased demand for steel products accompanied by an 
elastic labor supply ano substantial icle capacity would result 
in an increase in output and employment. However, the character 
of the product market and the bargaining power of the union 
prevented any substantial solution in this direction. As in-
dicated earlier sections, wages were driven up by 100.1 percent 
from 1947 to 1957 and exceeded the comparable gains of any 
other inc~ustrial grouping. Steel production worker employment 
lData computed from American Iron and Steel Institute 
Annual Reports. In 1947-49 an avera:~-e of 76.626 million ingot 
tons was produced having an average sales value of ~7,382.2 
million, or ~96.24 per ton. By 1957 the sales avlue was 
~yl5,468.8 million, and output was 107.264 million tons. If 
prices had not changed,t.he increased output would have sold 
for ~?10,323.1 million. Since actual total revenue was ~15,468.8 
million, implicit prices rose about 49.5 percent. 
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ro""e b;;,. only 27,000 or 5.2 percent !'rom 1947 to the peak year 
or 1955, while output rose ~7.9 percent. F'rom 1947 to 1957, 
output roae :38.6 percent while e:aployment roa~ by 20,300 worker• 
or 3.9 percent. It appears that the gains in ~roductivity an4 
increased del'lland for steel prodn.c ts w•n•e run off into tl.lfi p¢:cke ts 
of those already on tb .. e s·cen•. 11he union raised wa[~es muoh 
faster than productivity rose, ar.d the h:i.gher unit costs al.ao 
led to price inc reasea .. 
,9hanges in Output and Capaoi ty Utlli.aation Rates 
Comparing the periods 1947-49 with 1355-58, period~ lens 
enough to reduce the impact or inventory fluctuations and ot 
durable goods •lea tluctue.t1ons in recessions, steel production 
rose by 33 percent and real Gross Na~.onal Product by 38 percent. 
The rata of utilisation of capacity ia a measure of the relation 
between potential supply and current demand, especially the 
short-run demand situation. In the long run, supply dependa 
upon investment and tba influence or market power may make 1taelr 
felt through a relatively low level ot capacity. hence the ~ate 
of utilization of capacity can rotleot demand pull but cannot 
reject the 1ntluenoea of market power on prices. 
'l'ABLE 18 shows that the e.xperience of the la ttor ,-eara 
ot ths period was s1gn1f1cantly worse than the earlier ones. 
The banner automobile year of 1955 provides the exception. 
On a quarterly basis tha values at the peaks ot proaperity were 
somewhat lower, and the extent and duration of recessions woraened. 
FIGURE, 3 plots the data. 
Year 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
TABLE 18 
OPERATING RATE 
Percent of 
Capacity 
Utilized 
93.0 
94.1 
81.1 
96.9 
100.9 
85.8 
94.9 
71.0 
93.0 
89.8 
85.2 
60.6 
78.0 
Source: American Iron and Steel Institute, Annual 
Reports, Various Years. 
PIGURE 3 
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Source: American Iron and Steel Institute, Annual 
Reports, Various Years. 
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Unfilled Jrders 
Unfilled orders constitute another indicator of the state 
of demand and of the consequent pull on prices and profits. 
'i'he absolute dollar volt.::.me of unfilled orders reached similar 
values in peak periods. But with output and sales increasing 
over the period, the ratio of orders .to sales, a measure of 
the backlog of orders, has deteriorated. The following chart 
illustrates this relationship. 
PIGURE 4 
RA'l1IO OF UNFILLED OED3RS 
'rO SALES 
7~------~---------T--------~------~~------~--------~---? 
3 
-------+---·---- ---·' 
Source: U.S., Department of Commerce, Survey of Current 
Business, Various Years. 
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A pull on prices in peak periods may have oeen exerted 
by demand, but it appears that this pull should have been 
weakening and hence cannot fully explain the very steady trend 
upward:· in steel pricei. ·~·~hen dema.nd fell far short of capacity, 
prices failed to decreas~ and this point argues that the 
effect of demand is largely irrelevant for steel during periods 
of contraction.l At best, the state of t~1.e product market 
can explain only a modest part of the price increases.that 
occurred in periods of substantial idle capacity. 
lin the same way that unemployment has always been regarded 
as a barrier to an increase in war:·ea, unused capacity has been 
regarded as a check to any increase in prices. In the classical 
system, there could not be unused capacity because competition 
would force prices to fall until it was used. In the heynesian 
system, capacity can be unused, but it would bs supposed that 
it would be brought into use before prices could begin to rise. 
It perhaps should be noted that the idea of excess capa-
city is a very slippery one. Capacity exists in an industry 
in vary:i.ng stages of technological modernity. .;.)orne :nay be new 
and efficient, some old and high cost, and some may be in 
various in L;ermediate stages of obsolescence. '.J.'ne old and high 
cost may not be pressing on the market and may function as a 
standby, available if an emergency raises prices sufficiently. 
It cannot -,_,e regarded as keeping prices down until prices reach 
the point where this equipment is brought into action. In 
the steel industry exceJs capacity may simply mean that equip-
~ent is available for producing more but at current prices 
and profit rates or higher ones. both wages and prices were 
increased in 1958 when the industry was operating at less than 
two-tnirds of its capacity. Capacity itself was increasing 
at t£1e time. Prices '."Jere rj sing while production was falling. 
1\0 large expansion of demand could account for this. ...he price -.: 
makers of the industry were aple to hold the price line and 
apparently wanted to do so. art of the reason may 1e due to 
rigidity of cost or rising cost, especially labor cost. ~art 
maY be due to an effort to at least protect profits if not 
to"increase them;to provide funds for modernization. froductivity 
in this industry since 1947 has not kept pace wi til the average 
for all manufacturing. Part may be due to :tncreased confidence 
in the ability of the government to deal quickly and effectively 
with recessions. 
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Dunlop has pointed out that, in his view, the central 
problem~ in steel 
• • • has been how to finance exrensi ve new capacity 
in an industry where increa~es in productivty have 
not been significantly different from the average of 
manufacturing. If the i_ndustry is to finance new 
capacity, substantially from within, prices must be 
incr·eased to provide the profits for expansion.1 
ru, lop then acds that the attempt is partly self-defeating 
because the high profits necessarily stjmulate highor wage 
increases than would otherwise take place. The high wage 
de~ands frustrate the industry as its expected profits for 
expansion and replacement do not materialize. ~rhis futile 
process can go on through endless rounds of price and wage 
increases. This central dilemma led the financial interests 
in the industry toward: seeking a long term five year contract 
in the 1956 negotiations. 
If Dunlop's analysis be correct, it serves to supplement 
the proposition that_ the steel industry enjoys monopolistic 
market power. It is the consumer who pays the bill and not 
the investor. A strong argument may be logically made that 
steel capacity should have been financed to a much greater 
extent by external sources of funds rather than internal. 
Influence of Government on Steel ,,ages 
Since the end of wlorld V.ar II, in three of the four 
bargaining crises there appeared to be extensive influence or 
intervention by the Feaeral Government. In the 1945-1946 
lJohn Dunlop, "Policy Problems, Choices, and Proposals," 
in the Anerican Lssembly, Wa.::·es, Frices, Profits and Product-
ity, I'llay, 1959, p. 158. 
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period the inG..ustry rejected an 18~ cent wage increase rec-
ommended by a governmental fact-finding board. Wage and price 
controls were still in effect and when the government tied 
the wa?e increase to an Executive Order in February of 1946 
rais:tng the price of steel by ~5 a ton, the companies accepted 
the earlier reco~~endation.l In 1947 and 1948 price increases 
accompanied waee gains and ·were criticized but did not involve 
governmental intervention. The substantial package recommended 
by a Presidential fact-finding board sidestepped the use of 
facilities established under the new Taft-Ha~ley Act but was 
rejected by the companies. After a ttl·rty to forty day strike, 
one company broke the deadlock by si,>-ning an ac:_ree::-n.ent which 
contained the same 8eneral features and cost as the board's 
proposals yet was not identical to them. Harbison and Spencer 
c1at:n that "the gains for the steelworkers would have been much leas 
"withOut· , intervention by the President's Office because of 
the recession conditions at the time. n2 
With price and wage controls a[ ain in eff'ec t for the 
Korean '.';ar, in 1952 the ';iage Stabilization Board proposed a 
generous 30 cent package. Again the companies turned it down 
and the resulting dispute culminated in Truman's seizure. A 
court ruling declared the seizure to be illegal, and a 55 day 
strike ensued. Since the final settlement ~.ncluded most of 
pac'k:age recommended by the Wa~·e Stabilization Board, 1 t appears 
lsee :Prederick Harbison and Robert Spencer, "'rhe Poll tics 
of Collective Bargaining: ·rhe Postwar Hecord in Steel, 11 The 
American Political Science Review, September, 1954, p. 705-='f?ZO. 
2Ibid., p. 712. 
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that the main issue of the strike was the question of the union 
shop security clause. 
Several settlements then took place without strikes and 
wlthout governmental intervention. In 1956 a strike of 36 days 
resulted in the largest gain ever negotiated. waze increases 
aJ1ounted to 29 cents over the contract's three year term along 
with fringe benefits costing 17 cents and a cost-of-living 
clause which has finally cost about another 17 cents over the 
period--a total of about 62~ cents. While official governmental 
intervention was absent, rumors were widespread about "behind 
the scene pressure" to settle in an election year. A. H. Raskin, 
in the Sunday New York Times, July 26, 1959 pointed out that: 
'l1he only big steel strike of the Eisenhower 
administration was the five week tie-up in 1956. 
At that time the White rlouse avoided any public move, 
but it suprlied the decisive push for an accord through 
a series of behind-the-scene maneuvers •. Secretary of 
Labor Ja!nes P. Iviitchell arranged a private meeting 
between David J. rv:c::::Onald, ""resident of the union, 
and the heads of the largest steel companies. v~hen the 
companies refused to meet the settlement terms the 
union had in mind, a few telephone calls from George 
Humphrey, then Secretary of the Treasury and now ' 
chairman of National ~teel, persuaded them to go 
higher. The resulting contract brought the union 
the greatest gains in history--a total of 62i cents 
per hour over three years. The companies raised 
prices $21 a ton over the same period. 
Government influence appears to imrease the rate of 
increase in waees in the steel industry. The industry is 
too important nationally to permit too much resistance by the 
companies. The government may appear to be neutral in labor 
affairs by permitting lesser uniom and industries to battle 
for themselves, but when large powerfvl unions are involved in 
dlsputes with large powerful companies, tre effect on the 
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national economy is not so masked and the news media display 
more prominently the course and effect of negotiations. 
Public awareness forces governmental action to settle as a 
mediator as quickly as possible. 'rhe overall effect may be 
to ·;.iden the wage s true ture. Sooner or later the widening 
results in "coercive comparisons,'' and shorj_ng up the oottom 
occurs as agitation builds up pressure to raise mi1i-num wE~es 
or to preserve a group 1 s posi ticn in the economy by sue h tl-:ings 
as farm programs. Without consciously attempting to do so, 
ot~1er e_overnmental expenditures also serve to prevent too much 
widening from occurring.l 
lA substantial portion of the funds devoted to research 
and development comes from govJrnmental expenditures. Thus 
a significant growth in sGlaried professional personnel has 
occur:Ped. Federal aid to hiL.her education through student 
loans for graduate training also adds to this supply. Thus 
increased employment opportunities arise wruch enable an 
individual to qualify for professional work. The supply of 
labor available for production work is less than it might 
have been and the wa.~e s true t.ure is preventt}d from widening 
too much. 'I'he table below provides the data. 
TABLE 19 
PERC.'.!;l\'I' DISTRiiJUTIOL CJF' PEH~:iOl\S EhFLOYED II\ lvAl .. lJ-
I•,ACTTJHD.G, EY hiAJOR OCCUPA'1'IONAL GR~)UPS, 
1952-1957 
Professional, s:'echnical and 
Kindred Workers 
~anagers, Officials and 
Proprietors 
Clerical and Kindred Workers 
Sales ;Norkers 
Craftsmen, Fore~en and 
1952 
5.4 
5.2 
11.5 
2.4 
Kindred Workers 19.8 
Operatives and Kindred ,ijorkers45.5 
Laborers and Service ~orkers 10.2 
TOTAL 100.0 
Source: U.S., Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
1957 
7.4 
5.4 
12.1 
2.8 
19.4 
43.9 
9.0 
100.0 
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'rhere is obvious d:i fficul ty in assessing the effect 
of government in relation to the effect of independent market 
power. However, even if Government is weighted heavily in 
its influence, it appears that the market structure of the 
labor and product markets are necessary permissive conditions 
for the operation of the waF:e price spiral in the absence of 
excess demand. 
Sum.'nary of Conclusions 
1) From 1947 to 1958 the steelworkers received wage increases 
of ~1.44 per hour o~ 100.1 percent. Ko other industry 
grouping was as successful, even thour:'h comparison is Y!1S.de 
wi t.b the most W.ghly paid other indus tries. Of seven teen 
industries examined in 1947, nlne had greater average 
hourly earnings than steel while in 1958 only three earned 
lareer amounts. In 1940 about 15 percent of manufacturing 
workers were in indus tries having hourly earnin[cS higher 
than steel. By 1959 only 0.15 percent were higher. The 
ratio of steel average hourly earnings to all manufacturing 
was 1.16 to 1 in 1947 and 1.35 to 1 in 1959. 'rhis record 
does not appear to be a catching-up process. From 1929 
In every category the wr.J.te collar worker occv.pies a larger 
percentage of total manufachlring employment than he did in 
1952 wlnle for the pro due ti on worker· the opposite is true. 
Of course, gover~'nental expenditure on research and develop-
ment is not the scle cause of th~s change, but it has contributed 
to it. 
Salaried income in manufacturing rose from ~~10. 7 billion 
in 1947 to $27.6 billion in 1959, or 157.6 percent. ~sge worker 
income rose from ~31.8 billion to ~56.7, or 78.5 percent. 
h:ost of' the salaried gain was due to increased employment, rising 
from 2.5 million in 1947 to 3.9 in 1959. Wage workers decreased 
in total fro~ 12.7 to 12.3 million over the same period. 
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to 1947 steel wages rose about the sa~e as the average for 
all industries. If 1939 is selected as the base normal year, 
steel wages were the highest that they had ever been in 
relation to all manufacturing. By 1958 this relation-
ship was restored, and by 1959 steel had forged ahead 
to a position superior to that of any other previous period in 
h.ts tory. 
2) Tightness of the labor market in the areas in which steel 
competes does not offer a satisfactory explanation of the 
rise in steel wag;es. The following evidence supports this 
conclusion. 
a) In twelve key cities containing steel plants, moderate 
or substantial une::.nployrnent existed over the period. 
These ste·3l centers had the same or lower classifications 
of labor surplus as the country as a whole. 
b) A falling quit rate and rising layoff rate in steel 
also indicated an incr~asing labor surplus. 
c) Total employment of steel production workers rose 
from 517.6 thousand to 537.9 thousand from 1947 to 
1958, a~:gain of only 20.3 thousand or 3.9 percent, while 
ingot tonnage rose by 38.6 percent. '.I'he most significant 
aspect of total employment over the interval was its 
stability. In view of the relatively small increase 
in -otal employment and the rel~tively high wage rate 
structure of steel, no significant hiring problems were 
encountered. 
c) l1D.e trend of averaEe hours worked per week per employee 
ws.s dovm. if the 1952 strike year and the 1954 recession 
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are excluded fro::l the data. A rise in output and demand 
for labor could be met by incree.sing the work week above 
the 37.2 hours of 1957, insulating the incus try from labor 
market pressures. 
e) For key maintenance jobs in steel, comparisons with 
inter-industry rates for similar jobs in 18 steel-making 
cities indicated that steel rates were the sane or higher 
than those in ever~r city surveyed, or were exceeded in 
only one city. ~!ill po~twar steel bargaining often 
included incre~ent adjustments for specific job classes 
in acidi tion to the general increases won. 'r~1e se adjust-
.:nents were more than enough to bring steel jobs in 
line with comparable jobs in local labor silarke ts. It 
should be noted that many steel jobs have no counter-
part in industry anyway and that tnis, coupled with a 
rapid promotion from within policy, lessens labor market 
pressures. 'rhese pressures are also reduced by wage 
administration at the company rather than the plant 
level. 'l'~ms advantage is not taken of a local labor 
market in which comparable rates are lovier. ~Che saving 
in cost is not worth the resulting poor bargaining 
relationships and whip-sawlng that would occur in markets 
where the union was strong. 
f) The incraasec wages cannot be accounted for in any 
substantial manner by an increased skill composition 
in steel works. From 1954 to 1959 the incrsase in 
employment in t;1.e higi.1.er job categories increased earnings 
by roughly 2~ cents out of the 88 cents total increase. 
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From 1947 to 1959 the increased skill composition oi' the 
work force accounted for about six cents of t:ne *~1.44 
won. 
3) Demand factors are also inadequate to explain the magnitude 
of the wa~e increases satisfactorily. 
a) To tal physical ou tpnt rose about 33 percent over the 
period witn virtually no chance in the number of man-
hours worked by production workers. This increased out-
put per man-hour was a frequentl~/ cited source for 
deserved wa,2:e £'ains by the union. Since the wa_.:"e increase 
of 100.1 percent considerably exceeded the productivity 
advance per man-hour, unit labor costs per ton rose by 
approximately 50 percent, and steel prices increased 
by about the same amount as well. Steel prices rose 
from ~96.24 per ton (1947-49) to ~143.69 a ton in 1957, 
w~ile output rose from 77 million tons to 107 millicn 
tons. The Consumers' Price Index and the W!:'lole sale 
Price Index rose by less than half the steel price in-
crease. T~erefore~ the demand for steel shifted up 
and to t!le right. With evidence of an elastic labor 
supply facing the steel lndustry in the absence of a 
union which succeeded in establishing relatively high 
wa[xe rates and 1 abor costs per ton, it appears that 
tne increased demand for ste,,l could have been taken 
as greater employment and output if costs had not been 
driven up so sharply. Sufficient idle capacity, especi-
ally in the latter part of the period, existed to expand 
output substantially. 
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b) The rate of utilization of capacity is a measure of the 
relation between potential supply and current demand, 
especially short-run demand. In the later ye~:rs of the 
period, the trend. was dovm ln the operating rate; and the 
values at the peaks of prosperity were somewhat lower. 
The extent and duration of recessions worsened. 
c) Unfilled orders also indicate the state of demand. 
Prom 1952 to 1959 the trend in the ra tlo of unfilled 
orders to sales deteriorated. 
It appears that if a pull on prices had been exerted by 
an increased demand for steel, this rull should have been 
weakening, and hence cannot fully exrlain the very steady 
upward trend in steel prices. ':/hen the operat5_ng rate fell 
and was low, prices not only failed to decrease; but they 
eventually increased. 
4) ':2he influence of the government in steel wage determination 
is difficult to assess, especially in relationship to inde-
pendent market power. 'l'he only firm conclusion possible 
is that even if the government is weighted heavily in a 
nationally important industry, the marlfet structure of the 
labor and f'roduc t markets are necessary permissive conditions 
for tt1e operation oi' a wa;c~e price spiral in the absence 
of excessive demand. 
CHAPTER III 
WAGES, UNIT LABOR COSTS AND PRICES 
IN BASIC STEEL 
In the hypothesis it was asserted that in ~ period of moder-
ate inflation, the steelworkers' union is able to extract econ-
omic concessions much more rapidly than productivity increases; 
thus unit labo~ costs must rise rather sharply. Therefore, it 
is the purpose of this chapter to examine the magnitude of the 
rise in unit labor costs and to compare these with the increase 
in steel prices. In addition, the chapter attempts to make a 
contribution to the available data on steel prices and labor 
costs per unit by criticizing present indexes and devising 
new ones which are more accurate. 
The procedure of the chapter is as follows: 
1) A discussion concerning the problem of measurement 
concerning productivity increases serves to introduce 
the factors which must be considered. 
2) A criticism of both the American Iron and Steel 
Institute and the Bureau of Labor Statistics Indexes 
on unit labor coats and on steel prices is proviged. 
because it fails to account for the rapid growth of 
fringe benefit costs plus the growth in the proportion 
of salaried workers to production workers in the steel 
industry. The price indexes are criticized for failure 
3) 
to take account of the change in 
steel product mix 
' 
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various extra charges, and other factors. Thus existing 
unit labor cost indexes d 
are un erstated and steel price 
indexes are overstated. 
Revised indexes are calculated · 
which correct for the 
deficiencies briefly described above. The revised 
"implicit-realized price" index is then compared with the 
revised unit labor cost index in order to indicate the 
direction and relative magnitude of the changes on. a 
year by year basis. 
The Problem of Measurement 
To answer questions about the t 
movemen of costs in the steel 
industry with reasonable accuracy, it i~ necessary to consider pro-
blems of definition and measurement. On f 
e o the very great diffi-
culties is that most measures have a number of limitations that are 
often neglected in the battleground of words about what has happened 
or will happen. 
Labor productivity is one of the measures that may be loosely 
used in discussions. 
"output per man-hour" 
of Labor Statistics. 
Until recently, the most common measurement was 
of production workers, published by the Bureau 
One of the limitations of this measure is 
that the proportion of non-production staffs bas been rapidly 
growing, i.e., white collar personnel, research and development 
workers, etc. As a result, the index of output per man-hour of 
production workers has an upward bias and does not reflect total 
employee productivity.l 
lSee TABLE 57 for man-hours worked in steel for production 
workers and salaried workers from 1947-1958 along with the output 
in tons per production worker man-hour and production worker and 
salaried worker man-hours combined. TABLE 60 shows this informa-
tion as indexe a. 
In steel, salaried personnel have increased relative to 
production workers. If they command relatively higher rates 
of pay, and it is agreed that higher paid man-hours contribute 
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However, it .11ay be argued that some non-production 
wor>·ers, such as those en;::.aged in research and development, 
are not contributing to "current" output. In as nmch as 
t!1ese workers are an increas~' ~-1[::; :r:;ror:ortion oi' t:ne total, there 
is a c.ownward. bias to output per man-hour ;:1easures that include 
all .nan-r1ours. 
It is generally well realized that output per man-hour 
does not necessarily measul'e the contribution of workers to 
more thar. lower paid man-hours to production, it really means 
ail incre.ase in the c1uanti ty of labor input which man-hours 
alone does not me~sure. 
l'or example, the number of production workers needed for 
each unit of output in the :Federal .i\e serve Board's index of 
indus trial pro due t:!-on of the Lepar·trnent of Commerce's figures 
on Gross ~ational ~reduct in constant dollars--a measure of 
volume--has fallen by 25 percent in the eiE;ht years from 1951 
to 1959. ~n-,..ile production of durable goods rose 27 percent, 
the num: er of worJ;ers making them fell by 511,000. 'i'his is 
a r:ain in efficiency of 3.2 percent per year. but these 
ficures deal only with production workers. With non-production 
workers included, the number of workers for each unit of output 
fell only 19.9 percent for durable goods and 21.5 percent for 
non-durables. .~.·his is a gain in efficiency of about 2.9 percent 
a year, or less. In June, 1951, there were 7,533,000 production 
wor:{ers on durable goods. iwi th the index of durable goods pro-
c.uction of the .J.<ederal Reserve board at 129, the number of workers 
f:>r each unit was 58,200. I:c. June, 1953, ti1e number of workers 
rose to 8,313,000 but output was 154; so the numberfbi' each 
unit fell to 54,000. 
In .Tune of 1958, the number of workers dropped to 6, 350,000 
and output to 139; so t~1e number of workers slipped to 45,000 
for each unit in the index. In April of 1959, the index of 
durable goods stood at 164 and there were 7,022,000 production 
workers. .l.{lus, the number of wor1.-::ers for each unit was 43,800. 
From June of 19E1 to April of 1959, tne employed working 
force rose by 3,2og,ooo while production·,. orkers in durables 
rose by 165,000, and on non-durables fell by £51,000. 'I'he 
resu.lting hicher proportion on non-production workers th3refore 
exerts a considerable influence on productj __ vi ty if included and 
more realistically measures the productivity advances that take place 
'I'he foregoing statistical material C.oes not take into account 
the role of contract cons true ti on worker·s. It is possible for 
so;ne of these workers to be included in the catee;ories of production 
or non-production workers rather than in investment categories when 
plant is expanded. 
•_; ~-
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clwnges in efficiency. narder work and greater skill can 
raise output per man-hour, but the increase may also occur as 
a result of improved and hicher quality ~·urchased materials 
or because of an inc:r-· ase in the ratio of mater:i als to final 
output. It is most likely, however, that technological charl[·e 
is tr1e most important source of imreased rutput.per man-hour.l 
If output per man-hour ris s s because more capital i,s used, 
rresumably the added outp1..1t is not available for raising real 
w as until the costs of using ·t~e acdtt:L t:tonal capital have 
been met. Output per unit of capltal and labor combined is 
a measure of the gains available for distribution. -~.he fact 
that the output-capital ratio has generally risel-" less than 
the output-labor ratio has risen rre ans tnat capital per unit 
' of labor input has risen, and the effect of rising overall 
productive efficiency has been offset in part by the substi-
tution of capital for labor. Since 1900, the supply of capital 
has risen considerably faster than the supply of labor; 2 so 
that capital per worker ros~ about one percent per year. 
lHecent studies stress the roJe of technology by pointing 
out that economic growt'l and efficiency depend upon invest-
ment in tangible physical capital, but that this investment 
is ultimately dependent upon innovation. Considera:.:;le sign-
ificance is therefore placed upon investment in human capital 
be ca. u ;:;e present-day improvements in tee hnology are extremely 
complex and the "inventor-tinkerer" is no longer capable of 
initiating commercially significant innovations. 'i'eam research 
is the currently accepted mode of attack. See Irving Siegel, 
"The Role of Scientific Research in Stimulsling Economic Pro-
gress," American Economic Reyiew, Papers and Proceedings, L 
(May, 1960) p. 340-46. 
2ses John Fendrick, "Productivit~ 7 Costs and Prices: 
and :.~easures," in Wa;;_e~frices, Profits and Produc_tivity, 
American Assembly, June, 1959, p. 37-59. 
Concepts 
'I' he 
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Earnings on capital, of course, are expressed as interest 
rates or yields and hence are already stated in r·eal terms. 
Price level rises are reflected in the smaller quantity of 
pnys ical capital that can ·!Je bought with a dollar of money 
capital. Suppliers of debt capital do not appear to have 
shared in the fruits of risinf_' productivity of labor and capital 
because the yields on corporate bonds are lower now than in the 
period from 1913 to 1929.1 '::1he interest component of national 
income changed from 6.5 percent in 1929to 3. 5 percent in 1947 . 
'J.'~1is may sugGest the use of labor power to increac:e its share 
at the expense of capital unless it can be shown that an increase 
ir· the stoc)· of tangible capital r•elative to labor input has off-
set the rising average productivity of capital as measured by 
ti·1e ratio of output to capital inputs. Returns on capital should 
not haYe risen, economic theory suggests, if an additional ur,it 
of capital contributes no more to output today or even less than 
it did fifty years ago. Productivity gains would be distributed 
as nigher wnges or lower product pr:Lces and thus wovld appear 
in a real we e index.2 
Dif'ficul ties of measurement exist in tryint_ to determine 
how much of a gain in productivi t:l is due to a more skilled 
better-trained v:ork force and how muc :l_ is due to improved and 
better tools. Ean-hours cannot be combined wit!: dollars of 
tangible capital without transls.ting eaci:1 of them into comparable 
li:avid Durar.d, ='P. sic Yields of Corporate iJonds, Hew York, 1942. 
2see A. Rees, "Patterns of Viages, Prices, and Productivity," 
in Wafes, Prices, Prof~_ts and 1-'roducttv:ttv, I'he A'Tierican Assembly, 
June, 1959, p. 11-35. 
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units. '11he appropriate unit used has been a dollar's worth of 
service in a reference base year. If a man-hour of labor 
com:nands ~~2 in the base period; and ~:·100 of capital equipment, 
i.e., tangible capital,commands ~;·6 of net revenue per year 
(whether in rent, profj_ts or otherwiseis1nmatEirlal;:) the ~100 
of equipment is counted as equivalent to three man-hours. 
Lecause in production, use is ':lade of many more man-hours than 
even hundreds of dollars of capital, labor is weighted more 
heavily. .1.'he weights are currently eight to two for the private 
economy.l l'his method of measurement may be more satisfactory 
for the economy as a whole than for an industry like steel. 
:.;onopoly power may mLse the net revenue, and r'lence make it appear 
that the contribution of capital to efficiency in resource 
utilization is hlgher than it really should be. 
If, in steel, man-l'lours of both salarled and production 
workers are jncluded and both together represent close to 
40 percent of total costs, real product per unit of labor input 
will not diverge greatly from total factor productivity measures.2 
In oil, for example, capital and materials inputs would over-
shadow the labor element completely. 
Another measurement problem lies in the question of using 
"man- hours worked" or "man- hours paid for." In as much as 
vacation pay, holiday pay, _pensions, insurance, supplementary 
ur1employment benefits, wash-up time, coffee- time, call-in time 
and other fringes have increased significantly in the past 
lsee Solomon Fabricant, Basic Facts of Productivit 
(New York: l\latlonal .Gureau of Economic F.:esearch, 1959 • 
2Kendrick, 0~. Cit., p. 41. 
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decade or two, pay for hours not worked may be as hi.gh as 25 
percent of wage rates. Hence output per man-hour worked may 
have an upw::ocrd bias a·s a measure of :productivity or a down-
wsrd bias as a measure of labor cost per unit of output. 
Use of a "man-hours paid for" index would reduce the 
rate of increase in labor efficiency and output per "man-hour 
raid for" would rise less rapidly than output per 11 ma:p.-hour 
worked." Conversely, labcr cost per unit of output wot:.ld rise 
faster if "man-hours paid for" are used rather than "man-hours 
worked." 'l'his chapter will examine output in ingot tons of 
steel for man-hours worked for both production workers and salaried 
workers separately and also combined. In computing unit labor 
costs first, pay for hours worked will be examined alone, and 
then a unit labor cost index will be computed using all fringe 
costs as well for ·:::o th salaried and production workers in steel. 
An increasing proportion of time paid for but not worked can be 
shown as an increase ln averace earnings per man-hour over and 
above increases in wa,:_e rates as sue h. 
l!.'ven with all of the associated problems of measurement, 
indexes of output per ~an-hour can ve useful if limftations 
are kept in mind. Inclusion of salaried worker man-hours improves 
ti:leir usefulness. In computing unit labor cost indexes, iJ.ours 
paid for, but not worked, must be included for both production 
and salaried personnel. As indicators of the efficiency of 
labor inputs, output per man-hour indexes do not have a generally 
large bias because labor input is the preponderant component 
of value added. 'l'hose industries that show the largest increases 
in output per man-hour generally also show the largest gains in 
total productivity. 
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From period to period the bias may differ. Kendrick, 
for example, shows that from 1Jl9 to 1957, total factor pro-
ductivity increased by 2.1 percent per year and that this just 
exactly equaled the amou.nt for 1948-1957. Yet output per man-
hour rose by 2. 4 percent from 1919 to l957 and 3.1 percent 
from 1948 to 1957. In other words, when output per man-hour 
accelerated in 1947 to 1957, it did not mean that the rate of 
advance in total productivity had accelerated. It reflects 
a higher rate of substitution of capital for labo!"· as invustment 
grew significantly after ';'.'orld ;,;ar II. 'rhe addi tior~s to the 
labor sup_rly in the 20-64 year old age group were declining 
in tn.e dec ace of the 1950 1 s and machinery was substituted easily 
as investment was stimulated by high liE;tuidity and low interest 
rates. When the high birth rate of the 1940's :rroduces additions 
to the work force after 1965 in an accelerated fashion, and 
less liquidity raises .interest rates and has a relatively adverse 
effect on investment, it is likely that output per man-hour 
gains will be smaller than total factor productivity increases. 
r::'he bias will be in the other cirec tion if labor is subs ti tu ted 
for capital. 
Therefore, it :ts ti1e purpose of thj_s chapter to explore 
t::1e course of la·~.:;or costs in basic steel over the period 1947 
to 1958 by keeping in mind some of the limitations in measurement 
discussed at.ove. In other words, in order to compare satisfactorily 
t\1.e course of labor costs per unit of steel proc:uced with chan.~es 
in the price of steel from 1947 to 1958, it is believed that 
significantly different r•esults can be achieved by revising the 
labor cost and also the steel price indexes currently in use. 
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~LS and AISI Production Indexes 
There are two indexes which are available for measuring 
j_ron and s tee 1 overall r·ro d1.1.c :;ioh. The Bureau of' Labor .)ta tis-
tics has devised a formula V.'·1icr1 ::r.easures production in blast 
fv_rnaces, steelworks and rolling mills.l I'h:Ls is tne index 
used by the Senate Subco:nmi ttee on ;\nti-Trust and tonopoly 
(Kefauver Com;nittee) to compute la'::lor cpsts per unit of steel. 
'I'he other main index used is that published by the American 
Iron and Steel Institute. Only in~ot production is rreasured 
anc_ all large ing:ot pl~oducers are ~ncluded. '.rhus the data cover 
from 90.~ to 95.2-:r:.,e:::cent of the total int,ot r~roduction since 
1947.2 
The data for these two indexes are pre sen ted in the 
table below. It shows that th.e two indexes are much alike 
in their move~nent. The BLS Index seems to run slightly h.igD.er 
than that of the AISI. In each case, from 1947 to 1957, steel 
in.:::ot prodt'C tion increased about 33 percent. 
'')l.e Yefauver Committee w~s interested in a production 
index because it is r'equireC: in order to calcula. te if the labor 
cost per unit of output were rising faster or slower than 
prices. T'n.us the blame for steel price inflation could be 
r-laced on the companies or the union. f,l.e r:efauver Committee 
lu.s., Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin No. 1200, 
Septe;nber, 1956. This bulletin presents a yardstick for ~easuring 
blast furnace, steel worlcs, and rollln8: mill product::.on but fails 
to measure the a.ctivi ties of other de:rartments involved ~n steel 
proc.uc tion. 
2t.,o o t:1er part of s tee 1 inc: us try ac ti vi ty is covered although 
all other ac ti vi ties as a whole are like1y to .'Jea.r a close relation-
ship to tll.e industry's or..ly common denomiuator, ingot production. 
produced the results shown in TABLE 20 below. 
TABLE 20 
INGOT PRODUCTION INDEX 
I!I.DBX 1947-49 • 100 
AISI AISI BLS 
Years Index P:roduc tiona Index 
1947 101.4 77.707 100.7 
1948 105.5 80,575 106.0 
1949 93.1 71,655 9~.2 
1960 115.6 89,020 118.2 
1961 125.6 96,0~ 12a.a 
1952 110.9 86,8!8 113.1 
1953 133.2 105,522 132.9 
1954 105.4 8~,685 106.6 
1955 139.7 110,208 140.6 
1956 137.2 107,670 138.6 
1957 1~4.6 107,264 133.4 
1958 101.8 81,193 102.1 
Sou~ce: American Iron and Steel Institute, ~1nual 
Report&J and the BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS 
&Ingot production in thousands ot tone. 
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It was obv1oua to the committee that atd prices ttoae every 
year regardless of the price index uaed while in two year~ labor 
coat per unit ot output for production workers 1'ell (1950 and 
1955). Steel prices roae even in recession whln unused capacity 
was W.gb.. It waa equally obvious to :the committee that trom the 
1947-49 base to 1958, labor coats per unit ot output tor pro• 
duotion workers rose by 4:7 .e percent w:·;ile steel price a roae 
78.9 percent (Iron Age Index) or by 82.3 percent (BLS Price Index). 
The committee concluded that aince prices rose much taster than 
Year 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
':'ABLE 21 
Il\DB..,'\ OF Di~.LC tiEECT ~·~A~;E COSTS 
:F' _.H ,-J.)T!RLY E~L?LCYEES ONLY 
(1947-49 = 100) 
Index of Unit 
f'irect Wage 
Costs for Pro-
duction Workersa 
Iron A&·e 
Price Indexb 
Sources: 
93.4 
102.3 
104.3 
9f; .3 
109.1 
110.6 
119.0 
124.3 
120.0 
126.7 
135.8 
147.8 
89.0 
101.4 
109.6 
114.0 
122.0 
125.1 
13;).4 
139.2 
146.9 
158.2 
171.2 
178.9 
102 
::-;I.S Fri ce 
-- - c 
_r_naex 
89.1 
101.3 
109.7 
115.2 
124.5 
127.2 
136.9 
142.8 
149.5 
162.1 
174.3 
182.3 
aFrom Kefauver Committee, U.S., Congress, Senate, 
Senate Report i'<o. 1387, 85th Congress, 2nd Sess. harch 13, 
1958. 
b=:o:le Iron ALe Index j_s a weigi:1ted :tndex based 
or: the prices of hot rolled steel bars, shapes, plates, 
wire, rails; black pipe, and hot and cold rolled sheets 
and strip. 
C'J'he BLS Price Index is also weighted and based 
on the prices of rails, tie plates, ra~lway axles, freig1t 
car wheels, plates, shapes, bR.rs, hot and cold rolled 
s~'leets, electrical sheets, hot and cold rolled strip, 
cold rolled stainless strip, black pipe and galvanized 
pipe. Prices include mill base prices and typical extras 
and deduction~. 
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labor cost per unit of ov tpu t for production workers, the price 
increases coulc. not r_,e justified on the basis of increased 
wages due to bargaining; power by the union. In seven of the 
years the price increase exceed(3d the per unit production worker 
labor cost increase, in tr1.ree years it was sli::c·ntly smaller, and 
in one year it was the sam3. It appears fro-~a the table that in 
the late 1940's the steel companies succeeded in pusning prices 
up :J;.UCh faster than production worker labor costs per unit 
rose, w1ile in the latter part of the period they did not enjoy 
quite the same degree of success. T~1e ccnm1i ttee also claimed 
that under standard cost pricin:!, profits would rise as the indus-
try approached capacity operations because the table shows that 
actv.al costs would. be below standard costs with increased efLLci-
ency. For example, the labor cost index fell from 124.3 in 1954 
to 120.0 in 1955. In 1955 the operating rate was 93 percent of 
capacity; w::-ll le in 1954 it was only 71 percent. 
~ihile t~1ere are serious critic isms of the Kefauver ConL-ni ttee 
approach., the data of th_e committee s11own in the previous tables 
are graphed in FIGCRB; 5 , page 104 . 
Criticisms of .0LS ANd AISI Prtce and Labor Cost Indexes 
·--------
It is obvious that severe criticisms may be levied a,.ainst 
both t;1e price and la~:;or cost indexes shown. 
1) The BLS Index is computed so1ely from wa~es paid to 
:production workers, i.e., t~:1.e a1.•era,::e hourly earnings of hourly 
workers. Included in earnin~:s are avera2~e pay for hours wor>ed, 
shift differentials, Sunciay premiums (since Septenber 1, 1956), 
and premit,ms for holidays worl<:ed (since 1952). Excluded are 
.,. 
jljO 
It I:EX OF' l'T<I'r :C·L=1.ECT WAGE COS'.::'S 
F'OR 1Dt::1LY .!i~LPLOYEES 
U,.;it J..A-~o~ CotT ( Dt'~.-cT l,A.iAGE (o~t~) 
Foa Hounl't \,vonl<~ru 
.. "'•"' "''" ..1=tto...., A G.f" Sf£EL Pllt'(t ..:r-..,d..tl" 
...... 1.. .. 
Source: 'rABL8 21, Page 102 • 
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vacation pay, pay for :aolic.ays worked, pensions, social security, 
:lns<lrance, Sllpplemen tary une:r11ploymen t benefits, and some minor 
retroactive adjustments. In ot~1er words, the BLS figures 
represent pa:y for :'lours actually worked. ~lnce other b·::;nefits 
i1ave 2)one up at a startling rata from 10.1¢ per hour tn 1951 
to 57.8¢ per hot"r in 1958, the labor cost per unit of output 
developed by BLS and us ad by the :Kefauver Commi ttea is substan-
tially understated. l,~anap;e:nent probably takes ti:lese frint;e 
benefit costs into accourt in pricing policies. Productivity 
per man-hour is overstated if man-~1ours workec are used rati:1er 
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than man-_,ours p·aid for. 
2) ~i:1e BLS index on Uilit lauor costs also fails to inclt·de 
any part of the costs of salaried personne 1 and hence snould 
appropriately be labelled an "Index of Unit Direct ~age Costs 
For Production ·~;orl{ers. 11 1'ha t t ne employment of salaried 11e lp 
has .become significant is indicated by a growth in man-hours 
wQrked from 255.7 million in 1947 to 344.1 million in 1957, 
while the millions of man-hours worked by hourly workers was 
virtually constant. 'r~e ratio of hourly employee 1 s hours 
worked was 5.1 in 1947 and 3.7 in 1957. If manare:-11ent takes trlis 
factor into account in pricing steel, the BLS index of unit labor 
cost would be too low. Salaried workers probably include those 
on researc~ and development. If tl~y do not contribute to current 
output, they sl1ould probably not be included in an index of unit 
labor costs. 1o data is available concerning ~hese workers in 
the s tee 1 indus try in order to adjust for them. However, in 
view of the large numbers of produc t~~on workers, it is not likely 
that the significance of research and development personnel is 
overly important. 
3) 'rhe price indexes also appear to be deficient. 'l'he 
BLS and AISI price indexes were initially at 89.1 and 89.0 
respectively in 1947 (1947-49 - 100) and rose to 174.3 and 
171.2 respectively by 1957. T:lUs the BLS index has ·neen con-
sistently slightly higher than that used by AISI. Both indexes 
are concerned only with the price of finished steel products. 
Intermediate and by-products and their price changes are omitted. 
'J:'his had the effect of increasing the cost of coke, pig iron, 
and steel pro duets through a decrease in the by-product credit 
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attributable to coke oven gas. 
4) 'The Iron Age Price Index utilizes a r;ase period w~1lch 
is an avera~;e of the years 1937-1940 and 1946-48. But the 
product mix has changed to a considerable degree since then. 
In 1957, 29 percent of the shipments of the ten products which 
measure the Iron Age Index had changed in classification in 
comparison to the classifications during the base dates.l 
Some of this change is due' to naw developments in quality standards 
and part of :tt is due to a different composition of the demand 
for steel products whichms measurably altered the nature of the 
s tee 1 business. 
5) An often ,nade criticism of price indexes consists of 
the charge ti:1at quality c:hanges ar·e not reflected. JL-rnong 
users of steel products, cesigners have attempted to avoid 
paying extras by developing techniques which enabled tne 
ordering of steel to exact decimal thic 1<ness. Yet Iron A2~e 
I 
standards have not been changed. \Vhen thickness tolerances 
become more stringent, the steel companies may discover that 
additional costs accrue in trying to meet the new standards, 
or that cost rises bacause rejects increase in number and must 
be sold as secondary material at lower prices. ~xamples 
will be given in this chapter to illustrate this change. 
6) BLS and AISI indexes are concerned mainly with the base 
lrrhe Iron Age Index is a weignted average of the base 
prices of ten major ste.:;l products which accor,nt for the maj-
ority of finis ned steel shipments, weighted by the percentaf:,e 
that each of these products is to the total finished steel 
shipments during the base period. '.Vhe products are hot rolled 
bars, structural shapes, plates, rails, black pipe, wire, hot 
and cold rolled sheets and strip. 
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price of certain steel products. The BLS Index does try to 
incorporate 11 typical extras and deductions." Publi s i1.ed prices 
in steel frequently deviate from actual prices and actual 
steel prices are not easy to obtain. Extras are additions 
to the base price for spedifications other than those 
supplied at the base price. The base price is established for 
a particulal' i tern in a particular quantity; if the customer 
specifies another size, gauge, chemical or physical property 
or quantity, an "extra" is charged. A srudy of the prices of 
eight steel products showed that extras varied from 1~ percent 
to 35 percent with an average of 14.3 percent of the delivered 
price, while freight costs averaged-about 6.8 percent of the 
delivered price.l 
1u· S ·:1 f' L . St ti ti C p· i f •• , bureau o .aoor · a s cs, onsumers r ces o 
Steel Products, 1943, p. 131. 
TAJLE 22 
HA'rlOS OF BASE PHIC3, :J;XTRAS AND F'REIGHT TO D:ELlVEHEL PRICZ 
OF ET3 dT srrE.h.'L PHODUCTS, APRIL 1939 TO APRIL 1942 
Base 
Product Price Extras Freight 
Hot-rolled Sheets 74.6)b 19.8% 5.6% 
Cold-rolled Sheets 89.6 5.8 4.6 
Hot-rolled Strip 75.2 17.8 7.0 
Cold-rolled 3trip 60.0 35.0 5.0 
!;:erchant bars 87.1 6.0 6.9 
Cold-finished .Jars 69.8 25.3 4.9 
Plates 86.3 3.3 10.4 
Structural Snapes 88.8 1.5 9.7 
Average 78.9 14.3 6.8 
Source: "I,abor Depart;nent Examines Consumer 1 s Prices of 
steel Products," Tr1e Iron Age, April 25, 1946, p. 119. 
r 
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l''or ti1.e indus try u enerally, extras hav 0 be come an incre as-
• 
ingly significant factor and are particularl~r important to the 
smaller more specialized flrms. 'L1e la. tter concentrate on 
special steels in small quantities for which extras are 
frequently greater than the published price. \¥hen the market 
is more compe ti ti ve or in recession, reductions from .r;;ublis hed 
prices are made in the form of "discounts," waiving of extra 
charges or other concessions.l As capacity operations are 
reached, these concess'ons are dropped, thereb~r inc:r•easing 
actual prices paid until they approached or exceeded published 
prices. Prom 1938 to 1941, actual prices paid were esti::nated 
lBusiness \,eek, August 16, 1958, p. 30. In the middle of 
August, 1959, a recession year, steel was raisins its prices 
except for sta:tnless steel. rrae latter appes.rs to have encoun-
tered severe competition in many product uses from other ~ater­
ials such as aluminum. U.S. Steel cut the price of stainless 
by ~JlOO a ton. Along with the cut went some changes in pric-
ing policy. 'I'raditionally, steGl warehousers and ,jobbers who 
sell much of t:C1e nation's stainless get a discount from the 
mills--10% on the sta:tnless they stock and sell and 5% on sta5.nless 
they se 11 but do not s tocl{. rrhe discounts were je tti sone d 
in the· soft market because the selling warehousers could use 
them to undercut the mill price on big orders that would 
ordinarily go to the mills. Since warehouse activity is made 
up rrimarily of small order business, the averat::e sale of 
stainless plate being under 1,000 pounds, U.S. Jteel reduced 
fro:n 10,000 to 5, 000 pounds t~1e minimum order W£lich a ware 1ouse 
had to place before it paid an extra. 'rhis procedure helps 
to build the Mnd of business the producer likes best--big 
heavy prices. The <1,.100 cut applied to all grac.es, vih.ch 
varied in price fo rrn <:1)700 to ~.;-1, 500 a ton • 
.Dusiness .• eek, January 23, 1960, p. 38, reported that in 
St. Louis u.S. ~teel invsstlgated for six vveeks to find nprice 
skirmis~ling in the frinse area between mill prices and established 
schedules." ?his is a f'ormal way of saying that warehousers 
W110 felt pinched v.ere trading away things such as extras and 
freight charges. U.S. Steel cut the local prices of hot finished 
bars and plates by ~.5.40 a ton, sheet :~;:5.60, and structurals 
~~7.20. Ar official of J. ·r. Ryerson, tr1e largest clo:~1estic w~3re-
c10use cl:lain said, "There has been prlce snipin[ all over the 
country for ~nore than a year." J:..:o other warehouse locations were 
affected. 
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to increase by 13 rercent for the whole industry anc. was l10tably 
larger for the in te,_sra ted producers. 1 
7) In 1948, t ~1.e ,nul tiple basing point sy _;tern was abolished 
and prices :.nust r:cow be quoted f.o.b. place of production • .;:)ut 
·under the Hobinson Patman /,ct freight absorption to meet com-
petition is permitted. Thus the realized price per ton to 
the mill can change without affecting the :dV::> or AISI base 
· prices. In prosperity freight absorption is less prevalent and 
realized prices rise. A geographical changa in shiprnents can 
also affect the ar,1ount of freight abo srbed and influence 
realized prices as well. In 1953-54 ana 1957-58, realized prices 
to tne mills were probably lower due to increased freight 
absorption.2 With the operating rate tending to reac~l lower 
levels in the latter part of the 1947-1958 period than in the 
early part of the period, this factor becomes more serious. 
'l'his question of freight aosorption, of course, is due to the 
geography of production and consumption. 
loffice of frice Administration, Studies In Industrial 
Price Control, 1947, p. 41. 
2u. s . ..::>teel Corporation, Annual Report, 1953, p. 12. 
11 1Jnder the the revised policy, rr. S • .:Jteel will continue to 
quote prices f.o.b. its mills, or if the customer so desires, 
it will quote delivered prices which reflect full transporta-
tion charges from shipping mill to destination. 'rhe revised 
policy, however, parmi ts the :r:1eeting of a lo..,ver celivered price 
of a competitor wh.en necessary and co:::nmercially desire able in 
order to participate in the busine s's of an individual ct:Etomer." 
••• This suggests that when. rivals expect oper'.ltions will 
be less than capacity, they are more disposed to undercut 
U.S. Jteel via frei2-)1t absorption. ·,1hile U.S. Steel would 
not initiate arq price shading, if it is threatened by a loss 
of customers, it would retaliate as necessary to keep them--
e.g., by freight absorption. 
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The output of steel is ferly cc-ncentrated--Chicago (rougnly 
2050, Pittsburg ( 40jb), .2irrningham ( 3- to 5/0. Steel prices 
are partly ex:r;:lainable by the fairly concentrated location of 
prodvction and widely scattered consumptlon. ~he largest 
consumjnc state is ,;lc~1.igan, but only about 20 percent of all 
-ste0l is consumed there, three-fourths of it in Detroit. Some 
areas produce far '1'lOre steel thar.. they consume, whlle ot~ers 
are net t~:rorters of steel. L''irms in areas producing a surplus 
nust :-natch the delivered prices of producers in shortage areas. 
·rbese buyers at a distance will patronize these firms only 
if their delivered prices do not exceed those asked by nearby 
sources. 'Co match the delivered prices of nills located 
near the buyers, distant mills must accept different 11 '11111 
nets" on individual sales for they will absorb varying 
amounts of freight .charges to sell in distant markets.l 
Revised Indexes of Labor Cost Per Unit 
As indica ted, two important qualifica tiona to the use of 
t~e Index of Labor Costs per unit developed by the Kefauver 
Co::uni ttee are that suprlementary benefits received by i1.ourly 
rated workers were .excluded alon~: with the impact of salaried 
worker costs. F'aiJ.Jre to include pay for t~_me not worked, i.e., 
to account for hours raid but not worked, tends to enhance the 
productivity gains of labor and to under a tate the ri sine labor 
costs per unit of output. Pensions, insurance, social security, 
supple men tal Uclemployment benefits, holiday pay, vsca tion pay, 
1 See G. Stigler, "A .rneory of Delivered Price Systems," 
runerican Economic heview (December, 1950} p. 1143-1159. His 
explanation rests upon the geographic instability of demand. 
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and some mir:..or adjustments all add to lator costs and salaried 
workers cannot be left out of the anal;Tsis either. !.'he table 
below presents t::1e magnitude of the chanses in these factors. 
TABLE 23 
SL.!f .i:'LE'·, S1\! TAL BE11&'l 'J:'S Al· I~ B.Ol'RS V10RKED 
(Cents per Hour) 
~~-i lli.ons 
Hours -.~i llions 
Year 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
Pensionsa Holidays 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
16.2 
16.9 
16.7 
17.3 
17.9 
21.3 
25.4 
29.9 
33.2 
2.4 
3.1 
2.3 
2.8 
3.8 
5.6 
Vacation 
Pay 
5.1 
5.4 
6.8 
P-.4 
7.0 
9.9 
9.5 
10.9 
10.5 
12.6 
14.7 
19.0 
Adjust-
ments 
.06 
.02 
.02 
.01 
.03 
.05 
.03 
.03 
.05 
.04 
.03 
.04 
Source: kmerican Iron and Steel Institute 
\iwrked, hours 
Salaried \'•or ked 
b Rourly 
255.7 1281.3 
269.8 1335 .• 4 
265.9 1134.8 
270.0 1291.2 
293.3 1434.7 
301.3 1252.9 
307.5 1416.5 
292.6 1139.1 
306.0 1317.4 
324.0 1291.9 
344.1 1284.2 
331.6 990.8 
aThis column includes pensions, insurance, Sub, social security. 
bThe salaried workers are classified by the AISI as non-
production workers. 
~Cl1e ta':Jle points out that suupplemental costs for hourly 
workers rose substantially from five cents per hour in 1947 to 
33.2 cents per hour in 1958, or an increase of 564 percent. 
The costs of holiday pay and vacation pay also rose slgnif'icantly. 
At the sarne time it ls apparent that the mJ.llions of hours 
worked in 1947 ( 1281.3 ;nillion hours) by hourly rated vvorkers 
remained at about t:J.e sa,ne level.cen years later in 1957 
( 1284.2 mlllion hours). 'I'he 1958 recession year is not a 
112 
good benchmark to use for this comparison. 'l'ne :--rtilltons of 
hours worked by salaried non-r;roduc ti on employees over the 
same period increased by 31 percent. Hence an increase 
ii ingot rrodvction ap:;>roaching 33 percent was achieved with 
virtually no chenge in the a·:nount of work offered by hourly 
employees plus an increase o.f 31 percent in hours worked of 
salaried e:>1ployees. Since the rat:to of hourly workers hot~rs 
worked to salaried wor1{ers hor:trs worked was 5.1 in 1947 and 
3.7 in 1957, it is apparent that some 84 percent of to"'::al 
la>or costs (both ho:,rly and salarj ed) was incurr8d by hourly 
rated employees; and thnt this proportion has decllned signi-
ficantly to about 77 percent. 
In its r::.EPORT ON PlDD~TSTIVIrJ:ry It 'I'H~~ BASIC S'T'EEL n·~~CS-
TRY, the Bureau of Labor Statistics discusses the problem as 
follows: 
~he ~roductivity trends descrjbed in this report 
are based on the employment and hours of production 
and related workers. As in many other inqustries, 
production workers have been declining relatively 
to all workers in recent years. According to 
BLS statistics, the proportion of production 
workers employment to total employment in the 
steel industry remained fairly constant between 
1939 ahd 1947, at 88.0 and 87.9 percent respect-
ively. However, the proportion dropped to 85.7 
percent between 1947 and 1955. 1 Consequently, 
1.source: For 1950-55, BLS Employment and Earnin,2:s, Annual 
Supplement Issue, June, 1956; for earlier years, summary s~eet 
for blast furnaces, steel works, and rolling mills, 1932-1950, 
February, 1953. Census figures for 1939 and 1947 show pro-
portions of 89.1 and 87.5 percent, respectively. Statistics 
of the &'TI.erican Iron and .Steel IDsti tute reveal a greater trend 
toward employment of ot!1er than prodvct:i.on vmrkers. 'i'hese 
data indicate that employees receiving Wfspes coY"lprised 88.1 
percent of the work force in 1939, 85.3 percent in 1947, and 
83.1 percent in 1955. ~rhe tr·2nd seems to have accelerated 
in the last three years. 
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the number of employees per unit of output declined 
less tharl the number of production workers per 
unit of output, from 1947 to 1955. It would be 
desirable to construct measures of productivity 
using the hours of all employees in order to study 
the change in total manpower requirements of an 
indus try, and to compare the results with pro-
duction workers alone. However, man-hours for non-
production vvorkers are generally not available. In 
an effort to obtain some general indtcations of 
trend, two experimental measures have been constructed, 
by combining the man-hours of production workers 
with t h.e estimated man-hours (employment multiplied 
b~ estimated weekly hours) for other employees. 
In one measure, the weekly hours of other employees 
were assumed to be the same as for production 
workers, in tne other a constant forty hour work-
we'3k was assumed for other employees. 
The two assumptions about weekly hours yield 
approximately the s~rne results. Using 1947 as a 
base ( 1. e., 1947 = 100) an index of unit man-hours 
for production workers would be 127.3 in 1939, 
compared with 125.3 for all employees assuming a 
forty hour week, and 123.9 assuming the same 
work week as production workers. In 1955, the 
unit man- hour index for production workers would 
be 78.1 compared wit~ 79.6 and so.ol for all 
employees depending on concept of hours worked for 
all employees.2 
'fhe importance of using all man-hours rather than 
production worker man-hours alone is indica ted by the evidence 
that in 1952 and 1957 there were decreases in productivity 
based o~ all man-hours w~ule productivity based on production 
worker man-hours rose. Ti1e following table provides the 
necessary information. 
lAmerlcan Iron and Steel Institute man-hour data for 
all employees and for "employees receiving, wages" showed 
similar differences. 'l1he hours of "o thern employees are 
generally scheduled hours reported to the AISI. 
2u.s., :: ..mreau of Labor Statistics, ":,1an-.dours Per Unit 
of Output," in Tr:E .dASIC STEEL IhDtS'l1RY 1939-55, Bulletin 
Ko. 1200 (Washington: l1 .S. 3-overn:nent Printing Jffice), 
September, 1956, p. 16-17. 
ear 
1'347 
J34S 
1950 
l:Jf·l 
l ,;,")3 
lS5~ 
1::56 
1057 
195f< 
nours 
:.or~~e d, 
i-iou.rly 
( .' illions) 
1281.3 
J.36f. 4 
JJc<l.C 
12Jl.2 
1434.7 
1252.9 
11:1 ~-- • .r; 
1J.39.1 
1317.4 
l2'Jl.9 
12:'4.2 
9·coO.B 
InFot 
"'ons 
( '1.'.1<1\1 s 8.1 ·d s ) 
A:~"ST 
7r7 1 707 
l 0, 557 
7l,c::t5 
E-::9,020 
~1H, 043 
86' t;32 
105' ~~2~: 
83' 3£35 
ll0,20E_; 
107,670 
1.07,2b4 
f'l,l93 
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Output ~in tons) Hours Jutput(il 1 ton~ 
Fer .r rod···~c ti on ~;;ork.:ed, l-'er Man-houl 
~~orke r ')alari ed _ for all 
-.an-dour ( ... 'cllions) .:Man-hours 
.OC5 
.OC4 
.OE3 
.OC9 
• oc.c:. 
.ocs 
.0?4 
.0?3 
• Of4 
• Oc)3 
• JEA 
• Ot2 
2:".5. 7 
2r)0 .b 
2~~~.5.9 
2?0.0 
~~~13.3 
301.3 
30'7 . '-' 
293 .6 
300.0 
324.0 
3.1L1 . 1 
C,3l • 6 
.OE51 
.OEJ3 
.0511 
. J.':-72 
.JH)? 
• 05[~'~ 
.OC::12 
. J::: lt.r 
• 0678 
.OE· .. s 
J .... ' 
• C~ Cc 
.JEl4 
So1.·rce: Co<:-rputed from A·nericr,n Iron and .Steel Ir~sti tlJ.te 
Annual ~:ororts. 
rl;:18 table also s n.ows tha-::; in 1849, ·1.ourly wor;_zer _procJuc t-
ivity fell ~hlle rroouctivity for all ~orkers rose. ~n six of 
t[·:e years·ontr:u.t per pro,~!lF tion worl<:"er man-hour 1\711 anc~ tn2.s 
v:as also trt·e for rrccuctivi ty per ·nan-hour for all wor~,ers. 
Yet from 1047 to 1957 ;'lot:rly rated worker productivity in-
creased b~ 29.2 percent. 
?'ne bt~reap of' Labor 3tatis_t:tcs outrut s r;udy in tasic 
stsJl coLcluced t'u::t outpt:t reT' prodnct5.on '::orker man-1onrs 
are usee.. rrom 1JlC1 to LJ29 the annual rc.te of oec:;·ease in 
man-1--tours r(~qnired per unit of' steeJ was 5.9 rercent •. ' frocl'J. 
1929 to ]';;3::-J, 3.1 y:ercent; a<cd from 1~'38 tc l:.J55, 2.8 l_:Je:rcent.l 
l-,-1.-.., '; ~ l- 6 ~·, .;_-. . 
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It is ar.parent tll.a t the decli.ne in the numb.::1r of man-hours 
r:-er unit cf output has chanced quite markedly. In other words, 
the rate of increase in basic steel productivity has decelerated 
a gooc deal. 
It is impossible to deter:11ine accurately tr1.e total 
costs for salaried employees in as much as sur;ple"-:-~ental 
benef~ ts for this group are not published anywhere. Yet 1 t 
:is r~ossible to ascertain if they exert a significant effect. 
~:he table below provides t~e necessary information. 
Tl1.e ta'!:lle tencs to show that the dif:'erences in total 
er::~rloyment costs per hour for salaried and ~ourly e:;1ployees 
could not have been too signlficant because tn.e index of total 
emr J o;,m1ent costs for hov rly workers and the lncex of total 
eri1J:lqrment costs for hourl;:r plus sa1arj_ed workers rose at 
rou,;hly the sar.1e rates. If the index of total emplo;vment 
costs for both sets of worl<:ers ta>en together had risen much 
faster t:.1an the rate of increase iL the production worker 
:tndex alone, it would indicate that gains in compensation 
for salar:ied workers exceeded t~ose of t.1.e hOUl'ly workers. 
l·'rom 1952 to about 1956, the salaried workers index rose faster, 
per naps indicating greater gains in compensation for tnem; 
but b:r 1958 the two indexes were roughly in line again. 
'i'l1e conc1us ion warranted is that almost the entire difference 
in the rate of j_ncrease of dire~~t wcge costs per hour for 
hourly wor'k:ers and total employment costs per hour (including 
sur:r lemental benefits and salaried workers) is due to: 
1) The zrowth in :1ours worked by salaried employees 
wh:.le t~1ose of wa::e emrloyees remained virtually UlChanged. 
1847 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1~_157 
]_958 
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'l1ABL8 25 
VAR~ O~TS :C:!. PLOY}\;~:" T COSTS FER HOUR 
(19<1:7-49 = 100) 
Index 
of 
Average Pa-yroll 
Hourly Cost, 
EarningsHourlya 
BLS \',o rke rs 
Col.l Col. 2 
'r.'l. 439 92.5 
1.580 101.5 
1.646 106.0 
l. 691 108.5 
1.890 121.4 
1.990 127.8 
2.160 138.7 
2.200 141.3 
2.3'70 152.2 
2.520 162.5 
2.680 175.6 
2.880 192.0 
fndex or 
'l'o tal - Tb tal 
E:1ploy- . Employment 
ment 9osts Per 
Costs Per Hour, 
Hour, Hourly 
dourlyb 1dorke rs 
':,orl::ers c 
Col. 3 Col. 4 
;t.l. 489 92.7 
1.630 101.4 
1.696 105.7 
1.853 115.1 
2.059 128.1 
2.157 134.4 
2.333 144.9 
2.379 148.0 
2.5F3 160.5 
2.774 172.3 
2.979 128.1 
3.212 206.0 
'110 tal 2:r;dex of 
E:nployi11en t 'ro tal .c;:rip loy-
Cost Per ~ent Cost 
Hour, 
Salar~ed 
Plus 
~l.ourly , 
Workers 0 
Col. 5 
:;j l. 629 
1.772 
lf't~8 
2.046 
2.252 
2.4tl.l 
2.635 
2.755 
2.942 
3.193 
3.459 
3.690 
Per Hour, 
Salaried 
Plus 
Hourly 
,·~orkerse 
Col. 5 
92.4 
100.5 
107.1 
116.1 
127.7 
140.7 
149.5 
156.3 
166.9 
178.1 
191.2 
204.3 
,::)o,,rce: Co·1pnted from Iron and .:Jtoel Institute Annual 
Reports. 
aco:r1puted from Column 1. 
b':::erived. by ac:'d.ing the cost of pensions, insurance, Social 
Security and SUB of Column 1 to the BLS &vera~e hourly e arnin2:s 
s 1ovm in Column 1 above. 
ccomputed from Golumn 3. 
dobta~ned by taking the total employment cost per hour of 
salaried and hourly workers from AISI Annual Eeports and ac5aing 
to this figure the pension costs per :nour and Social ;~ecurity 
plus SUB benefits costs per :lour. For example, tne ~;,3.69 
of Coltunn 5 in 1958 is co~posed of ware and salaries of ,~3.359 
rer b.ovr, ~,:0.216 in Social Securi t;r and s;;B costs per nour, and 
i,,o .115 ln rens jon costs per hour. 
2) 'I'he qui~ rapid growth in frln2~e benefits· for hourly 
workers. 
Any difference in the rate of increase in compensation be"Cween 
117 
t~1e tv,·o groups of worl(ers may be excluded as au important factor. 
·~Al LE 25 above indicates that produc ti vi ty per production 
worker man-hour see ns to have increased about 30 percent over 
t·ie reriod in question wht1e hourly rated employees r,--:anaged 
to increase their comrensa tion plus frin[;e benefits by in 
excess of 114 percent. (.See 7Ai.3LE 25 ) [{e:nce the union .nanaged 
to absorb the produc tivi t;y gains and to a considerable extent, 
also at sorbed the benefits of market power in the product 
market as steel rrices rose. These costs arpear to be borne 
bY the consumers of steel. 
The ~~efavver Co :1mi ttee lalior cost index can now be co::r-
recteci to account for the risin~. costs of wac::e supplements 
ana t:1e irr.pac t of' an ir~creased use of salaried personnel.l 
lo co ITf, · te a revised laLor cost per unit of output index 
t11e follov,ing }Jrocedure is used: 
1) '.::"he in2,0 t tons of proo"L:. c tion a :r,e divided by the 
to tal 'lOurs worked of both proC.uc tion and salaried workers. 
':.':1is cornpvtat:i.or yields the tons of steel produced per man-
:i01Jr anc'l inc h:de s bo tJ:1 salaried and hourly workers. CA3LE 24) 
2) Slnce the unit to b·.; -nessured is the lac·or cost of 
producinf: one inEot ton of steel, the amount of steel prodvced 
by a ~-:~an-hour of work must be converted to the number of 
I 
I 
salaried and production worker man-hours required to produce one ton. 
1 It should ··;e noted that a 1 though the revised index :nay 
account for certain ;va~e suppler,ents snch as holiday pay, 
vacation pay, pensions, insurance, and supplementary unem-
ploy:nent compensation, it coes not account for sucn items as 
coffee breaks, wash-up tL e, call-in time, jury duty pay, 
Cnri s tmas b>HlllS , sub si dies tc tne company cafeteria, or dis-
counts on ;;~oods bou21:1t cirectly from the comrany. David 
Reismar! has pointed out that tne corroration is a 11 junior 
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3) Jnce the number of salaried and production worker 
r!lan-hours required to produce one ton of steel is known for 
eacn year, eacn figure may be multiplied b1r the total 
employment cost per man-hour for all wori{ers ( inclucSJ.ng 
all •ra.::e sup:r.lemdnts). The resulting pro duet, of course, 
r0presents ti:1e labor cost per ur,i t of output for all workers 
and all wace supple r'IJer ts are included. 'l'"le tabJ.e be low 
expressGs the chane;es over the per' oc'J and is derived from 
previous tables. 
'l'ABLE 26 
H2;VISEI: IFI:BX OF B: .. PLOY .. .!!;l>.,T CO::>TS FER TON OF STEEL (HUuRLY 
11.l\D SAI<ARIE:C PBHSOhNEL AND I:i'.;CLt'DIHG ALI WAGE SUPPLE-
it :~t• ·rS), AL:S El\:FLO~v:~Vl' COS'.::'S PEi{ T<Ji~ OF s·r.;i;EL IN 
' DOLLAES 
(1947-49 & 100} 
Revised Labor Cost Per Kefauver Co:mni ttee 
Year Ir~dex ·ron in Iollars Labor Cost Indexa 
1947 87.6 ~"31. 71 93.4 
1948 104.2 35.13 102.3 
1949 109.4 36.27 104.3 
1950 105.8 35.40 98.3 
J.951 117.5 39.05 109.1 
1952 131.3 43.65 110.6 
1953 127.6 42.43 119. o· 
1954 159.4 46.40 124.3 
1955 128.3 42.50 120.0 
1856 140.0 47.18 126.7 
1957 lE~l. 6 51.52 135.8 
1958 173.6 58.91 147.8 
Source: Derived from previous tables. 
aKefauver Commi ttc::Je labor cost index of TABLE 21 used 
for comparison. 
welfare st.·, te." It even provi.ded a thle t~.c fields and bowling 
uniforms. Reisman, of course, was referring: to the corporation 
in general and not just a company in the steel industry. 
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rl''l.e table shows that if all waE;e supplements are included 
in the cost oi' labor along wi tr1 the impact of a rapidly 
growing salaried work force, the labor cost per ton of 
steel rost:J to a significantly r1it_her O.er:;ree tha::1 the "direct 
labor cost" index developed by the Kefauver Comni ttee. 
3e le c ting 1957 as a better bene hmark date for purposes of 
ccmparison, it snould be noted that ti"le Kefauver Committee 
11 direct labor cost per unit of output" index rose to 135.8 
while the revised index shows that 151.6 is an indicstion 
of· t~e macrli tude of the rise v;~1en botn hourly and salaried 
workers are included. 
3ince it is toe revised index wajch must be compared 
to steel price chane:es, it is necessary to make certain 
t~at t'l.e price indexes are also corrected. 
Revised Index of Steel Prices 
In an earlier parazraph it was claimed that the BLS 
and AISI price indexes may not be completely accurate 
for assess:ine; the sitnation and for attempting a comparison 
between steel prices and unit labor costs from 1947 to 1958. 
Ti:1e price indexes were said to be deficient Ol' the following 
grounds: 
1) l'he tndexe s do not me a sure tne prices actually 
realized. E:x:tras, G.iscounts, and freigl1t absorption ~aust 
be cons:!_dered. rrhere is evidence that the BLS and AISI price 
indexes are too high ir" the 1 lf:~1.t of c hane;e s in the market 
in recent yes.rs. .Some of th.e smaller prod1_1cers in the r:ost-
war period broke away from uniformity on finis G.ed steel 
products (plates and sheets) to exploit customer s'nortag~s 
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but ti18se deviations were really abnormal.l :::'~1.ese pre1aiwns 
disappe&red sevt:lral years ac;o and now it appears that secret 
rr·ice concessicns in various for~s are tne rule.2 
1339 to 1949 the schedule of extras was not changed.3 rrhere 
are thousands of separate items included as extras and 
revision of the schedule is time consuming and costly. As 
a result, cnani:·;es in market conditions and costs are 
reflected first and for the most part, only in tn.e base price 
of steel. ~iowever, t~1.e adverse press concerning steel price 
increases in the late 1940's and early 195J 1 s, especially wnen 
some of t11.ese increases took place during recessions, has led 
to a consideration for improving public relations. I'·1:Ls dictates 
t~1.a t an increase in the effective price of steel be made by ci1.anging 
t:1e scnedule of extras wi t,1out altering t•1e ba.se pr>ice •. ,,,len 
t.1__:_s is Gone, the various indexes of price calculated by BLS 
and Iron Age do net show ~uc~ change, if any, in steel prices 
altaou~;n t~e a;nount actually pald by users increases. 
lir_ his D3cline of Comf'eti tion in 1936, p. 82, Arthur Gtl.rns 
pointed out tnat sue 1 a devla'€ion took rlace following Viv</ I. 
ihe post V:\v II case was publish_ec. as a Study of i·.1onopol;v rower, 
.learir·r s before a Subco:n.mi ttee of tae 1-iouse Cornmi ttee on the 
Judici;ry, 8lst Cong., 2nd Sess, 1950, part 4B, Steel .C.:xnibits, 
p. 629-36. 
2n • t11is last frontier of premium prices is feeling 
very stron[; pres::~ure from a highly competitive market ••• 
·~1e new base prices are t"1e same as f. o. b. mill prices of major 
pro0uc ers in o tner• are as. 11 Iron Age, September 16, H154, p. 2l'd. 
In 1954, National 3t~0l wit~ a favored location in Great Lakes 
plants, reduced by ~?2 a ton tne price of sheets and strip re-
quired by t,1e automobile incustry in the Detroit area. See 
11 3tee 1: The Price Pot Is Bubbling, 11 Ibid., ~-ecember 23, 1954, p. 21. 
3 c:.,_anges 'Nere made, :1owever, ln specific extra charges. 
U.S. Ste<::l calct:lated taat more than 1,000 chanc;es were made in 
i~dividual extra charges for hot rollec sheets alone from January 1, 
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-ivhen the de.:nand for steel weakens, since the extra charges 
made by all companies are not identical anyway, so:•le companies 
taa t ~nay have taker:. advantae:e of' a shortage previously by raising 
extras above t:1e sc :1edule, now reduce their extra c haree s. 1 
Also, some customers nay receive reductions in extras when the 
base price itself' is F1e subject of a ceneral increase; the 
result is that a'Jailable statistics :nalces it difficult to .iud;2.:e 
wr1a t is actually happenine:;. ..Jince the end of the Yore an >?r it 
a:tJf.eBrs that the price structure weakened as avera('_e 0xcess 
capacity grew. 
2) Since tne abolishment of the mul tlple-bas ins point 
s~;stem in 1948, .r:ills are required to quote r:rices f.o.b. r:lace 
of production. '_~.'his may chan~·;e realized prices without affecting 
the Iron Age Price Index nor that of BI,S. 0nder the Roblnson-
Patman Act freight absorption is possible and in the 1949, 1954 
and rerha:;ls 1958 recession years, it is clai.:ned that this pract1ce 
~rew, t:ms lower~nz: realized ~rices to the producers. \\~'len the 
operatint; rate rises, t>1e opposite effect occurs. 
3) Slnce t~J.e rri ce indexes of s tee 1 currently available 
al"' utilize an a"'.'eraze of ':Jase prices for selected st.::el prodPcts 
weighted · acc-ordlnis to avera~;e ship:nents of these products in 
a oase period (Iron Ape uses 1J37-40 and 1946-48), a LasPeyres 
194E to I:ece-nber 15, 1949. Uot until December, 1949, was the 
entire schedv.le of extras revis·Jd since 1939. 
lsteel, :t:ebrttary 13, 1G50, p. 47 and 56, stc;t:;d that w"clen 
t:1e d0mar:.d for steel v;e al:ens, "so:n.e comr anle s revise their 1 Dew 1 
extra charges becatlse taey work to the detriment of some co~nranies." 
;.'ne L:rpli c a ticm of this s ta temen t 1 s the t all co":1par:i e s do not 
always nave identical e.ctras. 
• 
lndex of th:is 
product mix. 
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type fails to take into account changes in the 
l:or a short period of tirae, this may not be a 
rroble',1 cf -larrse dimension. It is, of course, also r-:jco,s:.c,ized 
t:'lat custocners tend to shift to lower priced products when price 
rise.:; are lare:e for the rn~oduct normally used. To this extent, 
all price indexes of tl~ LasPeyres type are artifically infl&ted. 
t:.ov.eve r, an Lnportan t qualification tending to reduce U1e C.e :::ree 
of cr·iticism of the incexes used lies in the fact that sub-
stitutes for steel are :uot easy to find, even in the face of large 
rrice increa:.:es for steel products. .Lhis is more likely to be 
true for consumer prod1 1 C ts. In adcj tion, it is doubtful if any 
other type of rrtce index ot'1er than the LasPe;rres Incex would 
be entirely satisfactory. Indexas of virtually any ty:9e may be 
criticized because they fail to meastn~e qual:tty chane;es as well. 
r:ne difficulties that arise under the criticisms Loted 
al;ove :-:1ay be illustrated by examples. Ste e 1 users ::nay learn 
to eliminate the amount of extras they are forced to pa;; b7r 
designing ti1e ir prodv.c ts in a manner which enables them to 
order steel to exact decimal thicknesses. /is the steel producers 
surr ly these ordtJr·s tJ:1e ir own tLickne ss tolerances become more 
stringent anG ~ay result in excess rejects w~ich must be sold at 
lower prices alon; with other secondary material. Uther steel 
characteristics may also be de;nanded by customers and incre8.sed 
re quire:.Jents c oulc result in more s tric tne s s in pro due tion 
quality control by the steel com;:anies without com;:ensatini: 
c:1arges of extras. 'rhe following comparison may illustrate tne 
case. 
ColC: ~,ollec 
:::·cleets 
Jtrir 
,~ Per !'on 
,-;r(. 44 
13f).Cl 
Strip 221.97 
7otal Feve~ue for 
::-.otr1 ite1:-1s l,·~4i~-.o 
.:3o t111 c e : 
r·eports. 
lr·on 8JH:'' 
1;:.:57 
i e t .-_'onE' -~~'lipr:e6 
.c_t,~_:,?~), ?23 
!,~JJ,;·-48 
lJ,:.i43,7U3 
'i:J57, ?39 
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_: t 3. t i s ti c al 
Ir1 1947 colC:: rollec.i. strLp CO.il.f.r::.sea <:;.4 purceLt o1 total 
CalC rolled 
s.1eets en t 10 ot.cer ~and were t..7 1-ercent of total s.:..if-JildLts in 
LA7 anc rose to lb.2 rerce[,t in l0t4 and l'i.9 per·cent in lc:1~S. 
c{le prices or bob1 r,roducts .inc:r·easoC about 7fJ r.ercent 
frcm 1947 to 1~)57 ·3.r:cS v.l:1ile tne s':lipments of sheets jt~st a out 
doubled, s •:tlp~nerc ts oi s trir. decliDeci bJ rouchly one- thirc. 
Custo.:ners a~.parer1tl:y v .. er·e a:Jle to substitute tne lower priced 
_;_ r roved. 
1.at i':: is also obviou_s t-1.8t total revenue 
from sal:as of t 1sse two r roC:t'cts virt·Jally tri:;::l.:;d v,ri tel a 
doul.!led l~rice list acco.:-llf.anied by ar.~ increD._e :Lit tonna<:_::: of 
r1ot q_1)_i te :JJ rercent. ~ven v;i_ ti'l a recuc ti:;n of one-tnirc in net 
tons of stri.p s liJ:peci, ~otaJ r·evc:nue j_ncr'ea.'JJC fr..:).:J. '.175.c- :illion 
in 1047 to ~,.21;) uillion in l;J57 for a .::aln of 21 percent. .i.•or 
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sheets the increase amounted to \.·1,093 million or 263 percent. 
~:he q_uantity of strip produced amounted to only about 2.4 percent 
of total output in 1947 and less than one ~ercent in 1957. 
':.:'otal revenue frc m strip was only 2. 6 percent of total revenue 
from all sales in 194.7 and 1.4 percent in 1957. In view of' tnese 
fisures it is hard to see tnat a chaLge in the product mix 
had a significant effect O£_;_ the indexes. The sales voltL'11e in 
lS47 ~or all production was ~6.67 billion in 1947 and 015.46 
billion in 1957, a gain of 131 percent. l~evertheless, chan:es 
in the product mix occur, but ti.1e effect to t!le steel industry 
is less marked than 1 t would be to other producers. A steel 
consumer may shift away from a hig:1 priced steel product but 
his alternatives ar'3 few. He generally onl;r shlfts to another 
steel product instead. Venturing ir,to other replacement fie lda 
in much more difficult for hlm. ' ... he product mix in steel is 
also less likely to change as significantly as in other industries. 
nails, track spikes, wheels and a.x:les, for e:-·arnr;le, cannot be 
replaced at all by subs ti tu te s. 
because ti.l.e Iron Age Index uses 1937-40 as the base period, 
one mi;:ht expect that by 1958 a su~Js tantial shift in the product 
:nix could occur. ...his period is rather long. oy 1957, 29 percent 
of tne shipments which constitute the Iron Age Index were classi-
fied differently thar, they were in the base period. These 
cnanges appear to be quality changes as described above and 
charl€es in the nature of the demand. 
4) l'he 18 st cri ticis'.n of t'le y.:ublished indexes is concerned 
wit:l. the fact that they consicler only prices of finished steel 
prodvcts. Intet:.rated steel producers, however, are not solely 
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in tne business or manufacturing steel. Operations also inclu6.e 
by-r:roducts and intermediste ~roducts such as coke, ore, pig 
iron, gHs, tar, c~le,nicals, sand, stone, and secondary steel 
products. Steel ftpms sell fairly lsrge qvartities of by-y:rod~;ct 
:_as v:r1icb is t~1e resL~lt of co]{e operations. \~[rile much oi" the 
c,as is used by the companies themselves, the surplus was solo 
to public utilities for distribution throue;h city mains. The 
ri:r~ine; of natural gas from '.rexas reduced sales in this area 
considerably. 'fi1e follovdnt:, table demonstrates the extent of 
t':1is co:npetition. 
'i'AELE 28 
Sold to Cities 
1_ seci in ;;;tee 1 or 
Sold for inecus-
Volume of 
Gas ( ,cf) 
119,b23,501 
trial (se 422,680,150 
Sold to Cities 
Used in 3teel or 
Sold for Indus-
542,503,650 
Volume of 
Gas (i(cf) 
42,462,102 
trial Lse 636,405,118 
TOTALS ~:678, 867,220 
1947 F1·ice 
(fer· :;,cf) 
.135 
1957 Frice 
(.Per 1:cf) 
.223 
'I'o tal 
Heven1;:e 
f)7, 061,820 
;_,.91, 690,711 
':.:'ot al 
He venue 
'n' 17,834,082 
l41,918,y41 
<,·159' 7 52,423 
Source: TJ. s., :Sure au of il.ine s, ,'~inerals Yearbook, 194 7 
anc 1957. 
'l'he table S;lOWS the amount of e;as available had increased 
substantially in the bm yecr period wlnle the proportion sold 
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to public utili ties fe11 by 64 percer;t. 1' i he pr ce, however, 
rose by 46 percent and the decline in total revenue from this 
sou_rce approximated 50 percent. The 64 percent loss of cubic 
foot volume former1y sold for urban use was absorbed in industria1 
uses at a price of 22.3 cents per ~cf, a price decline of 23 
percent from the former 28.9 cents per ;cf. l'oted also is 
tr1e fact t:1at cas for inc'_ustrial purpose~ rose from 13.5 cents 
per ;;cf to 22.3 cents. The effect of tLLis chance on total steel 
revenue from all operations is rather negligible. 'l:'he total 
revenue received from all gas sales in 1957 was only about one 
percent of the ~,:15.46 blllton received fro'n all operations in 
1957. I'he loss of :;,17 million to cit.les represents some one-
tenth of one rercent of this total. In addition, revenue from 
gas rose from 91 ~illion to 159 million, or about 75 percent. 
~'~11 s compares quite favorably with tc1e ELS price index c hane~ e 
for t::1e same period for finished steel products. 
In order to surmount t:1e inadequacies of the B.LS s ta tis tics 
and Iron Age price indexes described above, it is possible to 
devise a new one as a substitute. 'l'his is based on the same 
method usod by the T'.,epartrrer:t of Corrun0rce in computint:, a measure 
of c::: ross 1~ a tional Prodnc t in cons tar~t dollars. Implicit price 
deflators were devised by dividing the "current dollar by the 
constar.t dollar estimates." 'rhe result is a measure of real 
production whic2:1. takes into account not only chanE_:e j_n price, 
but also shifts in product mix and quality (at least partially). 1 
lu. S., Pepartment of '-'ommerce, I~ a tional Income Supplement 
to the Survey of Curre:mt ::3usiness, Part LV, 1954 Edition. See 
also Staff Heport or J.;mployment, Growth, and Price Levels, 
~)p. Cit., '11AELE 5-l, p. 104. 
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If this is done for steel, the problems of quality shifts 
and product inix change are somewhat lessened in importance. 
Eut it shot1lci also be noted th&t the base is broade1eed from 
that em~ loyed by the Iron· At:.: a price inc~ ex and also t~m t of BLS. 
In o ti1er· words, t :1e new inc.i.ez: will inc lucie the sB.le s of faiJrica ted 
steel products and products and services not directly related 
to ste.al manufacturing. 'l'he exact volume of tnese is not known, 
nor are t:1e quantity chances from year to year. It is not believed 
ti1at tr1e totals can be significantly large for the basic steel 
companies reporting to Iron .~ge. In addition, the degree of 
vertical integration and merger·s nas varied from year to year 
and to a certain extent, intra-co~apany sales and purchases ~11ay 
affect t~1e index. Vertically inteE:,rated facilities may be used 
in lieu of outside purcnases and sales in periods of low utili-
zation of capacity and mergers, and vertical growth may occur 
in periods of prosperity to assure fir~s of a more certain supply. 
Rees reported t~e acquisition of high-cost inefficient. steel 
firrts by producers vvishin~; to assure themselves of a certain 
steel surply in the r:ost-war period when grey .narkets axis ted. 
'1che effect of t~.:.·J se factors on ti1e proposed inc ex is not known. 
~he following table indicates the data requil•ed for computing 
a L.ew index of realized prices using the AISI Annual Statistical 
Reports as a base. 
'i.'[ie inde:<: of realj_zed r:rices in the table was computed b;r 
dividing: the avera¢:e sales value for 1947-49 (~7 ,382.2 million) 
by tne averaoe number of ingot tons (76,G26) for the sa::1e period. 
·J:':.us -:;riel(, s ar: ave rae e realized price of ~-96. 24 a ton. If the 
1955 ou tpJ t of 110,208 ti"lousand tons had been sold at this average 
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trice J... it wov.ld have yielded a sales value of ylO, 620.8 million. 
n 19o5, however, the companies received $14,960.2 million 
or ,_3,339.4 more. This represertts an increase over the base 
price (1947-49 = 100) of 31.4 percent. T:~refore, the realized 
price index for 1955 in the table is 131.4. ·Tne rer.1aininc; years 
were calculated in the same way. This index runs considerably 
lower trraE that of DLS provided iE the table for co:nrarison 
r,:uq::ose s. .An index of to tal e::nployment costs per unit of output, 
~ill~rly and salaried workers and all fringe benefits is also 
included for com~arison. 
Year 
1347 
1948 
1949 
l9C;O 
1051 
1JS2 
1953 
1J5~ 
1955 
1956 
1957 
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'l'ABL:~ 29 
IL\;-~:;~~.i;S OF JOTJ\T. ·:.; fL0YMEl','l1 CJ.S·~· P3R UNIT 
OF :/C':L'E"U'l' Ai~L l1BAI"IZ.C:L f'RI C:SS 
l\e t B:i.L' ing 
Value ;Jf 
Froducts sn.ip- Ingot 
r-·ed and Ser- .Production 
vices ( I '.'') ( ~\.I S of ·1'ons) ... s 
6, 674 7?.7 
8 
• 
)FO 80.5 
7,391 71.6 
-J,4E::5 89.0 
11,782 9b.O 
10, t>J4 c-- ~ 0b. -==~ 
13,091 105.5 
10,545 83.6 
13,960 110.2 
15,160 107.6 
15, 4CE·; 107.2 
12,411 81.1 
Index of 
Healized 
2rices 
(1~47-49 
= 100) 
89.1 
104.0 
107.0 
110.5 
124.6 
129.0 
128.6 
130.5 
1.31. 4 
146.0 
149.b 
153.5 
Index of 
Total Emp1oyi 
.nent Cost Fer 
"Gni t of Out-
bLS Price put 
Index for (nour1~ o 
Co·nrart son Sa1arie c) 
89.1 87.6 
1~)1.3 104.2 
109.7 10;).4 
11.5.2 105.8 
124.5 117.5 
127.2 131.3 
136.9 127.E: 
142.8 159.4 
149.5 128.3 
162.1 140.0 
174.3 151.6 
lC-,2. 3 l73.C 
L.1sint?:· t!le new :~ncex on a sc~Jtter diagl'am, a nevi re1·;tionsi-ltp 
betwoeL ecnp1oyment costs per unit of output and prices is esta':1ishec 
fRic.E 
~)'\ci-t-A 
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'2.'he BLS ~rj ce inde ~ si:J.ovvs an increase for every year 
1 
while L1e realized price index shows a decrease in 1953. .._;oth inc:exe, 
:--aove along si r.'i larly to about 1952; fro ~1 1953 on the 0LS lndex 
rose :nncn ;11ore raridly, ris:i.nc; r::J.ne r:oints in 1953 alone as t:O.e 
realizec rrice lnecex fell for that year. 
Since 1957 is a better b!Jnchmar:r c:ate tl:mn r3cession 1358, 
t~1.e scctter diagra:TI incicates tlJ.s.t t~1e two VEJriables were aJ•:ost 
-;:.,;c1: on tne 45 cie,·ree lin:;, v,i th t'J.e urward price ·:.over,1ents 
beinc: more r:rononncec3 t:1ar t:1.e r:t2·htward cost YJOVe~1ents in the 
interveninG period 1947-57. 
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i11c::ex and the labor cost rer unit in':~;x s~Sirtod at about tne 
sa:;le level in 1947 and l:14f'. ln l';49 t,1.e unir~n won a 13 cent 
Lr:cr·G::t~:e v.nlle L:1e :recessi•)n of t;D.at ye::_,_r decreased ·pl!ocitiotion 
{!bout _ lJ percent anC the resultin3 e~cess carsc.~ty 
ten~ed to ~eaken forces tou~~ds price rises. ..:.':le rrice :i.ndex 
r0se from 104 to 107. Lowered output prod\;.ced inefficiency and 
r3t t:i.:1.2r w.g e levels: J.abor cos~s r~:-::8. _,'1is ls esreeially 
~n 1?49 to V2.J4 ~11J•on tons. 
e/pected, ti·le re.:1ize~:, price index shot u.r C:.rs:,E:tica1Jy from 
:.10 •. ~ iL H)5J to 124-.f: :tn lS.;~51. La:;or vwn arother 16 cents 
rer 'lOur, anC: la.(;or costs rer unit rose from -=ui :t.DCIOX of 105.:; 
anc rro6L.cti·:;n f'...;ll frc~n '.::.'0 :illior1 tons to 8C ~n~l1ion, an 
~·e -~ J abor sucr:eeded in winLing 
auo t ·1er 16 cents par ;·1our ano unit costs exf 1oceC. from an inoex 
of 117.5 to 131.3. -:.o offset tnis, rrices ro2e a; &in to s..n 
inCex of 129 frorn 124.6. 
fell eren t1ou h to:rca-c: rose from 36.0 i:r:·L~52 to 105.5 -,,::..1lion 
ir· 1953. '~'he un: :)n ~.ncrnase this 
t~1e s~wlJ er wa.- e rise :;~ncJ t 1e :L1creased effic:i.ency that tae hl.f:her 
operatinc rat0 hrou;ht. Jr recession ~.95~ s~eeJ. output f;ll 
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so~e 2J ~erc~0t and l~~or st~lJ. succeeded in ~innins an increase 
o f 5 c e 1 i t s per ilo ur • ·.~·~w St:l t'i'.O f.~~c tors cJrove ur;j t J a or costs 
to &n .. r:ccex of 15J.4 from 127.6. ~--1 195;) t~e success of t·1e 
anto·tc·blle .:.nc:ustry inc:r:3ased cemar.c~ for steel an::.;. out£-UL rose 
about 31 rercert. ...:..ve::J tr10U€.:1 la or won a suJ'Jstantial increase 
of 15~; cents per ~our, unit labor costs fell from an :in~'ex of 
lEG.LJ to 12U.3 as tc1e op:jrattn"'~ l~ate rose from. 71 percent in 
1;;5,_._ to 'Jc :r,;erceLt in 19t5. '.:,w increased ef:ficie ncy ac.d some 
excess car ac i ty combined to lce8p t ne l.nc:_ex of r0alize ci prices 
i'l:l.lrly stable. It rose from 130.5 to 101.~. ::..t ·m~3t b::; re-
:.1e-:1bered that from 1S52 to l';:j55, L:e cons\..:mers' price index 
Wl:l.S extre.Jely stable, e:oinb fro 1 113.5 to 114.5. A ,rt- ;1er 
cost of livi.u; c:--·ulC: be ;laroly advacced ss a union argurn'::lfi i~ 
for ~a e i~cr~ases. 
l''rom 1J55 t~lrOU[.'l 1057 tonnae re·nalr.ec re.~1arkatly stable, 
tnt t 1e opera tin" :rat·J fell from 93 rercer.t to 84.4 percent, 
indicatln; tlLt a s'ii.bstaLtial incr•ease in' i.nvestr:1ent in new 
fac ll ties haG. occt~rred. ,_'1e accel•::rated dGrreciation 1111cier 
t:1e rcivised tax laws stLnulat'::Jd th:ts t::rowth in caracity. :;:1e 
t\nion won 0 ~ cents in 1 85i'; anc EJ. 2 cer. ts in 1~57. Lat.Jor costs 
rer unit rose from an index of 128.3 in 1955 to 140 ln 1956 
c_ho increased pr::;sst.:r:J of ris:~n:~ laDor costs 
I er ton forced r-·rice L1crease.s an. L1e r·ea1i_zec~ price index 
rOE38 from 131.4: .!.n 1055 to 149.5 in 1957. Jut:r-t•t fell sli,~.cltly 
1~1 El58 la·::.or a ·o: in won ~3. 2 cents :re r :1.0ur anc ever: t~l.ough 
steel r-rodrct~on i'E:ll so,·:le 25 parcect in this recessio:)n to an 
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ra!:;e of CO.C :r:e:ecaLt, tno producers raised r:rlces 
R .. l ':.he uL:~ t lat;or cost 
5_1~dex jum:r;:ed co 1'73.6. 
l:t see !iS clegr t{l.8t proc-.uctivity per man-hour-worked 
rose about 60 fercen t over t~1e periocJ from l'a47-4.· avera~ 3 to 
l'J55. . __ ·lis inclnded boLl nourly a.Ld salaried man-.t1.ours. 
t:1e l'J47-4S av~:rar~e ti:li'OUb.l 1956, t"l8 ain was 27.2 p·.:;rccn,t; 
and r:ml;" ~~5 .l perc::mt to 1957. : .. ~y 1958 it had falle .. .: to a ,: a u1 
as 1.:-_dicatecl. 
in raisin;::_: rrices to t~1e point wher·e ir;.creased labor costs 
v;ere offset, so,r;e thrl-; s incr·dasing prices w:1eL ou tr;ut fe 11 
q1,;i te drastically. :.:v 1<;;.)57 t~1e index ot =:'ealizec prices had 
riser" to 14G.5 w:t!l.'3 total unlt labor costs rose to an index 
of 151.6. ~ince in 1'J53 tne .~:anufacturer's position was 
somew~wt worsd.r~ed c'iue to I'eces sion anc1 t~'le union was still 
a··le to increase wbges, :l.t can be ex:r;:·ected t~1at t:1e f:Lr"· 1 s 
~ill seek to recoup t~ir rosition an6 prices ~ill rise a~ain 
or stress -,vill l!e direct•ad tow:crc::s reduclnE: labor cost per 
·,'ci:~ t~~1rou'-·1 increased ef'fic1eDcy. j:t sicO~·:Jd be !:.:oted t:·1?t t~1e 
toru1age of steel rose about 33 percent frcm JS47 to 1957 wh~le 
the nDmb·ar of l1ourly wor er•s nan-hours-wor1.re6 was virj:ually 
t:.1e s ne in J.'J5? as in 1G47. 
·:vtc:ently l1L~~hly r:aid ~1ourly workers ·1ave been re·placec by 
salaried workers in ~teel. _::le latter wor~;uc3 255.7 ~-'.lJ.ion 
hours in 1S:J47 and 344.1 nillion hours in 1957. 
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The t:L~ on app·a:r'ently i;;nored auy e-rrrloyment effect ot j_ ts w 8 _.~.e 
J:·ol:!cies. F(_,r ·nuch oi' thls period t~e cosL of livinG argument 
for we~e gains ~auld have been specious. tot even incrGasing 
outrut per :Jan-hour woulc' nave ,ius+;ified s-:.~c~1 vast incraa:ws. 
·-~1e index of rr;an-hour outrt:t for bot:--1 hourly anc salariec worters 
rose fro~ 105.4 in 1947 to 126.1 in 1957. 
ar- L~dex. of total e1Jrloymor1t cost per unit in 1947 of ?:,7.6, 
t~1e -' ndex rose to 151.6 in 1957, c le ar•ly irld ica :;inc ti1a t waE:~ s 
a:c-_d t·cr:efi ts were '<VOn w~lich increased labor co~ts and did not 
merel:v _r:revent t 1em f'ror>1 [:·oinz dovn·. :ena;::~e ·1ent would ::;enerally 
conten.::' thnt t{le:re is no relevance to output rer r::an-hour and 
wae increases. ~o it, the relevant ~easure of productivity 
is the ne'JI~loyee perfor':1ance rate," which it defines as outr:-ut 
per ---mn-hour in rlan.ts wb_ose capital equipment has not been 
increased or Lnproved durin£: ti:le r:er1od in quest::ton. Of course, 
t 1is rate improves less ra1:::idly. 
:\1e rise iL rrofi ts is also frequently c:l ted -i:.1y t!-le union 
as crou.nr~s fcn1 wa.?e increases. :··emtc;:r's axc.d the rubllc al'e 
led to be li<n'e that an ineq_ui title relation bo tween prof::_ ts ar.d 
wa?es exists, an<' th:i.s v:oulc perrtJ:!.t an increase in W2.(~es v;:t thout 
ccrrespondinz pr:ice chan·ces. To the exter:t t 1'lat t..,_1ese 8rgunents, 
irrespective of their '·r:erlt, create rubli.c o;tnion favorable 
to L1e union, t~1e;: inc ··ease the union 1 s bargair::ing power. 
Yet in the 195:-3 strike ~t was obvious t'lat labor had lost a 
su.bstantial seg·.1ent of J ~-b~)ral publ' c orin~ o•j v;h:l.ch seen:.ed to 
f•;:J} '::':1-:-·t wage inc ·eas~;s 'laG been substanttal er,or·:::h, ancS that 
tJ-:ce ti:'·e for price decreas'3S had arrived.l 
u.1~ion re turnec t::1e vic tor • 
evc::rt~'leless, the 
.L.termal' Eosec:nan, 11 Af'tar tc1e Steel SettleJ'.ent, .:~1e Pr:i.ce of 
Peace, 11 J'r1e Le_port0r, ··.;~~.~I (February 4, 1060), r• 13-lc·. 
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Summary of Conclusions 
In its study of wages and prices in the basic steel in-
dustry, the Senate Sub-Committee on Anti-Trus~ and Monopoly 
showed that, from 1947 to 1957, steel industry prices rose 
74.3 percent while labor costs per ton for production workers 
rose only 35.8 percent. Thus the committee concluded that the 
steady price increases could not be justified on the basis of 
increased wages due to union bargaining. This chapter, however, 
concludes that the relationship is a much closer one due to the 
following reasons: 
1) The BLS index used to compute labor costs does not 
include such fringes as pensions, holidays, vacation pay, insur-
ance, supplementary unempoyment benefits, social security, and 
some other minor adjustments. These benefits rose from 10.16 
cents per hour in 1947 to 47.43 cents per hour in 1957. The 
average1 ::" hourly eamings reported by BLS rose from $1.439 per 
hour in 1947 to $2.680 in 1957 and $2.880 by 1958, increases 
of 75.6 percent and 92.0 percent respectively (1947-49 : 100). 
Inclusion of the excluded fringes raises production worker total 
employment costs by 88.1 percent in 1957. 
2) The Kefauver Comndttee failed to include salaried per-
sonnel in its calculations of labor cost per ton of steel. From 
1947-49 to 1957 ingot production increased by 33.4 percent, 
production worker man-hours increased from 1,281.3 million to 
1,284.2 million (.002 percent); salaried non-production worker 
man-hours rose from 255.7 to 344.1 (31 percent). In other 
words, 84 percent of total labor costs was incurred by production 
workers in 1947, but this proportion declined to 77 percent 
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in 1957. This important shift to non-production salaried per-
sonnel has been sisnificant enough to warrant inclusion in a 
labor cost per unit index. For example, productivity per 
man-hour fell in 1952 and 1957 if all man-hours, salaried and 
hourly, are included; but for hourly workers alone, productivity 
per man-hour rose. Therefore, it appears that labor cost per 
ton of steel increased by 51.6 percent rather than the 35.8 
percent calculated by the Kefauver Committee. 
3) The BLS and AISI price indexes also appear to be def-
icient. These are weighted indexes based on prices for a 
limited number of finished steel products. Changes in the 
pro~uct mix have been significant and have been accompanied 
by other factors which warrant a recalculation of the steel 
price index. 
a. The basing point system was abolished in 1948, 
freight absorption is permitted under the Robinaon-
Patman Act. Realized prices per ton can be affected 
without influencing the BLS or AISI indexes. If a ~11 
experiences a change in its geographical shipments, 
realized prices received may also change. 
b. In the last decade adverse public reaction to 
steel price increases has led to a need for improving 
public relations. Increases in the schedule of extra 
charges become more significant when the base price is 
less frequently altered. Thus the BLS and AISI price 
indexes show smaller changes than actually paid by users. 
Reductions in extras as excess capacity grew appears to 
have weakened the price structure. 
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c. Steel customers seem to be able to design their 
products in such a way that some extr~ charges and higher 
prices are in part avoided. For example, in 1947 4.9 
million tons of cold-rolled sheet was shipped at $77.44 
per ton. The figures for cold-rolled strip were 1.4 
million tons and $135.61 a ton. By 1957 the tonnage 
of sheets had doubled while the price rose 75 percent. 
Yet the tonnage of strip declined by almost one-third as 
the price also rose by 75 percent. Since strip steel 
was much higher priced to b~gin with and since sheet 
quality had been improved, cutomers apparently were able 
to substitute; actual prices to them did not rise as 
much as the BLS index would indicate. 
Calculation of an "Implicit price index" shows that 
"realized prices" rose 49.5 percent from 1947-49. This compares 
with the rise of 51.6 percent in the revised labor cost per ton 
of steel. Therefore, the existing steel price indexes appear to 
be overstated while the labor cost per ton indexes are under-
stated. Total realized revenue per ton rose from $85.89 in 
1947 to $143.69 in 1957. Even when the operating rate fell 
to 60.2 percent in 1958, realized prices rose to $154.20 a 
ton. Thus union gains have absorbed not only the productivity 
increases, but they have also pushed up unit labor costs 
considerably. The steel industry exercised i·ts market power to 
raise effective prices. 
CHAPTER IV 
OTH~R COSTS IN STEEL 
An element of the hypothesis concerns the claim by the 
steel industry that an upward shifting profit target was 
necessary because inflation.rendered the depreciation allow-
ances inadequate to replace facilities purchased in an earlier 
period of lower prices. Thus higher profits are justified as 
not being real but only "paper profits." In addition, a study 
of this nature cannot be complete unless the contribution of 
chan. as in materials costs, interest costs, and taxes to steel 
price increases are analyzed. 
Therefore the procedure in this chapter is as follows·: · 
1) Materials costs per ton of steel will be computed; an 
attempt is also made to determine the role of expenditures 
' on advertising and upon research and development. 
These are included in the data concerning materials 
costs. One of these costs in unnecessary from the 
point of view·.. of a purely competitive industry and 
the other may be more properly interpreted as an in-
vestment, not a contribution to current costs per ton. 
The data will show that materials costs, including the 
questionable elements noted, rose less rapidly than 
the price of steel. 
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2) Depreciation costs per ton will be analyzed next. 
While these costs just about doubled per ton of steel 
from 1947-49 to 1957, and rose much faster than the 
steel price increase of 49.5 percent, since they are 
roughly only six percent of the price of steel they 
contributed only a small amount to the rise in steel 
prices. However, in order to determine b·"'Blldiwo·.f the 
charge by the industry spokesmen that inflation has 
rendered depreciation allowances inadequate, a compari-
son will be made here between these costs, the move-
ment of construction prices, and estimates of the 
Department of Commerce concerning the amounts re-
quired to replace assets from 1947 to 1955. The 
comparisons will yield results suggesting that 
depreciation allowances have been excessive. 
3) Interest costs per ton are computed next. These rose 
even more rapidly in relation to steel prices than 
. 
did depreciation costs. It is also noted that the 
industry financed expansion through bonded indebt-
edness and retained earnings because not a single 
share of equity type securities was sold during 
the period. u.s. Steel, for example, paid stock 
dividends of 600 percent over the period without the 
necessity of reducing the dividends per share below 
the level of 1951 nor were earnings per share affected 
significantly. 
4) This chapter will also show that profits per ton and 
taxes per ton rose faster than steel prices per ton. 
140 
If it were not for the fact that materials costs per 
ton rose less rapidly than steel prices plus the 
fact that these costs are equal to about 45 percent 
of steel prices, the increases in the remaining costs 
per ton and profits would have required larger steel 
price gains. 
Other Costs 
The remaining major costs of production in the steel 
industry are: 1) materials, supplies, freight and other 
services; 2} depreciation, depletion and amortization; 3) in-
terest and charges on the long-term debt. Taxes are not 
excluded here as an element of cost even though the largest 
portion of taxes is determined mainly after profits are 
known. Each of these costs will be taken up in turn. Since 
the cost of materials baa varied between 44 and 47 percent 
of total steel revenues in the postwar period, with the 
exception of the two recession years (43 percent in 1954, 
42 percent in 1958), they are the most important element 
in total cost and will be considered first. TABLE 30 pro-
vides the relevant data. 
The index for material cost per ton of steel corresponds 
fairly closely to that published by the U.S. Steel Corporation. 
The company indicated that from 1947-1949, its material costs 
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weignted according to their own purcl~ses, increased to an 
index of 143.0 by December 31, 1956. The figure of 140.0 for 
1956 in the table below indicates that the method used here must 
be fairly reliable because tne result corresponds quite closely 
to that of the U.S. Steel Corporation. 
Year 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
TABLE 30 
INDEXJ:i;S OF. 'rO'I'AL MJiTbRIAL COSTS AND 
MATERIAL COSTS IN IX)LLARS PER 'rON 
(1947-49- 100) 
Index of Total Index of Material Material Costs per 
Material Costs Costs per Ton Ton in Dollars 
90.1 89.2 $41.44 
110.8 105.0 48.76 
99.1 105.7 49.10 
122.7 103.2 48.94 
154.6 118.4 56.00 
152.5 134.0 62.22 
171.5 124.2 57.70 
128.8 117.8 54.69 
171.4 118.9 55.22 
197.5 140.0 65.18 
190.7 135.4 62.76 
147.2 138.5 64.33 
Source: American Iron and Steel Institute: Annual 
Statistical Reports, 1947-1958. 
Inflation, of course, ha.s also characterized the market 
for raw materials. 'l'o indicate the effect of inflation on the 
cost of' materials and services is virtually impossible because 
no weights are available. The composition of raw materials 
acquired by steel companies varles depending upon the items 
produced and the degree of integration of operations. A rough 
check of the relationship between the prices paid for materials 
and the selling pr:i.ce for finished steel is provided by the share 
of the sales dollar used to pay for materials. But changes in 
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tee hcology along wi tn cilanE?e s in the rate of operations make it 
an imperfect test. However, it is the method most often used 
by the steel firms themselves. 
The index of rna terial costs per ton in the table above 
attempts to measure the-1...'1.fluence of ir.fla tion by the same method 
used earlier for the index of actual realized pricei. Ire other 
words the average material cost for the 1947-49 period was 
~3,548,530,000 or :jp46.43 a ton and an average of 76.646 million 
tons was produced. If the materials purchased for the 110.208 
m:'!..llion tons prodnced in 1955 could have been purchased at the 
average cost per ton of $46.43 in 1947, the total material 
cost in 1955 would have been $5, 116, 957,440. The actual co:" t 
in 1955, however, was $6,085,631,008. The increase of 
$968,673,568 of material cost therefore represents inflation 
of material pricesof 18.9 percent on the 1947-49 base. This is 
inflation per ton of steel produced. The remaining index numbers 
were all obtained in the same manner. The material cost in dollmB 
per ton is also given in the table and the index numbers can be 
calculated from these as well. 
It is apparent that material costs per ton are a larger 
proportion of total costs than is the case with labor costs. 
Yet the index. snows an increase of only 35.4 percent from the 
1947-49 average to 1957 while that of labor cost rose 51.6 per-
cent. To 1958 the respective changes are 38.5 percent and 73.6 
percent. If it were not for the lesser de::•ree of inflation in 
the cost of this input steel prices would have risen much more 
markedly. But since the cost of the material inputs are more 
important than the cost of labor, in absolute dollars they tend 
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to rise by roughly the same amounts over a long period of time. 
The table below develops this relationship. 
Year 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1~56 
1957 
1958 
TABLE 31 
DOLLAR CHANGES IN MA'J~ERIAL AND LABOR COSTS 
PER 'rOi~ PROM THE 1947-49AVERAGE 
Year to Year Year to Year 
Change in Cumulative Change In Cumulative 
.Material Cost Change Labor Cost Change 
*'2.51 ~ 2.51 $1.03 :1P 1.03 
7.06 9.57 3.65 4.68 
6.22 15.79 4.60 9.28 
-4.52 11.27 -1.22 8.06 
-3.01 8.26 3.97 12.03 
.53 8.79 -3.90 8.13 
9.96 18.75 4.68 12.81 
-2.42 16.33 3.34 16.25 
1.57 17.90 7.39 23.64 
Source: Derived from previous tables. 
Between the base period and 1957, a better bench mark 
date than recession 1958, the addition to material cost per ton 
of steel amounted to ~!il6.33 and that of la~:or cost $16.25. 
In other words, given a sufficiently long period of time the 
producers may estimate that for each one cent increase in labor 
cost per ton, material costs will also rise by the same amount. 
'I'he usual practice in setting steel prices seems to involve a 
procedure of taking the cents per hour granted in the wage 
package, multiplying this by two to include the expected effects 
on material costs and then multiplying the result by the number 
of manhours necessary to produce one ton of steel. For example, 
a few years ago a wage package of 24 cents per hour was negoti-
ated. At that ttme the number of manhours necessary to produce 
a ton of steel was about twenty. Use of the formula would result 
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in 48 c~nts multiplied by 20; thus arriving at a price increase 
of *;9.60 a ton. The price increase announced was $8.50. The 
difference can be accounted for by the f'act that in about ten 
percent of the product lines which seemed to be under the 
impact of greater competition, prices were maintained a_t old 
levels.l 
The present contract}- signed after a prolonged strike, 
grants the workers a total wage package of about 41 cents per 
hour. Currently it takes about 16.34 man-hours to produce one 
ton of steel. Eventually, the price of steel should rise by 
roughly ~13. 40 a ton. Slnce the negotiations deferred the gains 
to take effect in December of 1960 and October of 1961,, and a 
portion of the contract makes it virtually impossible to estimate 
the size of the increase now; the price increase predicted above 
will probably not be forthcoming at one time. Over the next two 
years the man-hours required to produce steel may also change. 
Investment and modernization have been heavy and favorable pro-
ductivity results can be expected. 
The unlon claims that there are some elements of materials 
and services costs that should be taken into account more 
thoroughly. For the economy as a whole advertising expenditures 
increased 33 percent between 1953 and 1957. To the extent that 
this expenditure increased more rapidly than rises in production, 
it helped to raise per unit costs, This increase in cost flows 
from management decision. Over the same period national output 
rose from seven to ten percent. Real national product rose 
lsee Foot note 1, Page 16~ 
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10.3 percent or at an annual rate of 2.5 percent while industrial 
production rose 6.7 percent or at an annual rate of 1.7 percent. 
Using a base of 1947-49 • 100, the PRINTER'S INK ADVERTISING 
INDEX, seasonally adjusted, s:nows an increase of over 100 
percent to April of 1950.1 The TIDE ADVERTISING INDEX, unad-
,jus ted, and also using the same base, shows a 100 percent increase 
as well.2 To the extent that these expenditures are considered 
unnecessary for competition, the role of the union as the villain 
of the piece is somewhat mitigated. 'r11e advertising expenses 
of steel companias are mot ~:r~ .• d1ly.ll"V-&11a'Q~$- !;or ~~p~~~8on. 3 
Another expenditure in the category of' materials and 
services is that on research and development. Between 1953 and 
1957 tlus rose by some 200 percent. 4 There may have been a 
similar relationship between increases in research and develop-
ment expenses and output for manufacturing firms alone. Since 
real national product rose 10.3 percent and real manufacturing 
product only 6.7 percent from 1953 to 1957, research and 
development expenses ascended twenty times faster than output 
and hence increased per unit cost of output. Before the 1954 
chan:_es in the tax law, part of research and development outlays 
were capitalized over a period of years. The tax revision of 
1954 adaed a new incentive to business by making research outlays 
lu. s., I:epartment of' Commerce, Survey of Current Business, 
April, 1959, p. 58. 
2Ibid. 
3The Statistical Abstract of the u.s. 1957, TADLE 1111, p. 871 
reported advertising expenditures of 0.276 percent of gross sales for 
primary metals industries for 1952. If this figure is used for the 
·steel inQustry, advertising expenses were about &jl38 million, or 40 
cents a ton in 1952. 
4 11 Commentaries on the Relationship of Prices to Economic 
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deductible as current expenses.l As a result, part of what 
w~s reported as profits in 1953 was reported as costs after 1954. 
Since a significant part of the rise in research and 
development expend! ture s included hir:.ng scientists, engineers, 
technicians, and assistants, a portion of the outlays for 
research and development actually show up as a sharp rise in the 
salaried cost per unit of output. Previous data indicated a 
sizeable increase in the millions of hours worked by salaried 
people in the steel industry. It is not known what proportion 
of this change can be classified under research and development 
expenses. 
Between 1953 and 1957, the employment of non-production 
employees in the economy as a whole rose almost 14 percent, most 
of the increase occurring in 1955-57. In a paper on occupational 
shifts in manufacturing employment, Murray Wernick, the Federal 
Reserve Board's :nanpower economiet, states that "expansion in 
employment among non-production workers in recent years has been 
largely accounted for by the extremely rapid rate of hiring pro-
fessional, technological, and kindred workers. The number of 
professiona1,workers increased from 5.4 percent of manufacturing 
employment in 1952 to 7.4 percent in 1957, or a gain of about 
55 percent. 2 
Stability and Growth," Reprinted by the AFL-CIO from The Joint 
Econm!:ic Committee of the Congress of the United .::>tates, October 1, 
19 58 , p. 12 9. 
lrbid., p. 338. 
2See I<'ootnote 1 on Page 86 • 
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Total salary payments rose $7 billion between 1953 and 
1957, much greater than the ~3.8 billion increase in manufacturing 
vh--.,ge payments. This unprecedented rise occurred when output 
rose slowly and forced large increases in the unit costs of labor. 
The number of production and maintenance workers in manufacturing 
declined by 922,000 or mor•e than six percent while the number of 
non-production workers rose by 446,000 or almost 14 percent. 
Clearly, there has been an important rise in the cost of 
material inputs per ton of steel. However, the index per ton 
attained a level of 135.4 by 1957 while the realiz(jd price index 
got up to 149.5 and that of total employment cost per ton 
achieved a level of, 151. 6. Since these two elements absorb some I . 
80 percent of total costs it would appear that profits per 
ton also went up. A later section will demonstrate this fact. 
repreciation and Amortization 
Depreciation charges of non-financial corporations rose 
52.5 percent between 1953 and 1957. The rise for manufacturing 
corporations was undoubtedly about the same proportion.l 'rhe 
1954 change in the tax law on accelerated depreciation contri-
buted to ttds rise. An increase in depreciation charges of 52.5 
percent, when national output increased approximately seven to 
ten percent, pushed up depreciation per unit of output and con-
tributed towards higher pr•ices. ':.'hese:-:charg~es, -of course, are 
not outlays to third parties but become a source offunds inter-
nally for future replacement and even expansion. For example, 
the total number of machine tools installed in metal working 
lcommentaries, .9.£.• Cit., p. 130. 
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industries has declined since 1953. The drop of more than ten 
percent has been made all the more dramatic by the fact that 
by 1958, industrial capacity increased very substantially.l 
'l1he increasing use of multi-station machines--machines 
that can perform anywhere from two to more than one hundred 
operations is one reason for the decline. Another reason is 
the junking of older machines, especially those more than 
twenty years old, which are being replaced by a smaller number 
of new machines that are markedly more productive. A recent 
American £;:achir.1st study found that today 1 s machines are 54 
percent more productive, on the average, than those ten years 
ago, ar.:d a similar stu.dy showed a 40 percent improvement in 
1950 over 1940 models.2 
There were almost 2,500,000 metal-:-cutting and metal forming 
tools in 1953 and the figure fell to about 2,200,000 by 1958. 
Despite this decline there has been an average increase in the 
avera§;e age of equipment. More machine tools are over ten 
years old today than at any time since the thirties--50 percent 
of the metal cutting machines and 62 percent of the metal 
forming machines. This is a four percent increase since 1953.3 
11:uc h of the rise in depreciation per unit of output has 
been due to the tax structure and rising outlays for plant. 
According to the October, 1957, issue of the SURVEY OF CURR8NT 
BUSil~ESS, "by 1956, corporate depreciation charges were 3 or 
lBus ines s Week, November 15, 1958, p .• 128. 
2rbid. 
3Ibid. 
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or 4 billion dollars higher than they would have been had 
the five year write offs and the accelerated depreciation, under 
the 1954 tax changes not applied.nl According to this Commerce 
Department estimate, therefore, about 15 to 20 percent of all 
corporate depreciation charges, in 1956, resulted from chances 
in the tax laws and government policy. Part of wnat was 
reported as profits in 1953 was reported as costs after 1954. 
In the steel industry less than five percent of the sales 
dollar was reported as depreciation costs in the period before 
·world ·war II and in the post-war period it rose to about 
5.2 percent. The table below provides the record since 1947. 
Year 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
TABLE 32 
INDEXES OF DEPRECIATION, PRODUCTION, Al~ D 
CONSTRUCTION COSTS (1947-49 = 100) 
Construction Costs 
Depreciation, 
Amortization Index of Ingot Producer's 
and :8epletion :8epreci- Produc- Department J:t'inished 
per Ton in ation Cost tion of . Goods--
Dollars per Ton Index Commerce Prices 
~.3 .08 83.7 101.4 93.3 92.8 
3.74 105.6 105.5 lC4.0 101.1 
3.E7 107.7 93.1 103.0 106.1 
3.67 103.0 115.6 106.5 108.7 
3.62 101.7 125.6 115.4 119.3 
5.18 142.7 110.9 119.1 121.3 
5.82 163.5 133.2 121.8 123.1 
8.13 228.3 105.4 121.6 124.7 
6.67 187.3 139.7 124.6 128.5 
6.45 181.1 137.2 130.7 138.1 
7.14 200.5 134.6 132.8 144.0 
8.33 234.0 101.8 134.2 146.0 
.~NGIN-
EERING 
NEV'iS 
RSCORD 
92.2 
102.4 
105.4 
113.4 
120.1 
126.4 
132.9 
139.2 
146.2 
153.4 
156.3 
158.2 
lu.s., Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, 
0ctober, 1957, p. 24. 
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The table indicates that depreciation costs per ton rose 
from an average of ~3.56 in 1947-49 to ~7.14 by 1957 or just 
about exactly 100 percent. By 1957 capacity had increased 
about 50 percent while production rose 34.6 percent. The 
depreciation costs per ton, therefore, rose much faster than 
either the capacity to produce or the actual tonnage of output. 
This sharp rise began in 1952, the aftermath of the Korean War, 
when the index shot from 101.7 to 142.7. In the recession years 
of 1954 and 1958, ·the index of depreciation per ton rose well 
above 20~ecause the tonnage produced fell almost 30 percent 
each time. 
I::epreciation may be calculated in various ways. Histori-
cally, depreciation has been determined by charging off the 
original cost of plant or equipment over its anticipated useful 
life. '.J.his s:;raight-line method was designed to measure the wearing 
out of fixed capital from physical use and obsolescence combined. 
This measure of capital consumption was then deducted as a cost 
of coing business in arriving at profits. Obviously, the ade-
quacy of depreciation c barges has an important bearing on the 
accuracy or realistic character of profits in the steel indus try 
because of the high fixed investment per dollar of receipts. 
~r~ purpose behind such deductions is to keep the real 
capital of the enterprise intact. In a period of stable prices, 
the cumulative charge-offs for a given item of plant or equip-
ment will be sufficient to permit its replacement at the end of 
the stipulated productive span. In a period of rlsing prices, 
however, depreciation based on original cost would become increas-
ingly inadequate in maintaining real capital intact. Hence 
reported profit is overstated in a period of inflation. 
Professor R. C. Jones has pointed out: 
The fact is that current charges for depre-
ciation are too low, not because of any real or 
imaginary connection with current replacements, 
but because the past inflation dollars have sub-
stantially less value than did the pre-inflation 
dollars in which the costs were incurred. T~e 
failure to recognize tins purchasing power de~i­
ciency results in an overstatement of taxable in-
come, excessive income '~axes, and an exagf'erated 
return on book investment. 1 
The Department of Commerce states that: 
If current year values of depreciation are 
substituted for the reported values, a measure of 
business profits and of total property income 
results that is more meaningful in many ways 
because all costs as well as gross receipts are 
expressed at a uniform current valuation. 2 
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Official formalized measures for depreciation exist for 
manufacturing industries on a current-year value basis. These 
estimates reveal the extent of the divergence b9tween depreci-
ation as reported for tax purposes and actual depreciation required 
to keep the real stock of corporate assets intact.3 
What the Department of Commerce has done is to estimate 
depreciation at constant cost (1947 prices) as well as original 
costs "by applying information on useful lives to the respective 
lR. C. Jones, "Effects of Price Level Changes On Business 
Income, Capital and Taxes," American Accounting Association, 
1956, p. 80-1. 
2u.s., Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, 
November, 1956, p. 19. 
3u.s., Department of Commerce, "Manufacturing Investment 
Since 1929 in Relation to Employment, Output, and Income," 
Survey of Current Business, November, 1956, p. 8-20. 
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current and constant dollar rurchases of structures and equip-
ment."l After computing depreciation by the straight-line method, 
depreciation at constant cost was converted to current-year cost 
by multiplying the depreciation for each year by the construction 
and price indexes for that year. Of course, this procedure does 
not make adequate allowance for quality changes, better organi-
zation or improved plant layout. The following table provides 
the data. 
Year 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
TABLE 33 
DEPRECIATION OJ., STRUCTURES AND Eo~UiPMENT IN 
IfiAl,lU:B'AC'rURING (Billions of D:)llars) 
Ratio of Cur-
Current Year rent Year to 
Original Cost Costa Original Cost 
2.3 3.6 1.54 
2.7 4.2 1.58 
2.9 4.5 1.52 
3.2 4.8 1.49 
3.5 5.5 1.58 
3.9 5.8 1.50 
4.2 6.1 1.44 
4.5 6.4 1.41 
4.9 '6.7 1.38 
Source: u.s., Department of Commerce, Survey of Current 
Business, November, 1956, p. 11. 
acost prevailing in each year of period. 
The table suggests that from 1947 to 1952, for every $2 
of depreciation set aside on the basis of original cost, it would 
require ~~3 or 50 percent more, to replace the assets. After 1952 
the amount needed does not appear to be so large. 
To return to TABLE32 and the steel industry, depreciation 
costs in steel, even when calculated on the basis of tons produced, 
lu.s., Department of Commerce 
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rose 100 percent by 1957. For every ~2 of orig:nal asset costs, 
it appears that the steel companies are setting aside ~4 in 
cepr·eciation, not ~3. )n the basis of capacity rather than 
act~.;al production the depreciation figures would prove equally 
startling. These costs per ton have gone up :much faster than 
anyone of the three cons true tion or producers' durable goods 
price indexes shown in TABLE 32 for con1parison. On the basis 
of absolute dollars set aside for depreciation, the rise to 1957 
was 180.0 percent or for every ·~-2 of original cost, the steel 
firms have set aside \:;5.60 in depreciation. TA..-:m 32demonstrates 
that construction costs and producers' finished goods prices 
did not increase anywhere near this amount. 
If any conclusion can be drawn, it is that the steel firms 
have understated profits by exceptionally high depreciation 
charges. 'i'hese charges rose 100 percent per ton of steel produced 
from 1947 to 1957 while capacity rose 50 percent and output rose 
34 r:ercent. On the basis of indexes showing the inflated cost of 
construction and equipment, the depreciation charses are also 
excessive. The Department of Commerce estimates that construction 
costs rose 32.8 percent over the same period and that producers' 
- durable goods rose 44 percent. El\GINEEEING 1\EVJS estimates the 
gain to be 56.3 percent. Inclusion of the data stated earlier 
in th::..s section concerning the increased productivity of the new 
machines and equipment serves to buttress the conclusion drawn 
that steel industry capital consumption allowances have been more 
than adequate since 1947. Higher profits to compensate for claimed 
lnadequate depreciation allowances due to inflation do not seem 
to be required. 
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Profits, therefore, have beer.;. understated and publisned 
returns on net worth are somewhat misleading as a result. 
In arriving at the rate of return on net worth, it is impera-
tive to recognize the distortions in both the numerator a~d 
denominator of t~e equation; the base called net worth and the 
share called profits: 
Profits After Taxes • The Rate of Return 
Net Worth 
It is true, of course, that in inflation the figures 
on investment as taken from company books relate to the past 
cost in years in which prices are lowe::", 'i'his effect in steel 
is not likely to be exceptionally important because the net 
additions to fixed assets are only a small part of the existing 
stock of assets in any given yaar. The numerator of the fraction 
may be considerable understated as depreciation allowances are 
excessive in the· sense described above, especially under tax 
rates that are high. 
Interest Costs 
Funds for expansion are raised from internal sources such 
as retained profits and depreciation allowances,and e~ternal 
sources such as the sale of equity and debt instruments and 
borrowing from financial institutions. Capital consumption 
allowances are used in general to purchase equipment for replace-
ment but to the extent that the new equipment is superior, it 
may 1)e said that the inc.reased output for a given expenditure of 
depreciation dollars constitutes expansion. 
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~he table below summarizes the sales of bonds and stocks by 
the sixteen largest ste,l companies from 1946 to 1956. The data 
were ob~ained from ar;nual reports issued by these companies. 
The tabulation is not a complete record of all external financing 
because it omits all short-term borrowing from insurance co:npanies 
and banks, borrowing from customers, issuance of securitles to 
acquire other properties and the sale of stock under employee 
options. 
As against these exclusions, which hold the total down, the 
tabulation does not show the extent to which debt was retired 
as a result of sinking fund operations and repayments of serial 
obligations. In the eleven year period, 1946 to 1956, these 
sixteen companies sold ~·1, 498.5 millions of securities. rrhe 
table below shows the division of this total. 
Over the period, 88 percent of the external financing 
involved the sale of bonds and only 12 percent stocks. It is 
evident that the tax situation has encouraged "trading on the 
equity." For all corporations Bonds and Notes averaged about 
73 percent of corporate offerings over the same period.l 
The Securities and Exchange Commission estimates that in 
1956, of a total of ~10,950 million in new securities issues, 
27.8 percent of the total was Rtock. It should be borne in mind 
that these totals include all types of companies including 
publ1Q utilities and the steel firms. Utilities typically 
raise a large proportion of external funds through debt issues. 
l"Econornic Report of the President," January, 1957, p. 184. 
TABLE 34 
TOTAL STOCYS ANI BONDS SOL4 SIX:PEEN 
STEEl, C01V!PAN IES, 1946-56 
Year 
1946 
194? 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
Amount 
6?,163,660 
51,300,000 
?1,500,000 
60,800,000 
113,?20,000 
22?,341,833 
203,096,000 
29,624,86? 
300,000,000 
225,?56,800 
148, 2?~_080 
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TOTAL 1,498,5?8,240 • Bonds 1,002,5~0,5~? 
Convertible Bonds 
Common and Pre-
ferred Stock 
324,491,?00 
1?1,546,013 
l,'::c98,5?8,240 
Source: "Ecor:omic Report of the President," January, 
195?, p. 184. 
Hence, for manufacturing alone, stock sales a hould be higher 
than the 2?.8 percent noted above. 
Steel companies have apparently relied to a considerable 
extent upon the bond market for expansion funds and also to a 
larger extent than manufacturing as a whole. Since interest pay-
menta are costs, it is also evident that interest costs per ton 
of steel produced have risen substantially, contributing to higher 
steel prices. The table below demonstrates the extent to which 
this has occurred. 
Although they are a minor part of total costs, it is 
obvious that interest costs per ton have soared. Since they are 
fixed costs, in recession years when output is low the index 
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rises sharply. In 1958 the operating rate was low (60.6 percent), 
and the interest index per ton jumped to 372.8. 'rhe sharp 
increase began in 1952 and by 1957 had increased by some 131.8 
percent per ton of steel produced. Part of the increase has been 
due to higher interest rates, but a major part has been due to 
heavy reliance upon bond financing. 
'l'ABLE 35 below also sl1ows the significance of the business 
cycle on interest costs per ton of steel: From 1951 to 1954 the 
operating rate fell and the index of interest costs per ton rose 
from 114.0 to 205.3; while from 1957 to the 1958 recession, the 
rise went from 231.8 to 372.6. 
Year 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
TABLE 35 
IN 'I'ERsST C0Sr.1S PER 'I'ON OF S'l'EEL IN Il''DEX J:HlJ'J3ERS 
AJ<"D IN AESOLUT:S DOILAPS (1947-49 • 100) 
Index of. Index of Interest 
Interest Costs Interest Costs Costs in 
Per Ton Per Ton Absolute Dollars 
~~. 24 91.2 92.5 
.25 95.0 100.2 
.30 114.0 107.3 
.28 106.4 124.3 
.30 114.0 140.9 
.50 190.1 210.5 
.52 197.4 272.5 
.54 205.3 214.5 
•. 49 186.3 216.0 
.49 186.3 276.5 
.61 231.8 323.4 
.98 372.6 393.9 
Source: American Iron and Steel Institute, Annual Statis-
tical Reports. 
In the prosperous expansion period after Yvorld War II, 
1946-1953, approximately one-half of corporate capital structure 
growth was retained earnings and one-half securlty financing; 
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of the latter, about two-thirds were bonds and notes, and one-
third stocks, Current debt, in the form~ of bank loans, accounts 
payable, income tax liability, and accrued expenses, accounted 
for about as much growth as security financing.l 
The following table provides data for industry as a whole, 
and the steel firms comprising 93 percent of the ingot production 
and reporting to The Amerlcan Iron and Steel Institute. 
mpreciation: 
Retained Profits: 
External: 
TABLE 36 
SOURCES OF PUNDS 1947-58 
(Billions of Dollars) 
s·:rEEL 
Dollars Percent 
$6.2 50 
4.7 
1.5 
38 
12 
ALL CORPORATIONS 
Dollars Percent 
&~106. 3 40 
95.5 
63.5 
36 
24 
Source: American Lron and ~teel Institute, Annual Statis-
tical Reports 1947-1958; "Economic Report of the President," 
January, 1959. 
'rhe table shows that the steel companies relied upon 
depreciation as a source of funds to a much larger extent than 
all corporations and minimized outside sources of financing 
when compared to all firma. While the retained profit propor-
tion is slightly higher for steel, this figure is somewhat depressed 
by the high depreciation totals. 
lH. G. Guthmann and H. E. Dougall, Corporate Financial Policy 
(New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1955), p. 507. 
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It is often charged that American consumers are paying 
for the costs of expansion because they pay the higher prices 
necessary to generate retained earnings and excessive depreciation 
allowances. Failure to seek external sources of financing indicates 
that the concept of risk capital has been diluted. However, this 
argument is countered by steel firms pointing out that retained 
earnings should be used in such a way as to yield essentially 
the same rate as that earned by existing common equity, and that 
this rate is at least an approximate indication of their cost. 
It is true that all earnings are received by stockholders. 
When earnings are not distributed, the stockholder foregoes 
divident income and hence, there is a real cost to him. But 
it should be recognized that the validity of this line of reason-
ing is based on the idea that monopoly returns are not pre sent, 
that sufficient competition exists. Otherwise the dividends 
distributed may be adequate or more than adequate and the firms 
could still have retained earnings of a sizeable nature. 
'I'he record suggests that a monopoly return exists in steel. 
For example, profits for u.s. Steel rose from 4:f,86.6 million in 
1946 to $348.1 million in 1956, or 293 percent; while tonnage 
increased by one-third. At the same time, the retained earninES 
rose from ~28. 6 million to ~pl78 million or 534 percent and the 
common stock dividend rose from ~34.8 million to ~144.9 million, 
or 316 percent. 
The follow:tng table illustrates the record for the U.S. 
Steel Corporation. 
TABLE 37 
DIVIDENDS AND EARNINGS PER SHARE 
UNITED STATES STE.b."'L COMPANY 
Number of Common 
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Earnings Per Common Stock Stock Shares Out-
Year Share Dividend Standing (in millions) 
1948 $11.99 *'5.00 8.7 
1949 5.39 1.00 26.1 
1950 7.29 3.45 26.1 
1951 6.10 3.00 26.1 
1952 4.54 3.00 26.1 
1953 7.54 3.00 26.1 
1954 6.46 3.00 26.1 
1955 6.44 3.15 53.49 
1956 6.01 2.60 53.49 
1957 7.33 3.00 53.49 
1958 5.13 3.00 53.49 
Source: Mood:z:'s IA:a.nual, 1958. 
In 1948, there were 8.7 million common shares outstanding. 
A three for one split in 1949 increased the number of shares out-
standing to 26.1 million and a two for one split in 1955 resulted 
in 53.49 million shares outstanding. An owner of one share in 
1948 would have received accumulated dividends of $118.50 over 
the eleven year period, or an average of $10.77 a year. The 
highest price the share was ever traded for on the exchange was 
~97.50 and that was in 1958. The low in 1958 was ~51.62. Under 
the assumption that the owner sold his now accumulated six shares 
for the 1958 low of :j!>51.62, he would have received over the period 
a total of $428.22 in dividends plus appreciation of a long term 
variety, or an annual retum of almost :ti;39, a part of which is 
subject to the 25 percent capital gains tax. ~inca the stock 
never sold for a price as high as ~100 a share from 1948 to 1958, 
it is evident that on the most conservative estimate, the return 
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exceeds 40 percent per year. ~a tn this record, any company 
t~at can also retain sizeable earnings must be in a monopoly 
position, and foregone dividends do not represent a real cost 
to tr1e shareholder. 
Summary of C:oncl!:!~~ , :- :' c· 
In an attempt to su~narize the position of the steel 
firms operating about 93 percent of the ingot·capacity, the 
data of the previous sect:Lons have been brought toga ther in 
the·. following table. 
Year 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
Index of 
Realized 
TABLE 38 
INDEXES Ol~' COSTS, PRICBS, AND 
PROFITS PER TON (1947-49:100) 
Index of 
Index of, Index of Profits per 
'l'otal Profit per Ton 
Prices per Costs per Ton Before After 
Ton Ton a Taxes Taxes 
89.1 90.7 80.9 81.4 
104.0 104.4 104.5 102.9 
107.0 104.9 114.5 112.3 
110.5' 108.3 157.2 134.2 
124.6 117.4 180.5 106.5 
129.0 144.2 106.9 96.7 
128.6 126.3 150.7 108.2 
130.5 130.2 ·133.2 117.4 
131.4 124.4 181.3 153.6 
146.0 142.2 181.6 160.0 
149.5 14:3.6 186.9 164.2 
158.5 157.3 169.7 151.5 
aTotal costs include labor costs; hourly, salaried and 
other benefits; depreciation; amortization and depletion costs; 
materials; freight and other service costs; and interest costs. 
It will be noted from the table that in every year, except 
for 1952, since 1949, the index of realized prices per ton has 
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}{ept ahead of the index of costs per ton. In recession 1958 the 
two indexes come closer to equality. Profits, therefore, have 
increased for each ton produced. The year 1952 proved an exception 
in a somewhat spurious marmer. This was the year that deprecia-
tion expenses shot up for the first time and combined with a 
labor cost and material cost index that rose sharply as well. 
Both the price index and the labor cost index increased consid-
era;.ly above those of comparable indexes in other industries or 
for the economy as a whole. Apparently the steel firms have 
monopoly price power and have been sharing this with a union able 
to push up labor costs per unit drastically. '.L'he labor force has 
not only captured the produc ti vi ty gains for itself, bv.t has 
forced the firms to exercise marl.{et power as well and have 
also shared in this. 'J:'he consumer, with no alternatives to 
steel, has paid for this power. A larger share of total purchasing 
power in the economy has funneled to these two' groups, making 
the role of competitors in other inQustrie~ such as agriculture 
and railroads more difficult. 
The columns of profit indexes per ton, both before and. after 
tax•3s, suggest that especially since 1955, the companies have beer. 
able to maintain successfully their position in tp.e face of a 
risine labor cost index that is sizeable. Price increases are 
the outlet when substitutes are lacking. 
TABLE 39 below is an attempt to analyze the cost and profit 
CO:-!lposi tion of the total increase in revenue per ton. This 
represents an approximation to the change in the price of steel 
and tries to show how the various elements of cost contribute 
to t~e price increase. 
TABLE 39 
VARIOUS COS·rs ANr REAIJIZED REVENU3S 
P BR TON O:B' STEEL 
Realized Revenuea 
Total Employment 
Costb 
Jvi:a te rials and 
~ransportationc 
Depreciation and 
Depletiond 
Interest Cos tse 
'::axe sf 
Profit Per.Tong 
1947-49 
Average 
$.>Per Ton 
96.24 
33.83 
46.43 
3.56 
.26 
5.77 
6.39 
1957 
~?Per Ton 
143.69 
51.52 
62.76 
7.14 
.61 
11.16 
10.55 
Percentage 
Increase 
1957-49 
To 1957 
49.5 
51.6 
35.0 
101.0 
132.0 
94.0 
65.0 
Sources: acalcula ted from TABiill 29 
bsee TABL;:!; 26 
c See 1'ABLE 30 
dsee TABLE 32 
eSee TABLE 35 
fsee TABLE 38 
gSee TABLE 38 
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Analysis of 
Cause of In-
cr,3ase in Rev-
enue Per Ton 
(Percent) 
100 
37.2 
34.4 
7.5 
0.7 
11.3 
8.9 
Over the period 1947-49 to 1957, the table demonstrates 
that the realized revenue from steel rose about 49 percent or 
much less than the amounts indicated by BLS and AISI data. 
Of this rise, total employment costs of hourly and salaried 
personnel plus all other benefits contributed 37.2 percent, 
while the costs of materials, transportation, and other services 
contributed 34.4 percent. Of the price increase shown, higher 
depreciation contributed a weight of 7.5 percent, higher interest 
costs 0.7 percent, higher taxes 11.3 percent and higher profits 
8.9 percent. In dollar terms, profits rose ~~4.16 per ton. If 
it were not for the simple fact that materials costs rose the least 
of all items over the period, the increase in realized revenue 
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(prices) would have been much greater. In other words, realized 
revenue rose by ~47.45 per ton or 49.5 percent; while materials 
costs rose from $46.43 to ~i;62.76 a ton, or ~16.33, an increas-e 
of 35 percent. If materials costs per ton had risen as much as 
total employment costs (5l~e~cent), the rise in materials costs 
would have been ~~23. 68 rather than $16.33; and prices would 
have been forced up even fur thur by the ~~7. 35 per ton difference. 
Thus, while employment costs and materials costs rose 
less percentagewise than capital costs, profits, and taxes, 
they represent a larger share of the total increase in unit 
costs because of their large absolute size in the total 
composition of costs. 
The conclusions drawn here are similar to those of Eckstein 
and Fromm.l The figures are slightly different however, partly 
because they use 1958 as the terminal period and partly due 
to coverage. Since 1958 was a recession year, it seems reasonable 
to choose 1957 as a better benchmark date to compare with a 1947-
49 average. Eckstein and Fro:mm also use for their revenues and 
costs only those associated with the production of steel itself. 
It may also appear reasonable to assume that steel executives 
base their decisions on all their activities such as even the 
sale of by-product gas. Therefore, the dollar revenue figures 
shown here run slightly higher. Eckstein and Fromm's revenue 
per ton was ~13$.88 in 1957 while here it is $143.69; their 
employment cost was ~49.04 per.ton in 1957 while here it is 
~~51.52; and their materials costs of ~?59.85 per ton compares with 
1o. Eckstein and G. Fromm, op~.cd.t~. 
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~62.76 a ton here. In other words, it is claimed here that 
the BLS and AISI price indexes do not accurately assess the 
situation in steel to compare prices and costs and a new 
"implicit raalized price index" was calculated along the lines 
used in the "GNP deflator." This 11 implici t price index" includes 
all of steel's activities and hence all costs must be used if 
an adequate comparison is to be made. lt seems likely that 
steel executives are concerned with all of these activities 
and not with steel ingot production alone. 
CHAPTER V 
THE PRICING PROCESS IN STEEL 
This chapter attempts to present evidence concerning the val-
id! ty of that portion of the hypothesfs which asserted that when 
the upward shifting demand for steel fails to rise continuously, 
either falls or reaches a plateau accompanied by a downtrend in 
the rate of utilization of capacity, the change may be seen as 
altering the long-term volume prospect. The appearance of this 
anticipation leads to an increase in the markup to produce the 
desired rate of return on equity. As moderate inflation con-
tinues, the desired rate of return is revised upward, i.e., 
the profit target shifts upward and steel price increases under 
such circumstances must be quite sizeable. Oligopolistic 
product market power permits such an adjustment. 
Therefore, the intent of this chapter is to demonstrate 
that an upward shift in the profit target appeared in the 
latter part of the period when output fell and extensive excess 
capacity appeared. In addition, administered pricing in steel 
will be examined under various conditions of utilization of cap-
acity in order to indicate that steel prices are raised by a 
higher amount when shipments of steal are falling and excess 
capacity grows than under the opposite circumstances; thus 1m-
proving the unions' ability to achieve differential·wage gains. 
Although Gardner Means' definition of administered 
pricing embraces those "set and held constant for a period 
of time" and thus can represent prices of a department 
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st;o::.oe o:r' rJstaurant, t:1ey ar.e Lot of sjcnii'icant concern because 
y,ri t< a decr>ease in demar:d the r,rice is lowered anci t:le ::B.rket 
1• '"' c 1 e ,., 1'6 c 1 .;,) '... 0 ... In as muc~ as t~1.e 1eve 1 of economic ac ti vi ty 
affects t;1e standarcs \.:.sed in any discussion of t~'le bet1avior 
of :rc:toLopol;• r:rices, it is advanta,seous to use t;-cree ciff'erent 
s tac0 s of ac ti vi ty as a base: ( 1) se riot: sly ae:rre s sed pe rioC.s; 
(2) rerioC:s of ;·nod·Jrate underutilization of capacity; (3) per.~.ods 
of rros_r:erity. 
:.'hat prices in oJ..jgo:rol-tstic iDcustries, includinr .. steel, 
tend to r0mair. rel.s ti ve 1;,~ inflexible in serio': s 1y cer:re s sed 
rerioc' s is surrorted :-'1ainl7 b'" three bodies of evidence and 
anal.ysis. _;_•irst, L1e study noted by 3. : eans about which 
i n v o 1· v e· d ~- a s t~;. tis ticql analysis showing the rela t-
lons -'~P be tween concentr·:1tion and rrices c1uring tne e 8rly part 
of the 1930 1 s. Second, e.lso by ~··~eans and covering..- the sa~ne 
perioo, a series of exa:71ples of products wl thir. t:1e sa:ne 
cor:noci ty ~:roups, with the goods of i'lL: . .::1 concan tra tion tenctnt;; 
to ce ~tons l;r& te rii~ :id:t t~' in :;: ric in;.: while th·.:: se of low cone en tra tion 
1~:.." connection with inflation, the important fact is not 
tn.D."G ad.mii:istsred prices may not change often, but tn.at v>c1en 
t-ley do, they' tcm:~· to rise rstner t~1an fall. A 'C.S. i3ur~au 
of Lc:: ·.r statistics jtucy exa.nined 1,789 co:nmooi.ties month 
b nor:t:1 for the ti:U>ee ytJars 1954-56, a ;eriod ••hen the Wl.Ole-
s le pr·ice level w&s relc;~ively stable for two yuars and moved 
l4 soornewhet in lS56. in the total list, the };rices of 36 commo-
d~.ties, or 5.4 percent c5id not chans.e, 65 or 3.6 percent had 
onl;' nega ~1 ve chani· e s ( ci:langinc from 1 to 5 tL:.e s) and. 655 or 
36.6 rercent" OLly rose (changir:g fror:1 1 to 13 times); and the 
re:naLt:ing EA.4 percent :noved botl-1 up a:nd cown. An examination 
of tr.~.e ites:a ctsclosed t:1at those witLl active mar~rets fluctuated 
t·1e most, t.J.o~;e nic:1l:y l'abricateo and fr ;quently related to 
c:,.er;1icals or metal onl"'-' rose. (r.s., Joi.nt ~;cono;nic Committee, 
Frequency 0~1 C;~~-~n iJ.oless.le Pr~ces, ·.',ashL<·ton, 195C:). 
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sllOi.'<ed flexibili ty. 1 '.::.curd, a lar.:~e number of i<ientical pro-
d.uc ts v:ere compared as to their r rice be tl.B.vior in tvw de pres-
sions, l89J-J7 a11d 1929-33 aeG. t~1e results in.Cicated that the 
ir1dustries whicCl re:nained competitive in '~he interval exrerlenced 
flexible prices in bot~~ c1epressions, v;h.lle t~~ose incus tries 
tlEt b.Jcame heav:"'-l:Y concentrated by 1938 tGnded to develop in-
flexibile price behavior.2 
·.::.':le work by "'·eans :1-as been crl ticized Ofl V<;r:· ous groum~s. 
_.'irst, it was clain:ec ttl.B.t the price data which ne used, the 
~\LS rr::_ce series, do not r.aflect hld.de!l co:..-.:_cessj_ons. 
~xtras are adcitlons tot~ base price for specifications 
otner t!lau those supplie0 at the ba::;e r;rice. '::. 1e base r:.rice 
is established f'or a rarticuLJr item in a praticular quantity; 
if tne customer specifies another size, gauge, chenical or 
physic a}. property or quantity, an "extra" is ci.1ar[:;ed. A study 
of tde prices oi' e i[>lt steel prodt<c ts showed that 11 extras" 
VS~ried from one anc one-half percent to 35 percent with an 
• •z av3ra;~;e of 14 r:ercent of t;·1e C'eliVel'Od r~r~ce.w For the 
i_nc>istry generally, extras have become an :i.ncreasir;.gly sig-
r ificant factDr aLa are particularl;: imrortant to t:.~e snaller 
.:\1e l.s.tter concentrate on speci:;.l steel .Ln 
s';lall quantities for which extras are frequently [reater L1an 
lThe Structure of the .nrr ... erican GCOLomy, Gardner ,:eans, 
~-C:L t., Part 1. 
2~To:m. ~H~ir, 11 3conorr.ic Conce11trat!on anc~- =...epressio~ .!:rice 
Fl[,idi ty, 11 A:nerican EcorD:nic Review, Papers and I'rocoeaings 
( : .. a y, 19 5 5 ) • 
3u.s., GLS, Consumers Prices of Jtee1 Products, 1943. 
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t'19n r~h.e rubL.s"::J.ed price. 
Actual c.lelivered rr:tces raic by s 1 eel consumers how·ever, 
co:~;Ddt ti'e or in recession, redu.ct.LorJ.s from publis~1ec: prices 
e.re rcaoe in t 1e form of (iscou.nts, v:aivin[,; of ext:ra ch& :rgcs, 
an t• . • 1 o ... ,:er concessJ.ons. As capacity orer·atior1s ?!'e :reached 
t~1es·3 concess::.ons are d:rorped, the:reby increas.:nG actual prices 
r~aid until L1ey arrroac>ted or exceeded pub1is2ed prices. 
~~lli increase in actual prices paid by consumBrs from 1938 
to Arril, 1941, was es tLnG. t8d to l"~ 13 percent for t:1e whole 
in( us try a:..,(l was notably larger for the in tegratec r:roducers. 2 
All effective price chanc;e can also occur if t1:1e geograr;hl-
a larser pro~ortion of total shir~ents by a co~rany are sold to 
1.,., s~ness '"'e<> 1r 1\ t 16, 1958 p 30 11 I t·' •c···""'l f DU • .1. 1 " "'"'', .""l.U,2:Us , , • • .. r; 'l.e '"l QC e 0 
Aucust, 1'J58, a recessiun year, stoeJ WEd rais:i.ng its prices 
::1xcopt 1'or s~.ainless steel. ·~:-.le latter appe~:rs to 'l.ave e:r1cotm-
te:t·c;c' severe compet:i.tion in man~r r:rod1;ct usos fro:::-:-c other t:la ter-
ials su.c 1. as al1:rainum. .So 1:·;h.ile all other steel rrlces ·.:e:,~e 
r:!sing, U.S. o.,}teel cut the price of stainles-~ by ~,-100 a ton. 
Along with the C'Jt wer:t so~rre ch8r1fes in pricine; roJ.icy. .'radi-
t:loi,ally, steel w~c-reh01.~se:r•s anc jobt;ers who sell :::nuc~l of the 
nation's stainless got a discount from the 1ills--ten percent 
na stainless they stock ar_d sell, arc five percent on stainless 
t;·,e;' sc::ll buy do not stock. .._'fie discounts v,;ere jettiscnea in 
t.J.e soft ~nar\e t becau-,e the sell:!nc warehousers coulo use them 
to u:ccercut the ~nilJ. fl'ice on b:l.g Drders t:J.a t woulc ordinarily 
._o to L1e ;·;Iills. ..:iince warehouse acitivity is :r.Jade up primarily 
~f s~all order busin8ss, the a~era;e sale of stainless rlate 
b:ing urC::er 1,000 pounds, u.s . ..)teol reduced from 10,000 to 
5,0JO pounc":s the mininmm order which. a Wbrehouse had to place 
befor·e 1 t pald an extrs.. ...h.: s procedure helps to b1..<ilG. the kind 
of business the prod:.~cer lll.::es best--blg, heavy pieces • .:.'he 
; 100 cut appl:led to all ~--r~1des, Wtlic l. varie(: in prlce fro~n 
·:700 tc >1, 500 a ton. 
2 :f'fice of i'r' ce h-dministration, Stc.dies in :::ndustrial .i:'rice 
Control, 1947, p. 41. 
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CL:StO"'lers located closer to te1e flant, t1.e freif:ht C~arges 
decrease anc in a sense accrue to the seller• and effective 
rrJ_cefl as revenue to the selJer undergo less chsn,:_e than appe::,.rs 
ohvlous. J..he complair_ts of' the inc3ustry to the Office of Price 
Ac:mi_nis tra tlon durin.. t'1e WRT' obviously showed that tonna~ e 
traveled furt!mr as dislocations develored, and the reduced 
phantom f're i[(at 1ovF:Jred prcf:t t levels. 
-:i. sagre r~1e n t on how widely, if at all, "extre_s" are traced 
t ~ .... 1 away seems o ex~s~. ~)r: July 1, 1960 hatlonal 'Tube increased 
i~s dealer Ciscount on star.dard pipe from three to five percent 
aLe other producer·s followed. 'I'hi.s ·rove arparently saved 
t:1e customel'S nothing, however, because lt seer::ed to be ai1r1ed 
at ss.vin:.?_ t!-1e cistributor ."3.25 per ton ip order to induce 
him to vv-ork harder in movins plpe anc to keep h:Lcr. f'rc·m taking 
on the c"istrihution of foreign L;:.ports.2 At t~e sane time 
l:!.ne ~;ipe procuc ers 2:ave s tanc~ard pipe r"i s :ribu tors a five r:;ercen t 
discount on some types of line pipe UfOD whic~ a discount had 
n'3Y~r been ;~ranted • ..Lt vws noticeable t:wt t:1.ese cuts came in 
~-nlD.nd ou~rl:e ts anc: reflected t~1.e reopeni:t ~- season for the St. 
Lawrence se,=,v•ay, 9.nd hence greater foreign competition. '.1.'wo 
ot]l.er rGglonal p:t'odvcers, vregon Steel anc Atlar.tic Steel, cut 
r,;rices on hot finished bar·s, lig~t structural shapes, nails, 
reinforcing bars, and merchant wire proC't:cts by Jul~' of 1960, 
ar:a1n to m:et foreit;I· co~:1J.:etition • 
. ,:=1jor procc.:.cers ac: well as s1naller o.nes C\.It rre-stressed 
strand wire prlces while sev3ral specialty procucers cut certain 
lEusine ss ·,\eek, J-anuary 23- January 3J-1~60, p. 28 and 36 
resrectively. 
nusiness :eek, Ju1y 23, 1960, p. 31. 
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extr•a c'~larzes on several t-ypes of vacuum meltec tool m1d air-
crt~_i't steel.l Ir 1 •• arcrl of 1960, raw and f_inlsned steel con-
duit tL,_bular ;:.~rodncts were C1Jt th1~eo pere:ent in a belatad .nove 
to :-na tc h: a cut aluminum hac nade months before on invading 
the conduit ma.rket.2 
'I'r1e se cuts ref}ect products under compet:L tion from foreign 
rrodt,cers, unC.er comp3 ti tion fro'1 products of' other inc.i strie s 
such as aluminum in certain uses, or hit;hly speciali;;::c::d steels. 
'Cr·s.de op~ni.on a:;::pes.red to_lean on rrice Cl}tting of a hi,sh.l~r 
selectiv8 sort whic 11 ai'-:ec_ at the rroc:'ucts imported :.n .:rre'-lt8st 
voJ ume. Jree;on ar:c1 Atlantic Steel ar'-' small non-lnte;;rated 
producers using onl~J steeJ scrap in mal-dn[;: their steel. lt 
hur·ts L-Lem less to cut prices w:1en t~1e scrap :na ;:et is so 
?.: 
cepre s sed. 0 '?he majors have not a1-:-pe ared to follow the price 
c,tt~.n;:-~ sentiment of these small firms • .L.ethlehe:n's Pacific 
Coast r:'vision at SeE:ttle met the comp titian of Jree_,0£1 how~.Jver, 
but only on the slzes _r::roduced by Jre;·on .:lteel. In other -vvor<is, 
L1e inte~·rated hur.e pr•od,;cers perrni t some nibblir1g of their market 
w1en the nib,_lers are so s:1ell that they cannot ;.;:ain too much 
n-:-; tne exrense of the nmjors or in certain special s i tua ti ons 
such as highly srectallzed steel :rrodncts and :t'oreign compe-
ti tlon. If any ,E;ains are ,r.ade 1 t may be at the expense of 
foreisners. 
1 ~bi­~·, P. 31. 
:;~Business '.-.eek, J.~-arch lJ, 1960, p. 38. 
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i 1·; s:1ould lle stress'Jd, howe1r:r, that criticisr:l of' ~f'ailure 
to r':dlect ~tdden concessi··ns may be valio only if discourts 
Lecorne more inrorbnt 1n e. ser:tous1y 6o:rrass0d period for 
y.r·oc'v.cts of hiC~1 concentration rat':.1er than for :rroducts of 
low concentration. ~cncessions :nay arply in the latter sphere 
as we 11. Yet ro sue h showint:, has even be en de ;lons tra t;ed. In 
adci ticn, ··-eans tool{ extraordinary pains to re::1ove the prod.uc ta 
in ~lis s tucy for w:~ic ;l t-1e r rice data appe e. red to be seriously 
~-oe vvor~c b;.' '"eans snowed that empirical f'i ncSin:_: s ':.ere com-
rectible wit: ti·~e --:odern theor•ies of imperfect competition. 
:t v:oulc involve a locical inconsistency to accept the t>1eore-
tical v.crk of Chamberlin ar1d B.obinson and reject the statis-
tical work of ;. eans. C!J.ambe rlin presented the r:1os t fua(iam.en tal 
reason v•hy prices in concentrated inc': us tries may be expected 
to stay relatively inflexible d.uring a de pres sec reriod of 
econc~::-dc activity. 
If eac~1 see~c'' ::1.~.s maximun rrofi t rationally 
and intelligently, he Y<:Lll realize L1at when there 
are tv:o or or;!.:\r a fe\'! s.,llers nis own move hs.s 8 
conaidera·;·le effect upon ~is co ~peti tors, ar'd that 
this ··a~:es it idle to suppose that they v.-~1.11 accept 
without rstali9.t1on the losses he :forces upon them. 
S'lnce t~le result of a cut b;v ar~y one is inovitabjy 
to c:ecl,•-3 ase :11 s own profits, nc; one wi 11 cut, and 
al t~l01',3:h the selle1,s are inderendent, the equili-
brium result is t,le san--e as tho·ugn t:nere were a 
:nonoroli stic agree:P-en t amon;I them.l 
·~-'he foregolns explains an oliz~opclist's actir}ns only 
v:'l.en he is consicerin[ a decrease in price. :=.uring per:i.ods of 
l:.:c:;. C~1.a>.1berlin, ·.:.';;,e 'I !:leo rv of !-,Ioncroli s tic Co,npe ti tion 
( Car,lbric~-,:e: riarvarc3 Uni vc;rs i ty Press, 5t cl 1l:di tion, 1947), 
p. 48. 
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ft•]_] carac 1 ty Opei'8 tion~ it WOuld b3 ra.Y.·e to e 1 .- cjn CO l•S iCier a 
price r :;auction; and ev:::ri when there is only a moderate amount 
of iciJ.e capacity, t1e di.rection of ;:rice chB.tlte is rsrely 
( ov;nwe.r·d .1 
':'!·1is is also another reason to explain the failure of 
oJ_lfO~~olist 1 s to re(uce price ar;6 t~1is rGaso~1 is arplicable 
to all perioc's and involves tJ.--"e elasticity of Cenand. l-nless 
V·1e ce:r..a::-:d :t s suf'f:ic ien tly e ln s tic, a lo-r.er price is not 
l;:Jt 1er r·easons :'lave been acvancec for tn.ls type of ba!.lB.Vior. 
Sorr.e empll.a.SiS has lJe.;:m rlaced pal'ticularly upon the rostronable 
nature of ~Gmand for durable ~cads anc producers' or capital 
goods. 
olson and Vel~ concluded: 
11 It :rust be re co.sr:izeo tr1er... that for each 
indivic\.al cm-r,.mocity, prlce is but one of the 
factors deter:nininc; its level of productlon. 
Post:;:.onabillty of de'·1and r:1ust certalnly be con-
sicered. 'l'he Latt1re of the productive process 
is important. '"-'he effect of' price c~1ac_es uron 
procuction is ~Je cessarily dj_fferent, t)o, for 
IIOducts ,.,::-1ose C:eruanC: is joint tLan for those 
Vvh0S8 Ce.a.:.and. iS independent. II 
( ~>ee ,_,. ~,;elson and .v. ~-eim, "Price '-)e::lavior and ..insinsss Policy," 
'onofraph -~;o. 1, :::. L. E. C., 1940, p. 41-2.) 
'0~l()FJ: an.Ci Crowder and Ioblin r·::Jached similar co nc lv.si ons. 
·::.' ·.Le r:os tpcn;abi li ty of" t:1e replace11ien t demand for many goods, 
such as autornob:.les, 'na:y also be Lnr-ortant. Ihese ..:'.oods 1::1re 
.~8_de to yield a lar·(;er amour. t of s·Jrvi ce, vrhi le the s·t1aller 
:"~LCOF~.e s are used for those nece s .:aries o:f life which are con-
suraed in shorter perioc's of ti:ne. '..L'he type of ,_ ood, wi:et 1er prod-
ucers' or consumers 1 , therefore, arpe ':irs to play a s~_gr:ificant 
role in co terminin:! t.he flexibi 1i ty of prices v,· it 0. the consumers 1 
non-durabJo gooc tenci:i.n:', to exhibit ti'le greatest degree of flexi-
bill ty and produ.cers 1 durable goods being :nore often ir:cflexible. 
As Thorp and Crowder have pointed out in .contrastin~~ output 
dhan8es for consumers'· and producers' goods: 
" •• changes in quantity out:~:ut for equal 
changes in price must b; accounted for in 
ter:ns of t 1e vs~··:i.a tion ln t~1e nature of 
ecor:o~ic characteristics of the goods them-
selvesas reflected in the demand schedules for 
t~1e p:rodt:.cts and not in terrns of price policies • 11 
( See .v. :!:. • :;.'ho;r>p aLd -~·.. .F'. Crowder, 11 'I' he Structure of Indus try, n 
!.~onoc,rari'1 ro. 2'7, .r. I. E. c., 1941) 
-- Iron and s te::Jl pro duets are durable and usually are 
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Vlt;;.rraD ted, since if ar: oligopolist as sumec that to tal de :nand 
v;ere elastic ;1e may be disposed to cut price even if the cuts 
are L:1rnedlately matched. 1-iis expectation, of course, wotld 
_rrice V\Ould ba more than offset b:y an increase in sales 
frc!:1 ,-lis si1&re of t~e business.l 
;:re:dncel's' 2·coC::s. lt is J,ot unexpected, theref0!'0, that these 
f rices tend to b<J iL.flexible. !,or is l t sur_r:risin6 tila t iron 
and s tee~~ 1-:roduc ti 0n tenc:i s to drop v-:;ry s harpl;:· durir1g rer·iods 
of recession or depression. 
l~j~ ~emand for steel products is essentially erived and 
c.epends to a considerable axtent upon t::1e de'Tiand for t~1e end 
rrsd ~:c ts for wt1ich s tee 1 is used. ~··or exa:n:r le, t~1e large up-
sur:;e in auto:nobile de10.and in 1~55 was not checked because of 
H ri:1e in tne r:,rlces of steel sheets of 4.2 ; ercent. .Sili.:;_:.:-
:.no~J.ts rose from 9.5 m5ll:ton tons to 15.1 milJion tons. Selling 
ab<)Ut one-half of all now cars on i.ostall:ments rer~ni ttine 
06 :.1cLti1s to repa;'l allowed the auto:nobile fir:ns to raise :;.rices 
az"d -'!1.aintair:;. consumer monthly payments at a constant level 
at the sa-,1e tL:;e, thus contributinc to t~e current c'l.em.and at the 
exrense of a futuro market. 
In recession it is not lH"ely that a rudL::.ct}cn in steel 
',rices v.::.J.l r·esult in a decrease in the r~rlces of' f3_L-.S'l.ed 
ln-·nC:.uc ts ·1ade fr:J·n -=:teoJ. that is suff:tc ient to caPse a sig-
ni:":'lcr'.:It :i.r1cree.se i.n sales. i';1e co :s"':: of ste'Jl ·ts usually 
a s·11a.ll fraction of the cost of tr1e finis;J.ed product. 
l +-' A r -~ ~ I b l·' t _. · t • t l d C . t • . ' l.'Or exa~"-T:=· e, uae .;...::>.L s pu _ca ..~..on en l e , 1ar l11¢ 
Steel's Pro;;;·ress, 1356 ediUon, r:. 67, rerorted that steel 
cos-:::s accounted for 4.4 percent of tne li·t price of an 
antomstic, tVIO-Slice toaster; 5.3 I>O::rcent for a Vl8S:li:Ci€ 'r.achi...Ge; 
c. .• b _~:;ercen t for a four burner• ,_ H.s range; 5. 8 percent for a 
n::.;_e-ter:. cr:bic foot refrigergtor; and 10.1 r:ercent for a_ aversbe 
f'oUl' C:.oor automobile. ':t :is suci~:ests t~1e de•:1anC. for steel to 
bc:l iDe ls s tic. 
in t:B case of producer ~urable goods it is possible 
that the prlce paid is less imrortant thar; the outlook for 
profits and t:1e i:cb.::rest cost of borrowing for investment. 
If "profit visibt li ty" bGcom::;s poor, tile c::emand f'or producer 
c.nra'::;le goods 03COmes :li(.nly inelastic. If price declinas 
ar·e expected to have little stimula-cin.e; effect uron demand, 
,mnufacturers of p:•oducc:Jrs 1 goods and the steel firms see only 
a reduction in profits or an increase in losses if sharp price 
C.eclines are set in ::-:1otion. Fostponability of durable goods, 
consumer or proch,cer c.urable s, also leads to reinforcement of 
t ~~ s type or t ;i::1kln[E. 
Willard ';'h:orp and Alfred Neal have presented refutat::ons 
c.f L1e ac:'ininis tared pricing thesis • 1 It was claimed that 
t w cevotees of ad1lini2t:::reC:. rriciu~· fa:i.led to ta~ce into account 
t~1ct in de pres sir")n a qualifier in the forr:1 of ceteris paribus 
V'i'1S LG!~:lected. ·.'h::2 ar·:~~um.c:mt is based OL the conteLti:J 1 Lhat 
t-:G COr:1aDG for C~Urable ~~OO;.~S is :;:ore l:'ead:!.l~ postponiDJ.e tr1an 
eemand for non-durables. 
f(:r c:_,_;re.~)le s is 1.vha t rrovide s t::1e correct e :rlar.:.a tion for the 
c-'.fl'erential prod: cticn declines durin;3 a derression. It was 
ass_:rtec th:_o:t t'1c work oi' .i·-ea1~.s shor.-ln;\ a :rrice-production 
non-durable :_;"ooC::s, anc t:1a': studiec sop~~rately t'1ese :::::oods 
( -la'.') show no price-r·roduct:tcn rela-t;:~onshir. ~i.OVtever, s=..nce 
pre s(.;r t any 2 rroof. 
: ot onl-- co rr:Lces in ollgopolis tic periocs fail to 
c;ecline cFrinz per~od.s of -~-·oderate sx-cess capacity, b1~t ti1.ey 
also fail to remair.. L flexible an_d actually rise. .F'or exam::;,le, 
t-he steel 5rH5vstry in 19~0-49 recession exrerienced a decl:!.ne 
~n util~zatlon of capacity fron S3 percent in 1948 to 78 ~ercent 
L lS4~-:J. 1.e~~ :;.:rices V;e:r•a increased fro:n a low of 3.4 percent 
on barbed and t·wisted carborJ. V\ire wh.i..c~-1 has been. unC.er heavier 
lw. Th:Drp aLd .• C::rovH3.er, 11 '_•-:..w .3trncture of Inc'.ustr~r," 
'- - ?7 - "' ~ } ~ '1 OJ '·lf 0 c ' 1 •.toncY·rafl1. .~.o. ~ , _.-. . ...!... G., .<1<± ; anc ·"" rec • ,,c;a , 
,_nc·nstrial Conce;·tration ar~c P:r'ice 1nflexibility (A:--lsrican Council 
0n Public Affairs, l(J42). 
2··o c ~t-·q.,e o·" +-;.· .. ::.<-e "'t11dzes se'-' J ::lal·r ".r"' "S ,.,_., l r a r ..... L.,_ • ,.,.~.~ .:1 .... ~ , ..~ • .... , .->a,.t, __ , __ ,orp, 
anr'. ,eal on rr~ce Inflexibility," Review of .6coLomics and Statistics 
C ove·;1ber, 1256). .For a cri ticis~n of J3lair by Jules I.'aclrman, to-
__;-et1er wit:1 a r•3joincer, see :Reviev; of Eco:::-:o:uics ar:d Statistics,' 
( • ove ~1bcr, 1958. ) 
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foreign co:.~pe ti tion to a l1.l<~l1. of 1':!. 4 perc0nt on tin and terne 
rl~te--electrolytic and hot dlrped carbon. For 23 steel procucts 
prices roc;e bdhieen 3.4 ~-ercent anc1 14.4 I~e··cent, \Vh~_:!_e cross 
27. c r ercent. ):t,l~- in t:1e ca cJes of' reinforc in, bars, co J.d rolled 
sh;::·Jts, ,·_alvaniz,:;d s::--~eets, and cal'bon skelp ciiC: s~n._r;;1ents rise. 
Au to ·:1obt le cic 'lan:2 anc ar;plla:.:.cce sales h-:.c1edia te 1:;,- after tn.e 
war· ~~e.pt t rese ship:nents up even thot p.:h prices rose.l ·:::.'ll.e 
:~J.:3 steeJ rr" ce incex rose fror:1 an :.ndex of 101.3 in 194.8 to 
1JJ.7 in 1949 (1947-49 : 100) ar:.d total ingot production fell 
from S0.5 ,n:ilJ.ion tons to 71.6 ':1illion tens. An Lq:Li.cit. 
realized price incex Sc:tows tiwt prices roso from an index of 
104.0 to 107.0. (See ':'A..:LE.. 29 ) • 
For t~1e 1948-49 cecliue in economic activity, 'I'A:,LSS 40 
anC. 41 belovi s:1ow t 1e percentae;e chan.<::,e s in snip:1ents and 
t 1e pel'centace ch::m: es in prices for 23 specific steel products. 
J.'...'he cons-c.mr,tion nf cold rolled sheets, especially, is 
'1L_:'1.ly centralized L1 these two incustries. 
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TABLE 40 
C:-J:A:·,G:;ES Il'J :::l'l'BBL SHil<'i1.2l'JTS AND II\ PRICES, 1948 '1'0 1949 
Gross Shipments BLS Price Index 
( Thous. of '.lons) (1947-49 
= 
100) 
Productsa 1948 1949 %Change 1948 1949 %Change 
fiars, [lOt rolled--
alloyb 2,124 1,589 -25.2 lJJ.l 111.0 /10.9 
BHrs, :1ot rolled--
stainlessb 29 21 -27.6 96.9 110.6 /14.1 
,~·.s.rs, concrete 
reinforcing 1,549 1,573 I 1.5 100.6 112.1 /11.4 
Lars, hot rolled 6,820 5,418 -20.6 100.9 1o·v. 3 1 s.3 
,:~·ars, cold finishedl,356 1,024 -24.5 100.7 106.1 I 5.4 
t• al ls and staples 872 739 -15.3 106.4 112.1 I 5.4 
Plates 7,178 5,997 -16.5 100.7 109.3 I s.5 
Ha::..ls, stand.srd 1,9L9 1,773 -10.9 100.7 110.0 I 9.2 
',;ire Hods 908 809 -10.9 100.5 112.2 111.6 
s·1ee t, ~1.0 t rolled 7,340 6,583 -10.3 100.8 109.9 I 9.o 
S~_le ·J ts, cold rolled6,382 6,746 ~ 5.7 100.7 107.6 I 6.9 s:1eets, galvanized 1,646 1,755 6.6 102.5 107.0 1 4.4 
:Slie lp 547 566 I 3.5 103.6 111.9 j 8.0 Strip, cold rolled 1,539 1,277 -17.0 100.8 108.5 7.6 
Strip, cold rolled 
--stainlessb 115 107 
-
7.0 99.2 106.2 ~ 7.1 StructurHl shapes 4,217 3,631 -13.9 102.9 112.7 0.5 
~1 il: plates 490 373 -23.9 105.8 11;5.2 I 7.0 
':Pin ;•',. terne plate, 
e1e c trolytic _; .. ~-
not dipped 953 3,693 - 6.6 100.3 114.7 /14.4 
Lire, drawn 2,?99 2,209 -21.1 100.1 108.5 1 s.4 
i ire, barbed and 
twisted 255 215 -15.7 103.3 .J9.8 ~ 3.4 v~oven wire fence 40v 360 -10.7 103.4 10().8 5.2 
Pressure tubing 875 676 -22.8 101.8 109.1 ~ 7.2 Stand8.rd pipe 2,353 2,264 - 3.8 102.5 110.3 7.6 
Source: AISI Annual Reports; and BLS. 
a All products contain carbon unless otherwise indicated. 
b'l.'hese products do not conta:i.n carbon. 
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At< D Pi IC~~S 1948 ~PO 1949 
Perce~t Increases 
In Prices 
3.4 to 8.0 . . . . . 
8.1 to 15.0 ••••• 
. . 
. . 
Percent Change 
Ir· s;-_d p;1er:. ts 
3 rroducts rose between 3.5 
to 6.6 percent; 9 products 
fell between 3.8 to 24.4 percent 
1 rroduct rose 1.5 percent; 
10 products fell betw~en 5.6 
to 27.6 psrcent 
'.:..'he table gbove shows that prices went up for eve!-y one 
of tt1.~3 23 ste :1 prodl-:cts, tile increases V~3.rying between 3.4 
percent and 15 percent. ~xcept for four products, s rllp~ents 
fell, the decreases varying from 3.8 percent to 27.6 r-ercent. 
-.::'he overall c:lecline of about 12 percent in all steal s:1ipmeEts 
was signif'icar-'-tly sre::;ater than the decline of less than seven 
perceLt in total ix:c.ustrinl producti.on and of one-third of one 
pe_,~cent in total economlc activity as measured by real gross 
national product.l Yet t~1e steel ir.dustry sold -80,575,000 tons 
of steel for ~8.08 bi]J.ion ~n 1948 a~d ?1,655,008 tons for· 
~ 7.39 b:tllj_rm in 1949. G1Jtrut fell alwut 12 percen~ while 
tob:tl revGnue fell by 0. E percent. .dence there was an effective 
The d·: ta also s !Jow that co lc rolled sheets and hot rolled 
sheJts are tne two ite:·:1s ~laving ~he largest e;ross shipments 
and nearly always rank Lear tb.e top in total shipments. Cold 
rolJ ed sheets are consumed in the main by the automobile and 
li~cono~aic Heport of the }resident ('i!ashington: L'.3. 
Governnent Printic~c :)fflce, 195'7), p. 124, 152. 
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app1iance industries. '~ot rolled ';)ars on the other ~~and are 
consv.:med by widely d~tffused inC::ustries. Yet t~~eir price be-
h.avior >noves alon.CJ in the same 11 stair-s ter:. n manner. 
If tc1e 1953-54 cecline in economic activity is studied, 
t1e sa:ie ,ceneral Ci:lsra<::t::ristics of steel rrice behavior are 
a;parent. 'Jf toe sa:ne 23 products, prices rose from a :ni:~i.num 
of ,).3 rerceLt (tin pl·; t0--.~ot di.J.:ped) to a maximum of 9.J 
p3 rcent (reinforced bars). ijot a s int;le rrice f0 11. Yet of 
t:1e 23 steel rrod.ucts studied, 20 of them experienced declines 
in. sn:.r~-:1ents ran[in:o fro:n a ~:1ini :Um cecl:Lne of 8.8 percent 
(a~ain. tin plate--t~t dipped.) to a maximum of 44.6 rercent (bars, 
cole f::_nished). ·:::'hefTS J.'rice index for steel rose fro::n 136.9 
to 1'12 .e. for 1953-54 w~1ile aD implicit "realized price 11 index. 
rose from 128.f to 130.5. (See TA: J:,E 29) l' 1e tables be low 
s:.·-:n:::18.rize t~1e se rela tionshlps for 1~153-54. 
~A..:T.ES 42 and 43 show t~1e relat::_oLs:lip between changes in 
ste8l rrices and steal shipments in percentae;es from 1953-54. 
~.r FliC~S 1953 TO 1954 
iercent Increases 
J.n fr~.ces 
0' 1 to 5.0 . . . . . . . . 
5.1 to 3.0 ••••••• 
fercen t C~1ang;e s 
2:n Shipments 
.3 pFoducts rose between 3.0 to 
22.0 percent; 12 profucts fell 
botween J.3 to 44.6 pJrcent 
.G products fell b0tween 6.2 
to 44.6 percent 
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'l'ABLE 43 
Gross Shipments BLS Price Index 
( Thous. of Tons) ( 1947-49 = 100) 
Froductsa 1953 1954 %Change_ 1953 1954 %Change 
',1ire rods 
Skelp 
Rails, Standard 
'Cie plates 
fla tes 
1,151 
655 
868 
426 
8,035 
4,977 Structural shapes 
Bars, hot rolled--
alloyb 2,323 
Dars, hot rolled--
stainlessb 46 
Bars, hot rolled '7,979 
Bars, reinforced 1,276 
Bars, cold finished-i,?9? 
3'leets, hot rolled 8,259 
s:1ee ts, cold rollrolJ, 060 
Sneets, galvanized 2,296 
Strip, cold rolled 1,960 
Strip, cold rolled 
--stainlessb 
Standard pipe 
'rin ple te, hot 
dipped 
\,~ire, drawn 
~ails and Staples 
P-arbed \dreb 
'.~oven wire fenceb 
Pr'::JSSUI'e r··ubing 
233 
2,869 
1,318 
2,866 
532 
164 
246 
390 
1,059 
507 
1,113 
236 
5,773 
4,489 
1,445 
34 
5,364 
1,759 
996 
6,307 
9,518 
2,366 
1,127 
170 
2,3'76 
1,3:J? 
2,454 
5'70 
136 
300 
223 
- 8.0 
-22.6 
-40.4 
-44.6 
-28.2 
- 9.8 
-37.8 
-26.1 
-32.8 
- 6.2 
-44.6 
-23.6 
-14.0 
I 3.o 
-42.5 
-27.0 
-17.2 
- 0.8 
-14.4 
I 7.1 
-1'7.1 
122.0 
-LL2 • 8 
Source: AISI Annual 1ceports; and BI·S. 
149.3. 
127.0 
141.0 
138.8 
135.2 
138.2 
140.5 
159.6 
136.7 
141.0 
142.6 
133.7 
130.8 
128.7 
145.6 
130.4 
13.4. '7 
1~2.5 
151.9 
137.0 
134.7 
136.5 
144.2 
159.1 
133.8 
151.1 
145.1 
141.9 
143.8 
146.8 
163.4 
145.3 
153.7 
153.5 
139.4 
132.4 
131.3 
152.H 
:J._33.3 
141.4 
132.9 
165.2 
141.5 
141.0 
142.7 
153.0 
/6.6 
/5.4 
/7.2 
/4.5 
/5.0 
14.1 
14.5 
12.4 
/6.3 
/9.0 
/7.6 
/4.3 
/1.2 
/2.0 
/4.9 
/2.2 
15.0 
/0.3 
/8.8 
/3.3 
/4.7 
/4.5 
/6.1 
aA11 prodt:cts contalr; carbon unless otherwise indicated. 
ljThese products do not contain carbon. 
~ :_• ........ · ·- '. 
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Aftain t.ne declJ.r"e of' about 20 percent in overall steel 
si:1ir; aon cs contrasts wi tn. t:1e 110dera 1~e C.Ecline of about two 
rercent in total economic activity and seven percent in incustrial 
!roductlon. Frice tai~s Wdre recorded in steel, in each of 
t1e recesslons of 1J4J, l::Jo::::-54, au1 l05a. 
~'.lis type of bcna\'ior does not accord "'i ti1. tt.at expected 
in a co:npe ti ti ve ;:1arl-:-e t nor can it be a e '~ua te lJr explained 
L1 a c;eneral theory o:' profit maximization. l~ecen tl:y, it was 
;·o:!.nted out in a study of price pol:icies lJ;l lar~:;e ent0rp:::ises 
to take r·rofj_ t maximization as the overricing 
[Oal of coFpora te pr::I_cint; and fo1Jowing tll.e familiar 
view tr1e.t ot:1er lon,~ run objectives and their vari-
ations fro :1 firm to .:'ir::n simply refle c -c t:-1e fact that 
Clf:·erent co~npanies in dissimilar inciustries, cannot 
use icentical 11eans to achieve he sa,ne ulti::nate 
objective. ~ut in orde~ to be operationally usaful, 
t~1.e concert of rrof':_t maxLn1zatloL1 needs to be so 
broadeGed, in the context cf co~rany rractices, 
t~1at it ·beco.:nes .r..ore a concept of optimum satisfaction. 
Tds is lar~aly subjectlvs.l 
.Since the 3a_Je s.:;t of considerati.ons ar.ply in ei tner 
c:irectjon, ol~<:o:rolists sCJ.oulcl I.LOt b, exrected to raise 
rrices just as thex f'ail to dec1•ease them. Price increases 
s~1ould not b:3 rut 1.nto effect because of a fear that co:npe-
t:ttors ·would 1.0t rnatch t1.cm when they had idle [lant capa-
city au:: \.er•e hun1::::ry for or•ders. Even in the event tl-1at an 
:!_nc2·ea3e i7.'1S announced, ·shere is r;o ti:'1eore tical reason to 
asst<:fle thst ot~.1.ers ViLll follow, especially to t'1e sa·ne 
identlcal level. 
lA. ~·· h. =:aplar;, J. =~lrla.n, 
Llg ~'us:Lness (llast:ngs-orluu::son: 
1-· .1 2S-29. 
Jl.. Lanzl llot ti, f'ricine in 
nrookin;s Institution, 1958), 
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Since an explan.atlon C<WLOt l~e founC: l11 tc1e thaory of 
i::-:1rerfec t co;nre ti tion itself, some wri ter·s have turned 
ov tside of ecol o;nics for tne ansv,-er.l EchvarC: · :ason wrote· 
l':li thin the econorric systo•.'l l t na.: also been poi.nt0d 
out that excess c 8!)ac i ty ne ad not serve a::: a sure check to 
r-··r~_ce i1:i'lation for other reasons. 
In tile sa--:1e wa:,'" that une' ...... ploym·:mt has always been 
~e~arded as a ha~rier to an increase in ws~es under competi-
t:i.cn, unusud capacity has b8en recarded as a check to any 
ir~c:r·ease in prices. In the Classical System, i;he:re could be 
r:o UilUSf::ld capacity becaL:.se comretit~_on would force price 
decl5nes urfi.l it was used. Ir_ the l<evneslan 3yste•'1, capacitv 
Cbn be unused, t..ut it would be supposed t;ha t it would be ~ 
brought :Lnto use before prices could b::::·in to rise. 
~~i·a ice a of excess capacity is s. sJ irpery one. .?.n 
::.r.ciustr:r's capacity may oxist in var:ving sta:,::·es of techno-
lcE::Lcal modernity. Some m.ay be ne•v and efficient, so;·ne old 
and 'lit;~l cost, and so me in varyj ng de~ rea s of obsolescence. 
'.'he old and ,ri_:=·h cost may not be pressing on t11e r:;arket and 
may function as a standby, a vai lab le if an emergency raises 
yrlces S'.-'fficiently. \e' y ;.li[;hly specialized equipment 
::nay· !lever have been :'r:.te.c,ded to t,e used to full caracity. 
,~xcess capacity may act as a check to ::.nflation ruy if 
5_ t :!..s defined as fB.cili. ties available to }JrOC'uce ac.~cition of 
e;oo(s at preva:1lln8 ~r·ices aLe proi'J.t rates. '.this rnay not 
be tne case. 
In steel, wa-c:t:l.s aLe~ r:rices were increased in 1956 when 
the i11t.t:stry was rGnnin~~~ at little more than 5J percect of 
car:acity. lt i.s ~-nterestint:; to ·note that the stsel companies 
c:1 a:m til.at wa e increases based on productivity gains S<lOUld 
be co~ puted by excludin~~: an? r.ew equip:nent .,,:h:~c:l reqt.~ires 
a pa:'ment on capital f:i.rst. (See A. r-:ees, "',',;a,_e ~-·:Jtermination 
j L t 1e :::tee 1 In6us try," A'leric·:m Bconomic :::1eview (June, 1£l5l). 
T'le fore::;oing argument concerni:LE excess caraci ty as 
a checz to ini'laticn re,1uires de::nor;.:: :;r~:;t::on th·=Jt firms 
ac tva1ly rossess and u::;e infor::::::lticn a11ont hov.' h:T ,s11 rrices 
:.:u:--1t e;o before j_dle equip':Tient can be used. It is essentially 
an arr~ument th1:,t the onl:v valid ~nethod of (J.eterminin.=': the 
decres of com:r,etitior iL.ar::. incustry is to examine price-
;narci_nal cost rel::lUons'1ir;s that prevail in snort-run booms, 
iG ecoe1o:njc activitv cr recessloL. If firms choose or are 
' ~ for•ced to a:ccept price-out::.,ut combinatio, s 8.t wh:tci:1 price 
equals naiT5.nal cost cnore or 1s ss continuousl:v, they are 
properly de ·cribed as rr-~_c:tng competitively. ( 3ee ,artin 
i~aily. Discusssnt on "Ad:-:::.inistered J.:rlces "'ecoLsidered," 
A·,ertcaJ..L EccGomic c:,avievv ( .·ay, 1959), t:• 459. 
l'hj s tnes: s fs-extre:11ely Clifficult, if rcc;t impossible, to (}3t 
at e:1pirically. I-rof:o::ssor -~aily has r8iter'3ted this the:ae at otner 
t'_r;es as well. (See Co~runer:.tar:ies on 11 '.:.'~1e Relatior ... ship of' Prices to 
~coLomic Stability aEc.i Grovjth, 11 Joint .L;couo:lic Com::ni ttee Eeprint, 
Ai·J.-CI J, Oc tob~r. 2J., 1058, p. 01. 
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t::1s.t nt1e ps~Tc~1olo.~:ists, t~'lG sociologists, aLd possibly the 
roli tical scientists will be t:1e main contributors" in 
developinE a rew capit~list "apologetic." 1 A later section 
of t:,-~_s chapter vdll try to cevelo:r: some lo&:ical ruasons for 
raisin:, rrices at ti~nes ofunder-utili.zation of capacity. 
Prosperous Periods 
In 1955 tQe operatinr rate in ste-::1 rose to S3.0 percent, 
aLC1 in 1956 to 8S~7 :;;;erceLt fro ·:1 the 1954 low of 71 percent. 
At th:l.s vvr:ttin~· it has been suhstantia1l~' below the 1955 l""vel. 
~ 1n54 ' . 1~55 ,L·rom .:J ::o ·_ ::!, , tne JLS prices of steel products all advanced. 
·-~:1e minLnu: increase was 3.3 percent, s.r.d the l"laximum was 8.1 
rercent. Also, except for thre<3 r;roduc ts, s!1ipments rose in 
e~ery ca!Oe, t!::le ::n5E1mum [;ain being 3.5 Jercent ar.:.d the :naximum 
S)5 .1 rercen t. .L:1e tablGs below provide the data. 
!.he unusual fact disclosed is that in periods of high 
deirland c l:mracterizec by si?.:ee,ble increased shipments and an 
operating rate rising from 71 percent to 93 percent, prlces 
rose somewhat but :rer :aps less than vwuld have occurred in a 
co:npetitive in,t;stry with similar demand and cost circumstances, 
aui also less t.:an i::1 the 1949 and 1954 recessions described 
earlier. 2 An LOtplicit reali.zed. :;;:rice index calculf:,tec for steel 
rose from 130.5 to 131.4 or less than one percent. (See 
lsee .:t •. ason, 11 The Apologetics of ~"ianageria1ism, tn 
Journal of J:t,_s:ness of the University of Chicago (January, 1958). 
lsee E. i ason, J.!::co:::omic Co1,centration ~I];d the Iiiono}olv 
Problem ( Cambr:i.d.ge: :i.arvara Onivers ity Press, 195'7) p. I'lb, for 
t.:1e view that in perio6s of nigh dernanc, ato:nistic :incustries 
t3LC to inc::-·ease rrice.s faster' than rrice::: rise in oligopol:l.stic 
::i.ndus tries. 
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·sxl~:Ja::-~ation of t'lls behav~:or hss proceeded alon,~; various 
:rat.1s. c:albra:tL:. strc:.s:-;es that there is a lag b~1tween tne 
1.nc:'esse in de~1and anc:: the :t:rice adjustment by the oligopolist. 
3zcluc1 ing: anticipatory price inc:reases, Galbrait~'l calls this 
cUff'erence an 11 unll quid a ted moLo:r-oly galn. 11 de s ta t0 s: 
.• i t~l infle.tlon, the demand curves of the firm 
ar,d industry are m.ovin£ persistently to the right. 
"Cinder these circunsta:nces tnere will nor:mally be 
all incO ccple te adaptation Of Oligopoly priC8S • 
Prices ·,c.i 11 r:ot be at profl t maximizin.s levels in 
aEy el ven s:i. tua tion, for the situation is continually 
changir~is while t;:--,e adaptation is by deliberate and 
ciscrete steps. .~;~lis 111eans that at any GiVen time 
t::1ere wlll ordinarily be a quaLtura of what ,.:1ay be 
celled unliquidated :nonopoly gains :i_n the inflation-
ary cor:te..xt, '.l't'le srJii't in demand calls for a price 
inc .J ase for rnaximi za tion; since t~'le adapt a. t:i. on is 
i1rcc::nplete, prices can at any time be raisec and 
prof:t ts thereby enhanced.}. 
:~'C1:ts 1a~ :nay also be partially t:1.e result of l5_v:tnE 
':1 a ;:;ole-:. fisr1 bovrl oecau.se the steel industry iR large and 
() 
econcmy."' steel ind· stry 
lJ. ~-,-. ,-_.:albrait:~-1, u··.=arl~et ·3tructure and. Stabilization 
Io1icy, 11 Review of Economics and Statistics ( 'ay 1957) p. 127. 
·,;. ::vans and ,'. lloffonberv ~ u l.':'le :;:n ter lnCus trv itel a t:J.ons 
Stu.ci;r of 1D47' II nev1~~9.f __ Ec_C?nO:nics and Stat is tlcs (::lay, 1952), 
:;:. S?-142, use inr·ut-outputrtacles to show thBt t~:e outputs 
l'ro ;: secbrs is widely diffused in some cases and not in 
0t~1er•s. ::.o·::e outputs are nore largely c~iret:ted to house-
holc:s than to intermediate stae6s. "'her•efore, the structural 
inr:act of a:r:.y one sector u:ron the systecn can be calct:.lated 
bv two meast:.res of sie:+i.ficance. One is called tD.e house-
l:1olc :=;ffect or its :'Lr:11:orta.nce to tete expenditures of J:lOUs·e-
·"o1ds, incL::5.iw·· inC:irect effects. Steel's si,§:nificance 
wou1o t•8 s tudiea tnrougr1 :tts i 1pact on toys, autos, razors, 
carrled foods, etc. ··.'~"lls hlract Is quite small. '.:1:1e other 
mee.sur•es ti'le ratio of inter·medi:te c~elivcries of a sector 
to its total g:ross outrut a1.d is called the diffv_sic·n effect. 
Steel's slgnificance C1e:r·e is :;uci1 t:~reater as it beco'iles widely 
ciffused throu,~;i:1out the econo~ny as a raw r:1aterial and sen~ 
finished e:ood. Al-:-:ost 95 rercent of t~e steel output c,.:msists 
of intsr-intustry dellveries. Utto Eckstein has rointed out 
ta.-,, t if s te 3 'J. r,r•l c·e s nad behaved Jike the rest o.f ti:1e w::1ole sale 
':'A.':OLE 44 
( Thou s. of '.ror..s) 
Gross Shipments 
Prod1Jctsa 1954 1055 foChange 
';,ire rods 
Skelp 
Rails, standard 
Hails, light 
T'ie plates 
Axles 
\,heels 
1,059 
507 
1,113 
84 
236 
61 
191 
Pla~es 5,773 
.3truc tural shapes 4, 489 
L.srs, hot rolled--
alloyb 1,445 
Bars, hot rolled--
stainlessb 34 
,;ars, hot rolled ·5,364 
Bars, reinforced 1,759 
j..)ars, cold finished 976 
:bars, cold finis~1.ed 
--alloyb 180 
3ars, cold finished 
--stainlessb 39 
Sheets, not rolled 6,307 
Sheets, cold rolled9,518 
Sheets, galvanized 2,366 
S(1eets, cold rolled 
98 --stainlessb 
s~eets, electrical--
allovb 499 
Strip, ~old rolled 1,127 
Strip, cole rolled 
--stain1essb 170 
.Strip, hot rolled 1, 712 
Standard pip~ 2,376 
Line pipe 2,611 
lil Country Goods 2,046 
0il Country Goods--
alloyb · 349 
'l'in :rla t.e, hot 
dipped 1,302 
'::in plate, e lee tro-
lytic 3,681 
Black plate 674 
' .. ire, drawn 2,454 
-.dre, drawn, stain-
lessb 
I3ale tiesb 
~ails ~Ld Staples 
21 
52 
570 
1,595 
648 
1,152 
83 
312 
119 
305 
6,858 
4,719 
2,278 
47 
7,381 
2,186 
1,527 
289 
54 
9,688 
15,064 
2,869 
144 
660 
1,477 
275 
2,4JO 
3,025 
3,098 
2,261 
429 
1,101 
4,504 
800 
3,211 
32 
60 
652 
/50.6 
/27.8 
I 3.5 
- 1.2 
/32.2 
/95.1 
/59.7 
/lE:o .8 
I s.1 
/57.6 
/38.2 
/37.6 
/24.3 
/53.3 
/65.6 
/38.5 
/53.6 
/58.3 
/21.3 
/46.9 
/32.3 
/31.1 
/61.8 
/40.2 
/27.3 
/18.7 
/10.5 
/22.9 
-15.8 
/22.4 
/18.7 
/30.8 
/52.4 
/15.4 
/14.4 
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BLS Price Index 
(1947-49 = 100} 
1954 1955 }b Change 
159.1 168.3 /5.8 
133.8 144.6 /8.1 
151.1 157.8 /~.4 
5.842° 6.067°/3.9 
145.1 152.1 /4.8 
7.375C 7.750c/5.1 
47.750c50.389c/5.5 
141.9 148.0 /4.3 
143.8 151.9 /5.6 
146.8 
163.4 
145.3 
153.7 
153.5 
154.0 
170.7 
152.1 
158.8 
160.3 
/4.9 
/4.5 
/4.7 
/3.3 
/4.4 
11.148Cl1.771C/5.6 
0.433c 0.453°/4.6 
139.4 144.8 /3.9 
132.4 137.9 /4.2 
131.3 138.8 /5.7 
0.548C 0.570Cf4.0 
9.175C 9.774C /6.5 
152.8 160.7 /5.2 
133.3 137.7 /3.3 
5.042C 5.2270/3.7 
141.4 150.7 /6.6 
144.382cl52.314/5.5 
151.87cl59.67° /5.1 
221.50C236.27° /6.7 
132.9 135.6 /2.0 
7.158c 7.33° /2.4 
6.258C 6.43C /2.8 
165.2 175.1 /6.0 
0.545c 0.56lc/2.9 
5.757C 6.167C/7.1 
141.5 151.9 /7.3 
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'T'At:\LE 44 (Continued) 
Gross Shipments 
( Thous. of Tons) 
1954 1955 %Change 
BLS Price Index 
(1947-49 = 100) 
1::154 1955 ;::c~nge 
.Products 
i~arbed Vdreb 
Noven wire fence 
1-rs s sure tubing 
136 
3JO 
233 
133 
312 
246 
-16.9 
I 4.o 
/10.3 
141.0 
142.7 
153.0 
Source: AISI Annual Reports; and BLS. 
151.3 
153.7 
162.1 
/7.3 
/7.7 
/5.9 
BAll products conti:J.in car·bon unless oth.erwise indicated. 
bT~ese products do not contain carbon. 
cstated as price (dollars). 
~AJ3LE 45 
P~IC~S, 1954 TO 1955 
.tc::;rcer,t Increase in 
f~·ices 
Ferce1t Change in 
3r1i}:TJ.ents 
1.1 to 5.0 .••..••..•• 2 products felJ between 1.2 
to 15.8 percer;.t, 17 products 
rose between 3.b to 61.8 
.. 1 t .. 0 v. 0 ~j. • • • • • • • • • • 
percent 
.1 :r:rodtct fell 1E.9 percent, 
18 pro~ucts rose batween 
4.0 to 95.1 percent 
is constantly ur.C!er the scrutiny of Con,sress anc the rublic 
and menaeement :ls sensitive about its corporate im.a[_e. ',"dse 
1ana~:e:.1ent r::a~r fir:d it necess~ry to concUticm t:1e rublic throupll 
'ubl~~c relatiocs to accept a. }--:rice increase. ,ejs-<1inc: st~ch a 
course of action au:: _::reparins t:1e public for lt produces the 
la;·. cescribed by -::1-albrai ti1. 
price :l.nc:e:< from 1847 to 1958, t~1e total price rise woulc. :1B.Ve 
IJ00n l'i r:ercer,t rat:ter th.~L ti:J.e actual 'cnc:Pease of 23 cercent. 
( t)ee ~·. ~c 1,~stein, "St::el anc t~1e Postv.rar Inflation," Study of' 
:::;,rlo;y·mcr.t, Jro·wth, ar.d Price Levels, Jcint .2;co""omic Co.n:nittee, 
_ ovo·:-Jber 6, 1:159, I='· 6-10. 
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~uyors nay be accusto'ned oy trad5_ tion to irlfreq"Jent price 
c~~ri es and cu.stomer rel'.ltionfl 1-:1ay also rroduce a lag. '.'ihsre 
t:l3 inG.ustry has a tr&(~lticn of leadersh:ip, firms -:-,lay await 
t··1e action oi' t::e leader. ,v:_ thou t le acers~li[, uncertainty 
concernins the magnitude of a rrice ch~nge serves as a deterrent. 
'.:'~1.e "lac" L1esis of (oalbrai -:h noted above cannot apply 
w·:1.en corsand does not continue to rise to t':1e rici:1.t but reaches 
a ;:1ateau. It is the inc:r·eac;e in 6emar;td that g:tves rise to the 
tL1e lae: whic :1. in turn proc"c uce s the "unliquidated moY"DfOly cains." 
lf cer::.and reaches a rlsteau, it ''laY be possible to achleve r:1axi-
e1ot ta~:e advanta e of a stabilized demand whic:1 could suprort 
1L§':~1er prices and rrofits. Various motives _'?Iay exist. Smaller 
f:~_r,ns ~nay have ambi ticns to expand and :li~,·her rrofi ts' provides 
tne wherewithal and encot:.rae;ement. A full monopoly rrice may 
~lave a ·-tractions for nswcomers to en tar. In ~1i s study of the 
s toe 1 incus try and collec ti Vi.:) bargaining, A. l{ees s clOWed that 
i;. t:1e hic;nly inflationary period from 1045 to 1\148, L1a t a 
;_;rey :-:1arket for ste:::Jl existed and t~t two companies actually 
bo1.~~ht obsolete ~ugh-cost ste3l facil:l.ties to assure themselves 
of a steel supply.l linder sv.ch buoyant de-nand conc"itions, ·u-.s. 
3teel reduced t~-1e :;·rice of finished steel and increased thB.t of 
se:ni-finished steel in 1042. It arpeG.rs that it was concerned 
ovur t'1.e vit:;orous crov1th of t!le semi-~ntefrated prod1.:.cers and 
e~rloye~ rrice policy as a weaponF A large ~ultiple proCuct 
lA. Fees, 11 ',ia,:-e ::::eterminntion ir. the 3t:.;e1 L'dustry, A;ne:r·ican 
"conornic Eeview (Jvne, H!51), p. 393. 
2~:;uslnes.s . 1. .. eeK, :a y 3, 1 g 58' p • 3 4 r 0 1 n ted 0 u t t lla t ·-- Q u • ...., • 
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f::_rr,;. can easily take a loss on sox,e rroducts and f.1.ake it up 
o::1 others to forestall increased co:npeti tion. _,_he inde.r-~enden t 
ncn-inte[rateC: f' lrrrls v,ere forced to r·ay hie:;;h :rrices for semi-
fiuisr1ed steel and receivec lower P'ices for their finished 
s tee 1. 
Eees also contenc~d that hit:)ler rrofi ts woulc' ha."':e served 
as an e ffec ti ve art:,un1ent for unions in thelr demands for ·wc:ge 
'& -: ns 1 (_, ' .1~. • • Tf it ... is b:J1_·eved t:1at wa~es are lnflexlble downward 
rjxrectec: to be a temporary TOstwar phenomenon tnat could eventually 
be satisfied as worn out stocks cf -,Jorld War II were replaced. 
AftrJr ·:,orld ·;ar I wher. the steel :i.ndustry was not orgar;ized, 
wa .e increases of ten rercent or more we:.r.e :;ranted three t1.mes 
\Ii tD.in one y·3ar to compete for an arJequate labor supply. -nflexible 
dcwLwe.rd Viat_es \'vere not feared at t~·1e t~_me. 
It is also contended that tr1e steel :tr/ustry uses stancard 
cost p:r:' ocedure s in e stir:1a tine; costs ano that this is a.ccoY.Llr:anieC. 
b::r "tar;_::et pricing."2 If standarc costs are determined at 
78 rercent of ca;acity, a~d a lonG run "target" profit rate is 
set for this lev3l, then operations above capacity auto~atically 
y:'eld a profit rate sicnif:cantly above the target, wh~_ch in 
~.tself represents & satisfactor~r rste of ratt~.rn. "-~~1a tarz~:et nay 
eveu be revised upv1a~ d :i..f ~- t :!.s ce8 1ed t~ls_t the conm:.mer :r:J.Us t 
SteoJ 's ::o':e: Liza tion l~ ro;ram nace it e.;~tre:nely efficient so 
t':lat: 1~res.sure could be aasiJy r1~t on price ct~.tters. 
1~ -. ') · r,• t 3''5 
.n. __ e e s , 1 D • ~-- l • , p • d. • 
and R. I.anzillotti, Cit. 
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yield the funcs necessary for expansion and ~odernization or 
r:;r lace-::ent, v:~1en de_r:;recia t_;_on cr1<:.r·;e s ar·e rendered inadequate 
r:-:~ l.nflation.l 
~f prices are increased wl~n operst:ons are clos~ to 
carac:..ty, the flow of ric~1es ::-1ay result in e'nbarrass'Uent to an 
'nc\,str;y li!re steel :!lvi.rl£::; lL t:1.e :_cublic eye anc under .:·efau.ver's 
s 1a( ow. 
·:real::even po~_nt in steeJ has been set at s.n arbitraril~r low 
0 levsl.~' :n 1960, at ~css than 5J rercent of caracit:r, 1:.3. 3teel 
reporte~ a eecline i~ profits from ~.359 levels, but the profits 
vw :·e sti 11 surprisingly sizeable. ~- t appeers t':J.a t t~1.e lov.-er 
1 :Cun1op has po:..ntod out that the proble'11 in s tee 1 t1.as been 
;1ov.o to fj_nance expensive rtew caraclt"J ir" an in:ustry wh.ere 
rrocuctivi ty increases have not bee-1 significantly differar-t from 
the averg,~ e in ·1anufacturing. If financed from within, ES tne 
in:;us-cry contends it Si10ulc be, prices have to be increased 
to r:r•ovic.e profits for expansion. .cut .l.2.;;~1.er profits provide 
t:.1.e t:_nion with a stimulus to increase Wafes nigher than would 
otherv.·ise ta're place. T·~:e pe.ttern ,:tay t~er: spread because steel 
~s a strate~,ic inC.~...1striai sector. LuLlop rlaces his reliance 
on the srowth. of effective s,_~bstitutes to steel as a restraint 
r t'y~r "'::han r:~_:<blic roli.cies des1.gnec to alter labor or prc.6.::ct 
·• ·.ar>e t struc tvres. (See J. runlo:r;::, 11 PollCJ' I·roble r:s" in 
·,,e,~s, Frices, Profits) and Froductivitv, 'l't1e A:-:J.erican Asse.:1bly, 
Jr:ne, J 95'~~, f. '57-5S. 
2 ~' •e ?efau·;e r• Co'rr~i t tee four-ld t :1a t t:1e bre al·even point for 
11 botl:J Lte steel in'ustry as a vhcle and the D.S. Steel Cor:r;::oration 
iLc~ivit~uall~.- ••• to La sJi;:~htly below an operating rate of 
~:) rcrcer.t of s9.l3s. 11 A ynana:;ement cnnsu1tar:.t testified that 
for ·:.s. ::tee] :.,- lh;;; thlrc c~uarter of 1957, r.s. ~~teel's br::;ak-
OV:H" r"int fc3ll to 32 percent. ·~~';1B f:Lnancial comnmnity, in 
es~:·,G.tin=· rrofits, an~arer:.tl~- r:lsces it at 32 percelJt of capacity. 
( ::,ee Co,-n :eLtaries o:n 11 '':.a :=-.e1t:Jt1ons·.1ir of l'r:'_ces to :-Economic 
3 :: a b ~ J. i t y B.r~ c' C ro v: t h, " ::: b i c • , .r • 15 • ) 
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r10 :!..Tlicatl.on is t~1.at wa:e increas·::Js can raise t~1.e break-: 
evun ;oiLt s:t·~ut any necessity for price increa2es b3cause 
t "e stsLC.9rd cost ::n·2.cin;;.': at 70 .~erce;;t of ca;aci ty s 10uld 
c~so bJ ra:!.::;ec, esrec~c.l~.y :t.f .=::overr~-ner1t fiscal aLe ~.:onetal'~' 
1 . .I ~:c lCY C8.c: ::J expec;tec to r·rever:t serious depressions. 
risk of larc;8 losses is r:,,J lon~er so breat as in the decac<e 
c,f t :e thirties anci r:~erhaps :nanai__e'ilent lllis not e.djusted to thls 
belief. 
At any rate, if t:~e steel co:.:rar_ies try to eLerate n.i::-;her 
profits L1 order to ra~se t·~e f;mc:s roqt;,ire~ for· expansion, 
r",t 1er +:han see~o:: exterr1al sources for ca,t..ital, rrice increases 
v1oul:'' be in part due to fJ.ctors ot1er t1.an risln(:; unit laLor 
cc· s ts. .:.:Lcr-t:Jased ::ec .. 1a["ization au::: tde growt:1 of salarieC. 
l 
rersow.·al s.s a proportion of t 11.e totallabor force also re-
d:;_ces "l.ou:r·ly rated labor ·req_uire,.ents. Combined wi ti.1 rivalry 
v:it1 l.sbor unio1." leacers in ct~1er in~ustr:iGs,2 L::.ese factors can 
be expe c tee: to loac; t~1e ste e lwor'l-cers union to pr·e ss for wa.~,e 
1Jee =::,-:,;_siness ,,e•a'~, " ere l\On-F:r·ocuctiC'n .,or1·e:r's on Payroll, 11 
Av::y.st 6, 1960, r:. 124. 
2.see A. Eoss, ':::'raCe .:rdon · .. aG:e Folicv (Ios Ar .. ::~eles: 
:nive:stty of ·.olifornia Pross, 1950). Also, within ti1.e steel 
5 ~u:'ustry i tse1f ravid ; c:':or;ald 1 s leadership has been chal-
!erl.[;3C by· I.onald Larick. 'l'l1e 1959 contract may cause more 
rivalry b<Jcause the cost of living clause vias tied to 
i..:lst:rance costs, i.e., as insurance costs rise the increase is 
deducted fro:n t~1e cost of living formula. L'.OVJ it arpears 
t."lat this formula will not yield any cost of living gains at 
all. Ttle dissident factions c1ave thus been presented witr1 an 
issue. (::;ee l:)t.::siness ';;eek, April 16, H1EO, p. 129.) 
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collar. J.h.G ef.fect of ti1."!.s r;·ress1:·re on rr!ces i.s a_~~ravsted 
as '10r3 rival olico!:ol ists adort the practice of negotiaU_ng 
jo:Ln tJ_~~ v;i t'l nctors. 
A significant incentive for an oligopolist to resist a 
v.a:'e advance is ~ls arrreher.si:>n t'l.e..t j_is rivs.ls may make a less 
costly bargain. 0uccessful barzainer•s \'JOule have a reason for 
r,ot joinir1g in t;-Je next price advance. ~~arFainin"J in concert 
tor1c: s to reduce t::1e t~ncertain ty .1 In the 1956 s tee 1 negotiations, 
1 In t'l.e per~oc} from 194'7 to 1954 til.er·e were seven contract 
terninations or reopenin~s in the steel industry. In 1949 
aud J;y52 strH:es occL:tr•red and on both occasio:cs, t::te im~ustry 
asserted that ee.ch co:npany hac: to }lead ~- ts own ca.se because 
oreratior:s, deg:ree of integration, local labor narket condi-
ti(ms, job content, etc., differed. Despite these protestations 
the basic terns of the settle~1ent we:r·e more or less identical 
eac :1. yec r for the lar~~er c ornpanie s and geograrhical cifferenti als 
were slowly whittled away by the union. However, in 1955 
the procedure of separate meetings between co;npanies and the 
t-:.nioL ws.s chanred when i. cionald and Abel r:-:e t with the top six 
co•:.rania s in Pi ttsb1:.rg. "a1d.c 'ci:onald of the union st.:.cceeded 
Phj lip . urray in 1952 and c o.nsol:i dated hi. s rosi tion in t::,.e 1855 
Tove b; re>11.ovinc a few powerfu 1 district directors '~Nho had served 
as chairr.1e1 of C0':1par1y negotiating committees v;hcre they ~-n:1.;_=_~1.t 
~1ave been tempted to settle before i'crnnald v:as able to gain a 
satisfactory contract witj_ U.S. ~teal. ~rev'ous to 1955, negotia-
tions r•esulted in some contractt'al ceviat~_ons frox:: t;,.e 11 :2ig 
Ste e 1" set tle:~1e r1 t. '1hi s ena!: led so:ne firms to derive a cost 
acvantaE<J and unsettle incustry pricing. '-'Osts were far less 
certain ard predictable. 
Uy 1956, twelve ~ajar comran~es aut ~rlzed a four ~an 
co:11mi ttce to bar[ain for then on ma5or i.s"ues but Lot 011 all 
ccntractual provisions. .L~le fol:<.r 1',en were from U • .:l. Steel (2), 
Bethlehem, and .Rerublic anc led by John Step£1ens • .l.'bis was the 
first tir:Je in nineteen y~ars of collective bargaining that 
the COQpanies volunto.rily partic.lpated in joint necotiating 
sess~ons. 
In 1959, the four rnan co-cmni t tee was empowered with aut :1or·i ty 
to negotiate a complete contract on all issues. It appears that 
one reason for t~o..e behavior of the companies was the insistence 
of some of the large compal,ies thay they have a ,:.reater voice 
in cetermir:ing the fiLal settlement, which, recardless of the 
way iu wh:~ch it was reached, would be arplicable to all of them. 
~. 3. Steel prob,,bly realized by 1S50 t:lB.t its luac5ersh:ip on 
inc't'sLrial relstions was no longer a::sured. In 1040, Bet:1lehem 
broke t'le patterL b;,o settlln,'~ v!l th t 1e uni.on on pensions and in-
Sl-:.r,g_nce. In l;:J52 :Sethle~1em reacnee an t·nc~erstancin:::; on tj_e 
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L. :.:;. :.-tJel, .~"Jetl1.lehem, al~d r·epublic r1egotiated jointly v.~ith the 
U· ion. 1,ord, (;eneral otors anC. C"::1rysler c::lade a CO:U.."'TIO.CL offer 
L:c ~ 1e s:crin£: of 1958 anC:' obtairJ.ed a virtually co::1:non settle-
:l"n t in t j1.e falJ.l In ac1di ti on to re(_uc :tnr ·uncertainties, j o :n t 
rw[;otiation provides an Ol:;portuni ty for a COilL'TIOn appraisal of 
tho effect of a v.a,ce 8''_r·J8ment on costs and hence ~:-:;plicitly 
on rr.Lces. OccaslonaJ.ly it nay be used as a hanc,y "~N8.Y to flx 
rrices. _::•r1e rang::J of uncEita1nty is 9.t least narrov:ed concerrllr..g 
t:1e probable price c~n:;:e each oltgopolist may anticipate. 
::.:n ·steel, 1 t rrovides t:ne price leader wl th lmowled~~e about how 
~1ie:~'l a price r,eed be set to meet with t_erjeral approval from 
t:-1e ot ::-1er produ.cers but not ~ o high as to invite undercu ttinE; by 
L1e 3Taller firms. -'l''Or:'l time to tb1e t:1e leader may put 
rr.assur•e on a:1aller .fi r:.1s by refusint; to increase prices hig.::1 
er..ou~~h. 'l.'his discourages entry and :nay not hurt tne efficient 
leader too mucn. .':hen the Alal '~<ooc .:;.teel Company arm01...1nced 
u<on saop v:'1ic.1 v.as later rescinced wr1en D.S. Steel failed to 
c;o along. If t • .S. :>teal fslt· tl1.at it was losin[, co; trol over 
t'le forr1ula for settinc a pattern followed ·oy t~1e others, 
it co1Jld count w:i. th certainty on being t~1.e co11par;y selected 
anC:: sin,s~le d out for a strike in a divide and conquer strategy 
lJ:'?. tt:e union. r .3. ~tee1. car1 no lor12~er insist on inCiviCual 
co ~1~~ any bargaining. 
~·'OI' priclng steel :r;roducts, t le important [Olnt is thf:lt 
u.n~er pr·es··,nt ne[.:ot:i.ations the i'llr~act of the bar:. ain can be 
i.lOI'.: easil~/ assessee as fur as cos -:s are concerned t_J.an was the 
case earlier. 
1;.~usiness ;ieek, J1.1y 4, 1959, reported ths.t not only 
v•.:e:re tO.e twelve major :lteel cornpanies coordinati:r: their bargain-
lLg stard, but t!:1.et other inc~ustries sucj_ as the electrical and 
autorrtotive-industries were keepin.~ in close toncr1.. It appeared 
that steel customors assured steel t•:1.at the:y possessed. acequate 
irrvuntories and. ~1.ence increased steel's ability to take a long 
strike. ln 195y/ ttle:"·e was a series of round-robin tall{s axnon?-: 
lahor relations officers in electrical manufacturing, steel, ~nd 
automobiles. 
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on June 25, 1958 that its rrice would rise by c.,.6 a ton effective 
on July 7; L.S. St3el did not follow, anC. t~1e increase was 
wi thdr8.wn. Yet on Ju_ly 30, Armco and depublic ax,nounced a11 
incJ:·ease of ,A.50 8 ton effective on AuE:ust 1 and u.s . .::lt•.:iel 
followed; the incrsac:e ~1eld. If t~lis increase hac j,ot beer" 
enou2n to satisfy u.s. Steel, t:nese smalJer firms could always 
revise upward and follow 1.3. Steel.l 
lrhe price increase averat::ed about 1,4.50 a ton for about 
~5 percent of all steel products. Armco St·Jel started the 
ball rollinp: (See Business VJee1{', August 2, 1~;58, p. 25), not 
. F .. S.:.:.>teel in the traditicnal way. ~1 ao rost of the inuustry 
followfJC suit 'Ni t::l a speed that surpri seo o'tservers. !3y seven 
da7s er:.out; 11. ~1ajors follmved the rnove of Ar:'1CO to make it in-
dustry wide. ..roducts arno1.:nting to 15 percent of steel shipped 
( s-':;ainless, rails, aLd tiL nlll _r.rodl-cts) were LOt raised in 
price. Armco teed off on July 29, 1958 w:t th incr'eases for 
carbon hot anci cold-rolled strip and sheat--bread and butter 
i te,.ns of t::1e industry. Within 24 hours, three ·ot!·1er major pro-
d'i..zcers followed ( Eepub lie, i\a tional, Jones :~: Laug,:1lin). On 
t:-:_e second day U.S. Steel ar:d Bethlehem clinched the r·ise 
v;l. t ~ new prlce lists. l 1 hr ·:;e day later, Eepublic raised prices 
on bar:', p~pe, wire, billets and slab. All followed at.:ain with 
l. S • .::.teel breaking tradition by being tl:-le last tnajor producer 
to second the mot:i on. On t~1e fourth day ~3ethlehem opened the 
t.':lird s:;;t of changes wi1.en it posted incr.;ases on plates and 
structurals. Again U.S. :teel relinquished tne lead. Rails and 
tln mill product prices were not raised. Low demand was given 
a.s L1e reason for rails vvhile tin plate is covered by a special 
rricing policy. l'he cannif18 incustry receives tl:l.irty-five 
da:ys notlce of price action. Steel-men say they are not frigh-
tened by anti-trust action because they 'luere just handling a 
11
'1<ash.ed transaction," i.e., the last wa,ee increase. On July-1, 
195f, an auto:-:1.atic w ~-;e increase plus cost of living adjust:'Ilent 
of 20 cents an hour went into effect. (See .i...'usire ss Week, 
At':,:').st 2, 1958, p. 25 and I>.1s:!ress ':,eek, Aucust :~J, l'd58, p. 30 
for a.r:. account of t~te moves. ) 
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.Jne :rnic::nt expect tna t a hi;_;hly e ffic ien t snaller firm, 
i.e., Lat:·cLal Steel, v;it:l a ~'"t;h profit rate due to cheaper 
:1aterials or better plant, would have an incentive not to follow 
a r;rice rise, especially if it was thou~)J.t t:'1at the leaders 
wo~16 not r~scind a ~rice increase.l ~ncerta!nty nay prevent 
tn~s but even if uncertainty is reduced, t e s~aller firm 
r11.Bt l~OSSCSS sufficient caraci ty to a'c~sorb acci tiot.al orders • 
Jw Je ader r,:_a~r conclu.de t'1.at L1e smaller firm cannot expand 
capacity quicl<ly enon£:_:1 a1:d t:J.at t:1e loss of a s::all volume 
of orders does n0t compare w~. th the loss of total revenue if the 
price increase is rescL,ded. 1.::1en the lesser o1i:=,c)po2ist has 
enjryed the benefl t of a payout :r::eriod lonr enout·h so that t'c1.e 
l'evenue lost by fai lint:· to incJ>:c:a se rri ce a.nd follow the leader 
is r;1ore tn.an of'fse t by an increase :tn sales vo1ume, t,1e leader 
nay rescinc the :r:-rice rlse. 'i':1e c;ain ~1ay not be v:orth t [le risk. 
1
'i:lerefol'e, 1vhen a lesser ollgor:·olist has substantial vnuseC. 
capacity or can expanC: quickJ.y, t '·1e certainty that t~1.e leader 
wil~ rescind a price ~ncrease is ~reater and there is no benefit • 
.. 1en t' nus ed ca; ac i t~r is very srr.a ll, t 1e re :ay be r:d.bbling by t ~1.e 
1ess'3r olie;oy::ollsts. uowever, the alacrity wit~-J vvhich leaderst 
rrice ~-nc;oeasus are "'1a ~ched SU-~ '':'3 S ts ~-' +:'1at l:l ttle nibbl5.ne; ,soes on. 
l:.usiness ·.ee:~, Jt:..ly 5, 1;:)52, r..:• 50 states that l;ational 
.Steel officials bel :t.eve, ,(,ot unli:Ve t'1.e ·giant pacerrtakers, t:1e 
s·'[":ller L'ir:J.s caL:not build rrice on costs. J"1~.: a fsw !1.ave the 
resources to :"'lake a choice on prices. ;\a tional accepts price 
at ';,<nete,'er the co"ll.reti tion says 1 t is, ace ther:. bears down on 
cost to asst;.re a profit. ln its ·sJ.::eCialties, tin plate and 
calC rolled sneet for auto boC.ies, it assumes that it is as effi-
cient as anyone • .Lt believes its role in pricing to be one of 
_rres::irt.~~ t·,e elants to rai.Sd price hiC1. enoufn to assure an ade-
~ua te sq~ply of fv.nc= s i'or experts iOli. LlaL .• ood 1 s •, .. 6 hike indica ted 
t 1e El'110unt desired. .c<ailure to conflrJ it b,; ~-·.s. 3teel lessens 
L1e e.IJili ty to sx::·o..ud for s:naller fir11s. 
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i'or-~1s of co:npeti t1.on, othBl1 t!1an price, a:ce resortec~ to instead 
b:3c.'1nse they are not so certatn anci take a lon2er ti:ne to have 
an ef .Cect. 
T 1e principal axpJana tion of the leaders hi~· of l.:. 3. ;;)teel 
ll c: s in t:1e nis tory and market p!1ilosophy of s tee 1 producers, 
t • .S •. :.teal's ovvnt3rs1ip of over one-t<Jird of t::1e basic steel 
carac~_ty, anc the fact t1:1at l:.S. Stoel is within reaca of all 
imrortaLt ·narke ts. 
~ven as a rrice leader, L.S. Steel regards itself as being 
::1em<1BC in by li:!d ta t1 01.1s on its price policy L;ipOs ed by non-
confor:nist follov,ers au::: by wh.at it :.1ay consider as competitive 
rrocncts outsice t~1e ir:t(ustry t':1at are beyonc} its control. 
-'~e corporation he.c! tr1:1dl tionally ref1Jsec to r1ib~Jle at its 
Sil!OUncec base rrices by uncercover .r.ric:e cuttir: and [:refers 
t.1a t 1 ts ccmpe ti tors ;r..a: e the first move. '~hen it dec ides 
v.· 1en ar;c :J.ov. far to brlnt; r~J.blis.c1ed prices into conformity 
wit~ actual bids. '"ence t~1e 1at:, ard tencer1cies of the 
com1&uy ~:iay be ex:r::lained. Yet t!1::s has not prevented it from 
settL t_le :r·ricing pace for tcw eLtir:::: incustry. 
"-'his leacers li:t: can be de1:10nstratec. since ·,,orld 'ikr II by: 
(1) t.1e lead of C • .J. :teal in abandonint:: basinL point pr·icing; 
(2) its J~ad in ra~sin[ steel prices after the unsuccessful 
att'J1!1:r:t :;f t:1e chief producers to hold the lir"e a.rainst tne 
post-v.ar s::1orts.,se; (3) t.1e annovncement (October, 1953) of its 
inter~t~_0':1 to ~:100t celiverec:i prices of competitors (and its 
effectiver:ess in firmir2: :rrices); (4) its priority in subsequent 
pri.ce ·"ove s to ta>::e account of :increased costs .1 In the post-
1, ew Yorz Ii 1.e s July F, 1948; July 21, 22, 1948; October 1, 
1953; July 6, 1955. 
196 
war per·iod, so2e of the Sc:1aller co ~pe ti tors broke away from 
1:nifor_·:1ity on finished steel rrodvcts (r;lates anc~ sheets} 
to exploit C'.J_sto,ner s::-lortates, but these cleviat:ions can be 
l jr stif:i.ably called al')normal. · 'fhe pre·"1iums disappeared several 
:·e ;;.:c>s a..__o ,and r~ow it appears that secret :rri ce concessions in 
vs.r:Lous forms ·nave occurred.2 
'-'~1e price of extras :Ls chanced ratner infrequently. Ste::Jl 
cor::par:ies chanr:- them &t t·IJe same tine and by the same amour:t; 
.lOWe\ c-;r, tr1ey ar·e not always identical. 3 Between 1939 and 1949, 
th.e sc;ledule of extras was r:ot chan: ed. 4 Sir:..ce t:J.ere are 
t_:ousar:cs of separate :i.te=-ns irLc1uced as extras, revision of 
t~1.e extras sc 1ec1u1e is tL:-e cor1su.m:tnc and costly. As a result, 
chan es in ·"'larket conc.itLons and costs are ri1ected first and, 
lT • .:>., Con,:._~r·Jss, ~-:e·~rir...;~s Before a SubconT-rJ.:ittee of' t'1e 
~,8use co~~1:Cd t-tee OE t:'1e J".1diciary, Stucv of C'nor:oly Power, 
Iart 4}_-), ::>teel :;~xhibits, p. 629-36, 8lst ::eng., 2nd 2:ess., 
1.50. !n h:1.s :Cecline 9f Co-~!'oetition in 1936~ p. 82, Arthur 
--~ur:rcs poL-1ted OiJt t1at t~e devi_aticn rarallel9d taat of the 
;_:re·-crs fo1lo\>;c_r.i.~· '.:orld 1:-iar I. 
~,~ 11 •• t'l3S last froLtier of cre-:ni.u--r:. !:rices :!_s feeling 
v-a•:7 strong prossu:2e fro'n a highl;: co petitive :'al'~{Ot ••• 
,' __ to n8w bsse prices ar>e t_J.o sane as f.o.b. :rl;_ll prj_ces of 
•1ajor producers ill otJ.er areas." Iron Age, Ser:te~:\ber 16, 1854., 
;. 210. In 1354, ~ationa1 Steel, w~t~ a favorsd location in its 
::r·e~;t La~ws rlant, reduced t-,r <,2 a ton t~1.e price of s;1eeta and 
str::p raq_uired by t:1e automob::.le industry in t':le :Detroit area. 
( 3Gl~ 11 ;3teel: ·~;1.e J'rice Pot Is Bubbling," Ibid, T.ece~·nber 23, 1S54, 
I'· 21.) --
3:,'-vs trade jou.rrial 3teel stateo. t·1at unifor'n change in 
8 :,l~ras 11 does not '1alr:e sOilse L; tne 1:!:::::-lt of -:he reasons civen 
:for rov:i.sinr; th.e extras." ('3e·J Steel, Zebruary 13, 1350, p. 47, 
anc E6.) :t:t also stated t~1.a t w.1e.c t 10 c:emand for steel weakens, 
so:1e co .1panies wlll revise t~1ese r.1ew extra charf·es because t::1.ey 
vmrk to the detriment of scme companies. ;''le implication of tills 
str3 te::n:mt :ts that all cO'l::_-anies co not always have indentical 
extras. 
4C1anp_e s wel'e made, however, in specific extra charges. 
c.s ... )teel calc~11a-:Jd tL1st more than 1,000 ctlan,-::.es w-sre made 
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for t.J.e 10 s t part, only in t,1e base price of s tee 1. Public 
rel•3.tions so::tJtimes dictattJs ttwt an increase L:1 the price of 
steel be :Jac,_e by chan;;in.:_: t:J.e schedule of extras v:i th.out altering 
.. :J.EHl th.~ s is dontJ, ti1e various inC.exe s of 
:;:rice caJculated by .DIJS, t;1e LatioLal Industrial Conference 
>Oaro, a..::d Iron Age do nc·t s:1ow any C{la.nge in steel prices, 
al t ~o1:.~:n t-1e a:nount actually paid by users inc:r'eases. Also, 
so;':lc cu:tomers may receive reductions in extras w:1en a 3eneral 
i.ncr.::ase is :nade in b8se prices; tGG result 1s t~1e.t the avail-
a1Jle sts.tlstle5 :,:a:tre it difficult to judLe w~1.at is actu'ally 
review of extra cnarzes t2a!.:. :.teel 
t:.nciertook in 1949 was said to .1ave resulted. in prices t.1.at 
"rs.·.'lect an honest eff'ort to arrive at t~1e tr-Jeoret:i.cally 
l;GJ'fect extra charge ••• one based on the actual cost of 
11 .· 1 a r:.-.·Lven size, coin;- a s-r::.ecific job, or suppl~Tinc~ a r c 1. " c_; ~· _ L-
srecisl analysis."l · .. it1 t·us effort, it ap:;:ears L1st the 
~1oped t:1at t'l.enceforth alterat::..ons would be nade only 
sr1iftec the costs 
of ez.:;ras. d · of t ~e r··r'i ce st.r·.~.c:tnre as.3ists t··1.e cor-'-'r eru1~ . : 1· J, .. -· 
i I"ollowin;;:: a <'oli cy of' trar,s -:1:::. ttin,· c h.anf"e s in rora tio:t I1 '·" t"' 
oirect costs fr0:.11 t:l,>i'J to tine to chaDf:ds in basu r:;rices--
c~lances that appesr to a resronse to variations in 
t Q.an would be in0icated b" aD insistence on cl ire c :~ costs -
-· ; - ,., · .. ,, ,,,, for hot rolleC S:lSGts alone fro:n 
in ir.ClVlC'tal extr"" c,t.tccie:;b33 1 c:c l:J 4 9 1,ot ·c.nt::.l Dec3tnber, 
T •. T l ,::74.5 to JJecenl er '"'' • -, ·- lc38 
... enuarJ _, - · '.._ . . -.. 1 " of ex"·ros revisec sulce 'd • 1 .)40 . 8 .:~ t-1., en0irJ sc_1eau. -~ - ~ · v -v, VJ ~ ..,_ v 
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esri~iLc a ]:articular rate of return. Thus it would a~rear 
t·~~~t any rrice action taken was ti1e r-esult of ch2.ne;es in costs 
factors. It wot:.l(_ also ap;e ar that iJ. S. Steel 1 s concerned 
wi t'1 a slow and uncerta~~l a::n.oun-: of nibblinL~ away of its share 
of t-le -,,arket by small0r competitors thron,: __ )l the 'Jediums of 
:::l:::ras, CiSCOUnts anc .fr8ig~1t Ch9.r?eS. 
StabilizLli_' t'Ti.s nar~~et anc ::1akinc all changes in base 
r:rices onl;' rrcd:.,_ces results t~1at are 10re certain anc. also 
.:nore ope~·1. 3:naller co_:lre ti tors ·:nay he s t tate to :1a~(e an obvious 
move. ,.:;v-tdence seer·1s to disclose that in settin; price 
c:omina;:t fir~n tenC.s to choose t-..oo hi.i..:;h a lev01, and as a resul J 
loses so:a0 o!.' its s ,w,rJ of' the ·;•ar>e t ove1• tL--,-,e :J.S the s:.L:ller 
.f ir,as Gm.ploy low c ;1arge s for extras or £,rent l&r ger eli scounts 
in order to r.ibblo away. '..:..'.1is is especially tn:e in L1.ose 
steel r,rodt~_cts vuic;, are 'li~nly specialized and lq which 
s;~aller com::anie s :-r.ay c oncen trs te. J?or 3Xa .-,p J e, 100 percent 
of alloy rroctt'_ctlon is rurc:1ased with e~;:tras wnle only 
L;-0 percent of t.~e rlates and 34 percent of the structural 
shar-es involves extras. :Zxtras account for 35 percent of tne 
final I rice of C·:ll~ rolled strip a11d o::1l;y 1. 5 t-'ercent of t"le 
final r,:rice of structural s~1apes. 
Fpwa:roc Jni.ft in :)teal Irdus try I-ro.fi t 'l'arget 
'l'~'le s·~1rve~~ by L~e ~3rookings Institution places t~1e target 
of 1~.c~. ~)tecl at: "Over t1.e years a net return, after taxes, of 
"' "'d ,. '''·t .,..ercer.+- O' in;·est--•ent 111 Ir order to cl.eter::'1ine ar·~t~'-" _ (,l,, __ ·l .t:- '" : -· "., .-, .... 
'"arlan, ~--irlan, ar:d 1.anzi1lotti, np. cit., p. 169. 
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if t~1e:!"e nas be ~n a si-lift in t~'le r~rofi t target over the years, 
t·1e accompanying chart si1ows t:1.e relationship for t':le steel 
i~~ustry, not jPst u.s. ~teel alone, between its operating 
rete and its r2ts of return on net wort~ after taxes from 
J 325 to 1G52, exc1u0in,; the Vil:l.r ~rears of 1941-45. 
L1e est~_::nstinf 11na for t:.1e chart vJas corrputed from tne 
';'~e equa tlons for the regression 
line ar·e: 
II. 
< 
'_:_;:;.e l::.ne of tne eqv a tion is: Y (rate of return) equals 1.045 
f .083X (operating rate). 
'c:'he chart also shows V'?hat the estimating line would be 
if plotted solely from tae operating rates and rates of relllrn 
from 1947 to 1958. .'.'he regression line is shown :tn red. 
The chart reveals L1a t. beginni:ne:; in a· out 1955, tne obser-
vations rise materially above ti1e r:>t"trcssion line. r;::-,e line 
comF~ ted for 1947-58 rises about four rercen. tg__c e roin +;s above 
t_le 1325-5~~ line. Co~·~pared to the past rels tions:lip, t~1e 
s,_-rle operatinz r"te seems to yield a profit rate higher b~- at 
least four percenta~e points. In 195~ for example, a 
recession yeer, the operatinG rate was 61.2 percent of' capacity. 
Ore tne basis of the past relationship, t':ce expectad rate of 
return would be about 5.07 percent; but in 1358 it was 9.8 
percent. _;_·or 1955, s. prosrerous year 1ri t~ an operating rate of' 
~73.:) p·arcent, t1.e expected rate of return was 15.2 percent. 
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It ay,::pears that t~e target l'8_te of return has clearly 
s rllfted up as tne steel companies try to the consumer to 
;:ay h~s sha1·e of inc:t:·e-Jsed lnvest:J.ent.l '...:·he same overall 
efrect on pr:tces is ac~1.ievad whe.n manat:err.ent lowers the rate 
of procm:ti,)n at which t:1.e targ:at rete is to be achieved.2 
·.: .• 1e c~1arges by t:w un::.r::m cl tlng an e :tremeJ..y low broal{even 
roint of 40 :rercent of capacity or less :-;;.ay indicate that the 
standard volume f~t whici1 L1e tar&:et is to be achieved has 
shifted down to a lovver operating rate. T:1.e s tee 1 in:.~ us try 
is now unquestionably confronted with excess capacity that is 
greater t ;ym in the e ::;rJ ;: part of the 1947 -5Ci per~ oc, auc t 1 1.e 
lc"ee ~i'·Tl o~rment 
,_; ~·'- J- r)- I :.:f1•owtll, and Irice Levels, op. cit., p. 17. 
2. arkups .nay not e ;~pane in a pe rlod of excess demand be-
cause attention may be concentrated on lons-run target rates 
of return and long-rur. mar1{et shares, over a f.er.od which will 
i.:clude both ~.;:ood tl'::-jes and bad. .:arkups over dlrect costs 
nay be designed to earn--on anticipated volume over the period--
a return wh:~.c ~1 is co ... c.s::.ce red satisfactory but no:t:J so ~1i5~1. as to 
j_ncuce excessive r1ew eJ:.;try. A rise or fall of volu..111e will, 
of course, e:reatly increase or decrease ti1.e s~1ort-run profit 
nare;in over-all cos:s incluo.irJ.,£; over-n.ead. 3ut t.l.e ;narkup may 
not ·oe revised unless t1e c::Wn._,e in current denand ::.s seen as 
altering the lon2 term volume prospect. l:'aradoxically, a current 
incrJase in de.La.c1c w~1.:Lc:1. revises upwa::.'d tne lon::;er term volu.ae 
prospect :ni;::::1.t leaC. to a reduction in the r:1arkup necessary to 
r·roduce t:.1e desired rf:.l.te of return. If the in:::ustry, however, 
roesires to ·1ake t-le COnsumer help pay for future inV:'1Strnent 
r·,, t~1er t :"laG. the security ovmer alone, ta.e embarras sin~ pr•ofi ts 
c;ene rated by curr·en t ri sic.:; Cien1anc and upw~:trd an tic ipa ted future 
v-:,lurne 11ay b; toler;:: ted anC: publ~.c orinion galvanized to acce;t it. 
0 , t 1.e other har'ld, if the longer ter::n volume prospect is 
revised downward, and t;1e r3cent excess caraclty figures indicate 
tnat t:Us .nay now be the case, an incr·ease in the markup ~a~r be 
resorted to in order to produce the ceslred rate of return. 
If t~1e desired returr:.. itself is revised upv.-a:·d 11hen lcng-term 
volume prospects fall, prlce increases w:i..ll be sizeaole. 
( .::>ee :·~obert lanzillotti_, rtPricln~~ Objectives in Largdr companies," 
A.cne:r-i can ~CO! .cOmic ·c:eview ( Dec;:r'!'lbe r' 1958), r. :::;21-40. 
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0ss~,:rtion thDt such a ::tat(; vvill cont:inue ~1ay lead to a 
decl:.De ln t~e standarc volume. Fro'n 1947 t~l!'ough 1852 t~e 
o;:;:r'a tin rate aver::;.:::ed about 92 rercent ar:C: varied between 
SJ..l ar·d lOO.a :r;eJ:'cent • .Z·rom 1853 to 1952; another five years, 
t~ or~rstlng rate avera ed about 82 percentaL~ varied between 
t1.2 and S4.J rercent. 
Summary of Conclusions 
1) From 1947 to 1957, a period of moderate inflation, steel 
prices rose steadily, even in recession years when steel shipments 
decreased. Apparently there is a lag in adjusting prices to a 
rising demand for steel products. In inflation when demand is 
rising, the price adjustment moves in discrete steps and short-
run profit maximization is incomplete. Thus "unliquidated 
monopoly gains" exist which may subsequently be liquidated. When 
a demand plateau is reached, prices may not rise to full profit 
maximization levels because industry leaders may be concerned 
about the attraction of high profits to other firms. In addi-
tion, price poli~y may be employed to discourage existing firms 
which are non-integrated from expanding. The lag hypothesis 
appears justified in view of the fact that in years when demand 
was high along with the operating rate, effective price increases 
were smaller than in recession years. During tl!le:_--l-9:45r-48'_rapid 
inflation, a grey market for steel developed and was not liquidated 
'Qr· izmnediately raising prices to the necessary levels. The lag 
may also be due to a necessity for conditioning an adverse public 
to accept a price increase. Prices may also not rise to 
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the level indicated by rising demand. because the industry sets 
its profit target and prices at 70 percent of capacity. When 
the operating rate rises the return is satisfactory. A price 
increase would generate an embarrassment of riches. Yet when the 
operating rate falls below 70 percent, prices may be raised to 
achieve the profit target. 
2) Resistance to wage advances may have decreased recently. 
An incentive to resist lies in the apprehension that rivals may 
make a less costly bargain and hence not join in the next price 
advance. However, bargaining in steel has been reduced to a four 
man team representing the entire industry. Uncertainty is reduced 
and joint negotiation provides an opportunity for common appra-
isal of the effect of a wage agreement on costs and prices. The 
leader is more able to judge the size of a price increase that 
would be satisfadDry to all and also discourage entry. When 
excess capacity exists and a small firm could expand its Yolume 
of sales by failing to raise prices, the increased revenue may 
be completely offset by the leader rescinding the price increase. 
If the price increase had been followed in the first place, revenue 
might have increased by as much as it would through an increase 
in sales volume. Thus too much nibbling does not occur. 
3) A study of the return on equity associated with various 
operating rates from 1925 to 1958 yields a regression line which 
enables an estimate of expected return to be made. A line calculated 
from the data of 1947-58 indicates that the profit target shifted 
up at least four percentage points, especially after 1955. 
Apparently, when the operating rate trends downward, prices are 
raised to meet a pre-determined profit target. This represents an 
unusual adjustment to declining demand. 
CHAPTER VI 
MATERIALS OF OTHER INDUSTRIES THAT COMPETE WITH STEEL 
The purpose of this chapter is to establish the validity of 
that portion of the hypothesis which claimed that the very large 
increases in steel prices have not eroded the steel wage gains 
by inducing a natural corrective in the form of increased sub-
stitution of materials of other industries for steel products. 
In other words, the magnitude of the recent steel price increases 
has not been significantly retarded, nor can retardation be 
expected in the near future, by an increased use of substitute 
materials. Thus an important source of steelworker wage gains is 
left intact. 
Therefore, it is the object of this chapter to judge the 
validity of the argument that inter-industry competition, and to 
a lesser extent, competition among products and processes, has 
lessened steel oligopoly power.l 
Counting only those firms withan an industry tells one very 
lsee S. Slichter, "The Growth of Competition," Atlantic Monthly, 
November, 1953• and A. D. H. Kaplan, Big Business in the Com~e­
titive System (washington: Brookings Institution, 1953); an 
also Edward Mason, "The New Competition," The Yale Review . 
(Autumn, 1953), p. 37-48; David Lilienthal, A New Era (New York: 
Hayes, 1952), p. 47-94; in addition, John Dunlop, Wa~es, Prices, 
Profits, and Productivity, The American Assembly, 19 9, p. 156-
60. DUnlop prefers to count on potential increased inter-industry 
competition to aid in solving the steel wage-price issues rather 
than specific public policy designed to regula te the bar ·s.ining 
parties. If an examination of inter-industry competition or poten-
tial competition yields pessimistic expectations of any growth 
in competition between steel and other materials, the ability of 
the steelworkers'union to raise wages and the industry to raise 
prices will remain with the economy for sometime. 
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1-r_ ttle. Cou.r.. tiL~; :nus t bs ~one by taking categories of uses 
for t:1e proc.uct of an industry, considering what :products of 
ot:1.er incustrie s directly compete ir: ti.1.e se categories. 
r:'he re :Core, t 1e r.cai n effort in t ~1.is c ha.r ter wi 11 be O.irec ted 
towarC:s an evalt·ati.·on of t _e poss·b~lities of substitt.:ting 
other •.rmterials for steel and towards an assessment of 
wnat :1ay be called t'le upr:er Ji:~1it so far as t~1.e possible 
rerlacement of steel j_s concerned. It snould be noted tl:lat 
t:1is .1ethod ter:~s to exagcera,:e t:1e ar.1otmt of competition 
w':~ic'l the stee1 in(·ustry is likely in practice to have to face. 
As a startinc: point, tne four main materials competing 
wi ti·l steel will be e:::amined ar;C. the main facts on the trend 
of rroduction for t~-:tese items vdll be explored. Tj_ese four 
-;1a terials are pls :=otic s, al U!:lirn::m, concrete anc timber. 
Plastics 
-r:1e steel Jnc~t stry faces competition from the so-called 
1.ard plastics, a r-::lativel;; naw product. 1ihile competition 
is more or less confined to thi.s area of the plastics industry, 
it is i--r.possible to easily separate statistically t.1e i:1ard. from 
other forms and the fig1;res given in the followini table include 
all types. 
I'>le table lnc ica te s that the production of rlas tics has 
been sor-:1ew1:1&t irrisnlar; tbe aLnual rates of increase haV•3 varied 
considerably. Cutput j_3 increasin~: rapidly, howev=r, and is 
likely to continue to do so. 
·;.hile tnere are mary· oifferent types of r:last:i.cs, apparently 
the ~nost prcmisin;~; competitors to steel are polystyrene and 
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r;_'A.2L8 46 
~~~1ousands 
Year Of 'Ions 
1947 625 
1348 '740 
LA9 745 
1950 l,J75 
195.1 1,215 
1952 1,166 
1953 1,388 
1954 1,413 
1955 1,784 
1956 1,955 
Source: Herbert Simonds, A Concise Guide to Plastics 
(: .. ew York: Reil:holC: :E'ublish:ir.g ~ompany~ 1957) p. 120. 
rolyethylene. ln 1957 and 1958, 2,17f,qOO. "nd 2,300,0JO tons 
of r1astics and resin rna ter:tals were reported as produced ir the 
~~Li ted 3ta tes in the l'Bpartment of Gorr ... m.erce 1 s Survev of Current 
T3nsi~ on kay, 1959, p. 23. T:lis study si:lowed t:1at plastics 
and r~sins a\era~ed an increase of bdtween 15 and 25 percent 
anr1ua11y from 1929 to 1957. Since tl1.ere are so r;J.any types 
of plestics ant so many different uses, it is difficult to classify 
ar,d find data for t~1ose w~ich are considered to be ·~lard plastics 
COI:1J~8 tin__ \!Vi t j, S tee 1. _iowever, S{frene r; las ticS and polyethylene 
plastics aprear to be two of the most important. 'J.l"i'le following 
table provides ;:ertinen t ir,forrna tion, i llus tra tin.c; the rap:i_d rate 
of production growth. 
Polyetl1ylene is prcdt•ced che:m:i.cally by polynerization of 
etl1ylere obtained fron petro1enm or natural p·as. )utput stal'ted 
wi t·t one :rrilli.on rm.mds in H143, e:::;::andec: to 50 m~ llion by 1950, 
to 21J ~ill~on in 1954, and to nearly 900 million pounds in 
1~58, :rore tl-~an a tr1ree-fold increase in !'our years. ':'.'his fast 
f 
TABLE 47 
STYRENE PLASTICS 
Year 
1948 
1957 
1958 
Thousands 
Of Tons 
82.5 
388.0 
360.0 
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Source: u.s., Department of Commerce, Survez of Current 
Business, May, 1959. 
growth in ~olume exceeded that of any other chemical product 
developed during and since the war with the exception of 
synthetic rubber. 
Not only polystyrene and polyethylene in the family of 
plastics compete with steel. Other plastics also do, but in 
a way that is difficult to assess. J.f'or example, the auto-
mobile industry used the plastics shown in the following table 
in the amounts noted. 
The plastics noted in the table below averaged about 
nine pounds per car but omits the polyesters, urethane, fluoro-
carbons, epoxies, etc. It is estimated that if all plastics 
are included, the average used per car in 1955 amounts to 18 pounds. 
TABLE 48 
PLASTICS USED IN AUTOMOBILES IN 1955 
Type 
Butyral Sheeting (Safety Glass) 
Cellulose Acetate Butyrate 
Methacrylate s 
Nylon 
Phenolics 
Vinyls 
TOTALS 
Source: H.Simonds: op. cit., p. 118. 
Annual Tons 
8,500 
2,600 
3,700 
1,900 
2,600 
10,500 
29,800 
for tt~ lnited States from 1947 to 1954. 
A?PA: _:_:,'. :;:' AL~ . :i~L :~ 1· 
1965 _:,:).::'1 A~':£ 
Year ':"'otal 
1947 1,870 
194B 2,138 
194_9 1,202 
)_·;:)50 2,433 
1951 2,578 
1952 2,672 
1953 3,211 
1954 3,010 
1SG5a e,s3o 
~CABLE 49 
Civilian 
l,Bl:J.l 
2,038.9 
1,702.3 
2,294.0 
1,802.0 
1,703.0 
2,321.0 
2,410.0 
1:. • A. 
Source: ; e tal Statistics, 1955. 
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. :ili. tary 
59.9 
99.1 
99.7 
139.0 
776.0 
969.0 
390.0 
600.0 
l{. A. 
aJ ane s 2. Eos~nsv.e ig, "·::":1e Le nand for blu.nlnum, 11 university 
of ~~llinois Bt,lletin, Apr·il, 1957, p. 161. 
Jn tne basls of hosensweig 1 s esti':late of aluminum con3um.-
I tion totalinc 8, 930 ::U.llion pouncs in 1965, the annual rate 
of ::_r_cr·ease ire alu:;:lnum consmnr:tioL would exceed lJ rercsnt 
cumulat:Lvely. 
Concrete 
~'VJin:. to t~1e creal-; Vc.riety of concrete produ.cts, compre-
~1ensi ve s to tis tics ar·e not available. i-iowever, some indication 
of tt1e r~rowt:1 of output can bt=: obtained fro:n t'le statistics of 
cenent rroc11::.ction rres:Jnted in the table below. 
Cement production a~pears to ~e growing at a lower rate 
t:1an t:w t of aluminum an::: rlas tics and t~1e growtl:1 rate is uneven. 
·'.hi.s is to be evpected stnce it is associated wi tn capital 
PLU:::::rc:·J:Jl\ OF C:L21'-<T 
( Ti1.ousands of tons) 
Year 
h153 
1•;154 
1'~J55 
l\:!56 
1957 
'l'ons 
44,405 
45 648 , ' 
4(2, 908 
56,024 
58,468 
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Source: U.S., Departrn.ent of Co:nmerce, Sto.tistical 
Abstract of t11.e t.:nited States ('iiasl1.ir~gton: ·u.s. ·:fovernment 
!'ri.ntin'- Office, 1957), p. 722, 738. 
iLvestr-:1ent to a considerable extent. But it should be noted 
t:u:o.t its e:::rowtC1. is quite as fast as that of steel proc-:uction; 
and also ti1a t :!.f a greater use of reinforced concrete tenc~s 
to b3 at ti1.e expense of structural steel, it gives rise to an 
increased demand .for reir.forcing rods of high tensile wire. 
•::~mber 
une of tl:1e com::et.i.tors of steel, espec1al1y in the building 
fi.e1c, is 1u.:nber. :Lumb,;;r production has varied between 39,107 
mill:ton be arc feet and 32,176 boarc feet in tl1.e period 1947-56. 
·~.1e output char.3:8d very little during the 1950's and has been 
L'2. fact 'JUC ~ lower than it was in 1913, while :the· 1929 · fj_ge.re 
ro~ghl' corresronds to present output levels. In the o:-rreantime, 
t1e aver·ace mlll value for l,OJO board feet rose from :;,15.38 
in 1913 to ,· 26.94 in 1929 and to ~,55 in 1947. 3lnce the in< us try 
ifl a basic anc' pr:tmary one, it arpear>s to be affected by the 
law of diminishing returns to a gre·a ter extdnt than .,lfts·eT. ::~:In 
steel; of course, improver:1ents tn th~ producticon r:rOCElt!S ~:re ·;·'"' ~ 
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:-:1or·e s ib.-,ifican t and dirnin i shing returns ln the raw :na terial 
itself can be offset to a considerable eztent. The table 
below inc-:icntes that expansion in the production of lumber 
:"las not proceeded to any extent approaching t'.1e pace of steel. 
Ir; ".:_'315, 36,8:)3,161 tons o+' steel were produced an~ by 1956, 
a leve 1 of 115,2 J 6, 149 tons was achieved. ..j_ th a s tee1 capacity 
arproac[J.ing 147,000,000 tons over the sa~e period, the procuction 
of J1·mbar "JB.rdly chan::_ ed st all. 
Year 
1Sl3 
1947 
1950 
1953 
1956 
1957 
1958 
p}:.:}: C''~'~Oi A!.~: I" YAJ,T:3 OF 
I:(~~;~:)Ett--SZL·EC'_~~~r_ Y._,A~··s 
Proc}uction in 
'i ll:!..ons of 
Board Feet 
44,500 
35,400 
08,000 
36,700 
37,500 
34,oooa 
33 oooa , 
Averag'J >i 11 
\alt:e, .,, per 
1,000 .Doard Fe~::t 
::~15. 38 
55.00 
i., .A. 
1~. A. 
1\. A. 
r,, • A. 
l\. A. 
Source: 1:. S. J:::epartnent of Cornmerc a, Statistical Abstract 
of L1e '-.-:nited :_::tates (';Jas'nington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1357), I'· 703. 
au.s. CepartJer,t of Co:nmerce, Survey of C1 ~I'rent .t511Siness, 
~.ay, 1959. 
I:'ac tot•s to Co::-1sider in the C.::1oice Be tween ;,:a terials 
~~e fir~t step in Ceter~ininf the possible scope of 
competition between steel and other materials is to examine the 
factors governin~: t21.e choice be tween rna teria] s. r:'he :nain factors 
t~at can be examined are: 
1) 'l'-Je phys:!..cal rrorerti.es of t:te various competin::; materials 
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(timber, plastics, aluminum, and concrete) as compared 
with steel. 
2) The relation between the initial costs to the user, 
i.e., the market prices of the various materials. 
3) The way in which these prices may be expected to vary 
in the future. 
4) The relation between the cost of installation, main-
tenance, and depreciation of steel and these competing 
materials. 
All four materials are lighter than steel and all, 
except timber, generally have a higher corrosion resistance 
than ordinary steel. Concrete, however, is not very resistant 
to oil. 
Aluminum is a better conduetor of heat and electricity 
than steel while the other materials are good insulators. 
With the exception of perhaps concrete, all of the materials 
concerned are inferior to steel with regard to heat resis-
tance, and this also applies to strength and elasticity. 
Aluminum and plastics appear to be more workable on the 
average than steel, while steel is more versatile as compared 
to the other three materials. 
Since steel goes into a great number of technically 
different uses, serious competition with steel over a wide 
range of uses can arise only from those materials whose 
properties are generally comparable with or better than steel. 
The physical properties of ordinary steel and those of the 
four major competing materials are summarized in the table below. 
The foregoing conclusions should be qualified by the 
fact that the properties given may be improved significantly 
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by a] Joy~ nc and ru ~.nforc:i. rl§.' .• howev:~-3r, alloy in~ e.nc re inforc i.ne-
cs.,: bc: cUscussec: only in connection with s:pecific uses. i.e t, 
one ~~;r,";;r•ally com~non a~.vanL::1Ee that the four comr:eting materials 
hsve over steel-is ti1eir lle;;htness and their :1.i~her corrosion 
resistance. 
FnYi}_ Gf.T f'.hJI';!;I{TL.::S C,) fA::sr; TO 
OI\L~~l . .. ;.~Tl 3I.~.3L 
Prorerty Alu:'l:l.nu':1 Plastics Concrete Tiro.ber 
\.;eight O•'or :!:qual 
'Volume) • • • • • • :1£c~hter 
Corrosion ~esistance Beftsr 
Insula ticn (.de at and 
~:;lectrici ty). • '.;orse 
r;onductivity ( iieat e-16 
.:::J_e c tri c 1 ty). 
tfe s. t lies is tanc e • • 
Strene-;th (I: or Equal 
Sizes) and Elastic-
;)e tter 
··,.orse 
i ty • • • • 
;,OrL··-bi li ty. • • 
. . • ·~~-orse 
Fetter 
Ii~;::1ter 
Better 
:c,e t ter 
\ orse 
'.'iorse 
Better 
Li~ hter 
3etter 
(Except· ,)il) 
:;Jetter 
·,:Jorse 
,oJ:'se 
Lle;!1ter 
'dorse 
T_}etter 
Viorse 
\:orse 
·:.orse 
:n!:ler.:mt r<lysical chs.racteristics deter:nine til.(; general 
aJ:'Sa of cr1o ce oy a prospective user of these ::1aterials. 
·.=·~w rroble:n of choice, however, is not solely an engina·3ring 
one; but also a1 ucoi,omic one. ~~i1ether one c.~terial or another. 
:~ s r r·efer·rcd obvious l:r C:epanc s on its r;rice or cost to the user. 
r.._'he buyer, of course, does r.ot sir:1rly co;:tr.;are t~1.e relative cost 
of equal volt me s of different ;na terials. ue also ta:.-ce s i:c1to 
consiCeration two other factors; 
1) ~1 he re:r-ercussion2. :>f t.w use of one r.s:ther than t:1.e other 
mg to rial on t:1e ov3rall proc:tcc t1. on cost of the article 
to be: rroduced. 
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2) '=' ~1e r:apercus s i _,n on ciepraciation and r:1ain tenance. 
t'her;.;for3, in order to jud:~ o tr1e al terr~a ti ve s to the use of 
steel, it is necessary to evalu.ate the trends anc. relative 
prices of the co:npetinc; Llaterials entering into the field of choice. 
A useful proced.l~re is to compare the trenC of rrices with the 
different materials in their crude form. 
ALUMINUM 
'::'he following table, for example, shows t:'le price ratios of 
alu~:linum to steel for selected years. l'he ratios are based 
on t:1e amounts of ti.'le two metals neces.sary to do tl'le sa1ne job, 
i.e., it takes about two ct::.bic feet of aluminUL11 to do t;J.e same 
job as one cubic foot of steel. l11e two to one ratio is very 
conservative in as ~nuch a:0 c~he SJ..ecific gravity of aluminum is 
2.71 while that of' cast or structural steel is 7.25, thus 
producing a ratio of 2.89 to 1. 
L-.I Cl<: LA·L.: Y3 )J::.' A<O :_;_, ,'S JF 3'_!1E::!:I" A~~D 
ALl1 : LTJJ. '_'0 UJ 'Li;i; SA: ~r;,; J,J:O . 
Year 
1939 
1945 
1946 
104'7 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1J52 
1953 
1054. 
1959 
Price of ~1u.minum 
as a Percentage of 
Frjce of Steel 
58f:.4 
416.'7 
394.8 
341.0 
323.1 
32'7.0 
324.8 
339.3 
345.1 
348.4 
351.6 
586.08 
Source: :~e_:tal 3tHtistics, 1955. 
air:.. 1.:>59 s teo 1 was rriced at '7 :?. ce!'l ts per pounei and alum-
inum st 2:::; cents rer round; the r·~tio is 5bt.;.::>. 
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':'::w table inC:icc,tas tl1e t alurninu...'Tl ha."' declined considerably 
in ~rice as co:~1par·Jd v.:i til s t08l but also t':la. t by- 1954 it cost 
t::1r3e and one-half tlrnes as much as steel vvhen tr1e strengt::-1. 
c~lar8cteristics Ge.:lded to do the sa:ne task are considered. 
1059 alv.minum cost aJ:r:1ost six ti:nes ·steel on tae same basis. 
In tts pure state, aluminum has a tensile strengt;-l of 
about 12,000 pou.ncts rer squ.ara inch. i:leut treated aluminu:·n 
alloys, still retainLt:: toleir inhe:r·entadvantages :i.nclu::~:i 
~ei~·ht and corrosion resistance, possess tensile stren~tns rangin£ 
Uf to 80,000 pounds per square inch, well ab0\:3 t~L:t Of S0::1e 
t;·:r::;es of steel. Alumirwm :i.s alloyed easily '.';it:~ carper and 
l 
'MJtlf':ane se. -- A rounc' of s;Lur:1:!.nun1 :i. s approximately t·LI·ee tima s 
the size c:::o a pound of other ::netals. ?~e table below ~~ves 
so,13 of' t1e pertinent :i.nfor":1ation. 
otal 
Ah'.minum 
3teel, Sast or 
:>tructural 
Copper 
TABLE' 54 
Specific 
Gravity 
8.71 
7.E-l5 
2.94 
Ar. :;:::roxir:'.a te 
Weight F·3r 
Cubic Poot 
170 pounds 
490 
560 
Source: Aluc11\num Panorama, 1959, p. 14. 
Volume rer 
1,000 pounds 
(Cubic i·"eet) 
5.88 
2.04 
1.78 
It snou.ld tee noted that since 'netals are oft,3n used to 
cover a ~iven area or to ~ake an articJe of a givGn size, a 
nol;nd of alur.1lnum ,~~oes aJ·1ont t£J.ree t;j-r,1es as fer as a 
1959' p. 13. 
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fO'-'XJC of steel. Aluminum c::trl.ClOt rust and nab·.re al2o provided 
it ,_,.i th c:1arac t.Jristics which enable 1 t to reslst corrosion. 
~)E +:he S'arface of ever~T pj_ece of al1.:minum exposed to a~.r t:1ere 
for 1s al .os t ~.n:3 tantaneousl.y <''- t:1in coa t~.n;_~ of aLJi:llnu·1 ozide. 
-~:1~ s co a tl.ng co11e s c los<3 to e lLttina tlng corrosion. i-iowever, 
~c c.aln strent::tn. w.~e". alloyed, aluminu1 loses its corrosion 
r::;sj_s tance so::·:J.ewha t, except vvhell alloyed >;i th :na;:~nesium and 
mar!'--·anese. 110 avoi( this, a thin cladd:Lng of' hi(::.h.purity slum-
inurn car1 bG a::rlied to 3ach sL.:e o1' a stron'-. alloy sneet, uut 
it is a costly prccedure. _;le wni te :ae cal conciuc ts about 60 
percent as nuc r1 e le c ~riel ty a "1 copper for ar: equal volume. 
35.nce aln"nlm_;_m is one-thirc of the weig:·1t of copper·, one pound 
of aluminum has the s~1r.e conc5uctivi t;~ ·.1s two pounds of co_r:per. 1 
A1um1nurn can b·:J drawn iH wire as fine as a hair or 
stra:1ded ovar a steel cor'3 to form· a -crans;-.1ission line as 
th·c;,;- as a man's wrist. 2 It is easily wor1ced and can be rolled, 
forved., sr-:un, drawn, extruced, or ~1ac:1inec. I·~ CE:n also be 
·;}elc~ed or 1·:,echanica11y joined effactively.3 :::'<1e per car:-ito. 
const'::nption is S·' low in :nost nations that it seems llkely tt1at 
e:xr::ansior: in. its outrut will be used in C'.:trr·ent profitable 
vsc-33 r;;,t~er ti'lan to cc ~r::ete vddel~r wit1 steel. 
:::t j_s also r::ossible to co2npare the price of alumJ.num in,;ots 
r:it:1 the price of steel billets on a voltune basis, i.e., tr1e 
l.r . , OlG., p. 14. 
0
-bi-'-'~., I=· 14. 
3Tbi' ~- c.. , r. 15. 
,., ,·.-_ 
I:' J .• 
Fer Capita 
~ation Consu~ption 
~raz:.l 
IncH a 
Canaca 
Sritain 
lrni tcad States 
0.60 pounds 
0.00 
12.00 
12.00 
16.00 
Source: Aluminum Panorama, l:J59, -~.. 119. 
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1 umber of cubic feet of s tee 1 ti1.a t can be bou2;ht wi tl.-1 t':J.e price 
of one cubic foot of alwninur:-1. .J.he following table inc~icat•ds 
th~ s :rol::::tj_onship 
'.dL:LE 56 
.:::elect0d Years 
1901-1905 
1916-l'J20 
1931-1935 
1S36-lg4o 
:!.941-1345 
1946-1950 
1851-1355 
1 J56-1S59 
Lumber of Cubic Fe3t of 
Stee 1 '.;:'hat ,;g_n i::..e r;ou2=;i:1.t 
•·i t:1. ':2~e !-rice of :~ne 
Cubic l•oot of Aluminum 
10 
5 
6 
4 
3 
2 
3 
1.25 
Sor:.rce: A1u."1l.:inu::n Panorama, 1S59, r:. 112. 
'·'·1e t9.::Jle ce:nonstr:·tes t;1.3t at t~e t1.:rr: of the century, 
one cubic foot of ah::.mj_nn:n cost ten tl'11es as :'nuch as an 
equ.al voluFJ.e of steel, brt t':l.at by 1950 the figure had been 
recuced to two times as much. ·i·::1eref'ore, ever; where the use 
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of t 1e :e tal is on an area r~;ther than a strengt~'l basis; 
a11_,minum is still qu"itc costly in relatir::n to st,Jel and r1ec-
essarily ~ust r:~osse.ss other a:~vantac;es in order to co:--1pete 
effectively. 1or e:,am:;:le, aluminum can compete with steel -·~n 
construction Wr'lerecovr3raf-:e of an area rat1.er than strene;th is 
required only if there are maintenance advanta~es and ease 
of construction. alu~inum paneled buildlnts can be clad in 
vir::ua11y a day. It S!l.oulc also be stres :ed that t:1e obvious 
dec line in t":-1e re la t1 Ye price of ah~m.inum has now made it 
cheaper t~1an corper for :nany uses. IE electrical work aluminum 
!1.,::s sli[~l.tly less than two-thirds of the concuctivity of copper 
or: a volu'11e basis, bpt it has two t::_:Jes the conG.uctivity of 
copp:::;r on a we1:-:ht basis. '..:.'he sa;ne job nay take a lal';-::er 
vohne of alumnum, bvt it would weigh less. 'l'he price of 
c0rper tripled between 1946 and 1955, while that of alu::ninum 
1 
rose 63 percent.~- T!:le inroads t~at a1umim::m is aakin2: into 
t;:1e co;:per :narket may lessen the degree of co:11peti tion that 
~11 'ht have taken place with steel in the absence of price 
i~creases for copper.2 
lherefore, in order to compete effectively v;ith steel, 
aium:.num ~-~ust posse·ss advanta:;ees suffic:ter',_t to off!llt its 
~'li- her costs. For example, alu:ni num is said to be comra tible 
wl t 1 nany types of fooc..: and can be used as containers, and 
it is also an excellent conouctor of :'leat, losing :'leat very 
1 11 Alvmlnum 'J.al<:es on a L':ew Job, 11 J:::'vsine ss .,:eek, October l, 
1.-' 5o, :;-~ • 140. 
2r~eonarci -,, )l11s to ad, rr 'J'renc·s in J"i s tr:i. bu tion," Electrical 
· ,orld, October, 1054. 
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qu:l.C 1 '",~ as well. .:.''le latter advant8?e can be imrortant in en~~·tnes. 
)f the total output of a1unimun, about 12 percent goes to the 
transportation industry, and the figure is expected to rise to 
16.8 percent by 1965.1 
un a com:nercial airr1ane, it :i..s estimated th-st evt;ry 
-
extra pounc. of we i,ht reduces the payload by ~, 7 .S annually. 2 
~'1.e advan.'~a.~~e of the lightness of aluminum is obviov:s here. 
In rail transportation, aluminum has been used in box 
cars, tank cs.rs, and gondola cars. 3pain has the 'I'algo :'rain, 
constr-c1cted entirely of aluminu.'11 with a wei~(1t saving of some 
75 ~=ercent over steel. '.i'h3 French have alu~ninum freicht cars 
\l:h:i..c '1 t'l.ey claim are equal in carryinz capacity anc. strengt~1 to 
st~a1, but the~,T wet.:;h half as nuch. The 3ritish have used it in 
their unde··,r;rounc' city transportation syster;r because the light-
ness of al'1minum cran ts it s.c'lvantar:'e s where starting and stop-
r.( 
pin~ are frequent.u 
I1~ water transports tion, aluminum j s used for super-
structures, bu1kheBds, lifeboats, -nasts, funnels, anci .:mrine 
f1'rnitt~re. 'l'1e c.s. 'lnited ·:-)tates, our largest passenger 
liner in service since 1952, contaicJS alu··n~_num alloys weig£1ing 
2,0JO tons and the 2eadwei~:ht sa11ings are estimated to lJe 
about 2,500 tons. Due to the li~'1ter deck structure, an incirect 
sa,/int, of almost three times 2,500 tons (7,500)is achieved, 
and operatins costs are said to be reduced along with fuel costs 
lRosensweig, op. cit •• 162-170. 
2A1~ninum Panorama, 1953, p. 115. 
3- -t ,. J.b~d., p. 1lc. 
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up to ei;~t or nine perpent.l 
:n au tor:1ob.i le trar1sporta tion, tb.e appearance in t:ne Lmi ted 
3ta t~J s of' the L.e w and s~,laller car may increase t.:1e usa of 
al 1.rllr ...um considerably. ....1e . .reneral .~otors 1960 com1-act car is 
:rcowered by arl aluminiJ.:'l enciae' ... }le clngL~1e is :'r.ounted lr1 tc1e rear· 
anc.. J~c1e wei~;.1t distribution forcc;;s engineers to use as. lie;ht-
we1~,:1~ an cm.gine as ros-:>ible. J..'he result is a lL htwei~·ht 
'-· c~ , 
cuoled., opposed vtston pov,;er r1ant si~tllar· to t~1.dt already 
in use in the four· cylir;der Arny's ~-. ... echanical Lule.2 
air 
I:r:1 Europe, \lol~~svwa~;en ar1C Forse he have f1aC~ long success 
wit.c. the rear-no·xnted, opposed r;iston ent:5..nes, thougi1. they use 
naLllG slum r·: ther than aluminum. 
criticized because for ev0r•y norsepower it :~ ains, it pays too 
1.::.~.:~1 & .rrice ln co::1:;;:ressicm ratios, :,mltir;le carburetors and poor 
cas ,lilea;~:e. Lal't;er curs wei~h in s.t two and on";:;-half tons. ::::n 
an orcliuary enc;ine, savin. s of 100 to 200 pouncs ar•u possible 
; by s'Jb s ti tutin~~ an a1 uralnum 11ock £'or the; conven ';iona1 srey iron • 
. t •. nc::. slnce the aluminu:-n. ent.;h~e dissipa-;:;es ':lest ,l'!)C':l •etter than 
irOY'J., ar. air cooled type can be used which saves from 100 to 
leO rounds l:i." the radiator and .i acke tin:~· of the w:, ter cooled 
en;ine. Anti-freeze is not neaded as well. ?or evJry one-
pou.x: of weit::rlt saved on thG en.:.;ine, it is possible tc cut 
from three to four rounc~s fro·•l t':le supr:ort1nc s true ture. It 
aids in solvin,,, the prob1ei:l of devis~ng brak3s for big he3.VY cars. 
Lic>1tne s s also nake e for fuel economy, a;:,G. a.r; er;;;ine that runs 
1 T1- i Q- t' 115 
-J...u_ .. •' :...--' • • 
2 ~ ·' s 1.• 1 .:> <' s e 0 1r ~Vi .L.J.vU ,. v:':')...' &y 17, 1J58, p. 1b9. 
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t:J.e r-:refi.ring cifflcr~1 ties anc ;-arm.i ttin_;~; L1e use of ft:els 
Lnee octaLes ::..ower.l 
_"'h3r3 a:r•e drawbr,;cics tc t~13 use of alu.njnum, .:1.owever. 
·o:-'t ~-s a bi~; one. In 1958, alur.1Jnum ir:<c:ots rold for 4J cents 
per I>:J1Jnc, as co.rrparecc with eleven cer:ts for ;;_rey iron. J.' ~~is 
diffs::>ential is too big to elinrl.nat::J the fact t~1at only half' 
as -.nany pounds of aluminum a:·:: needed. A;:.otner r:':isac!vanta~:3 is 
the tdchnical one of protact1ng the inner walls of aluminlli"11 
blocks fron e~'{cessive wear. ::Jontrov.c;rsy exists over Wilether 
to produce aluminum blcc~s b~ t~e conventional sand-casting 
-::1ethod or by L1e newer die-cast:i.nz Jethoct.2 
In die-casti:n;:_;, -:nolt(·Hl alu'ninun is injected at r;roat heAt 
tOJnd speed into. iant rresses. '.t1e T'oehler-Jarvis --iv.1sion of 
t>1e .. ations.l Lead Co:·:~any has built a 2,0JO ton press for 
th:i s purpose. In order to comre te wi tn grey .iron, it is 
b~lieved that the cost handicap can be ov::;rcoxrre by significant 
econo~nie s in cas tinf:, :;ac hining anC:. hancJling. '~'he press turns 
out a hi;;hly finis!1.ed ca":ti::-~._ in a si11e_:le process. Little 
::ac!1lnic.e; is needed and muc.1. ~r:ore power is s ved • ·:..·he C.ies, 
. however, are of' :~:te;~1 co .s t ar"d frc:qusn t c bange s ln fo r:ns would 
wipe out all savjngs. 
c~;5 po~Jncs, while aL identical one in st_;e:!_ weighed 1,375 pounC:.s. 
~~s is a clear sa~ine in wei~ht of 550 pounts or about 40 rercent. 
l·usiness -... eel"' August 16, 1958, p. 45. 
r;. 
:..- ·; 1-, ia' r [,<". 
.::..:.::.,_ • ' .t"' • ..... v • 
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Arparer:tly, to ac::Ueve co:nr arable strength. t 1e sheets of 
r:luE'lti_c em:rloyed have to be .09825 inches (2~ r.tillimeters) 
t..1ic:: as co">'lrar•ed to .035433 inches (9/10 o;il1imeters) in 
t '8 ca:=::e of steel. 'ICJ.is kJeps the weis':1.t saved to rouc;hly 40 
r::ercent. ::owever, the price of rla.stic sh~ets per square meter 
is fro_;, three to four times that of steel.· 
ror passer;:::er car hod~.es plastlcs ar;C: aJurninum have 
nor:J c':5_fficulty ln C01"'1pet:1.nt with steel t 11.an is t 11.e case 
wi trt regarc~ to corrnercial vehicles. '.";"ei;~)1.t savin;-; t,'u'oug~1. 
t~e u.se ·of 11Ehter :naterials is not as imr;ortant for passenger 
cars because it would be difficult to attach any sLsnificar!ce 
to t-:e ic":e a tr-la t t~1e re is ar" increase in payload in a rri va te 
car. Perfornance is also difficult to describe in quantitative 
tar>:ts. :::.'·1e advanta,:e of weie;nt-savin,~ becomes visible tbrough 
lower operatinr: costs. :'"n addition it is hardly li~rely t~tat lower 
1~1aintenance costs for steel substitutes is of th.e sa:ne ce:;ree of 
importance for a passenger• car as it is for a·co.:nmercial venicle. 
Lastly, production of private ca:rs is at a hig,1er rate than for 
c:J 1::-r:erc:i.al -.w.chines, and tr1e r:rospect of low retoC>lin~:_,; costs 
for ?;'la ,. tics coe s not assume tt1e a+; trac ti vene s s as would be t ~e 
ca. e for 1i.:,1ited outrut. ~he rii,::::_h costs of toclin£: u:p for steel 
ar".: 'lini":tzed v;:1e: t·<le annual outp1..1.t for auto·:lobilcs is in tercns 
of 1illtcns of units • 
.::'~le followinr taole estirnat·Js tr1e reaJ.tion of density and 
"'~ej_: ~t rer square :oetar of steel, reinfcrced plastics and 
alt.1:1inum she<::lts for bodywork. 
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ViEI21iT Ji, S -~ ./~S ·J~: J\.I.Pf~()JCI "\.-;.~~r-':c :rb_.·~ SA~:-~ SJ.:1 .R~L·.J~1T~-I 
a terials 
.::,teel 
~lass :.e info reed 
Fla:::tics 
Al u ninun Alloys 
A ..- 2 i, 1~~, ~-~~ .~ .. ~ ... ; l~~~-~L ~l .·~.Jt?.T:JI-<>-AI.:S 
_ll c ~~:ness 
il~ int8 ters) 
0.9 
2.5 
1.3 
I.ensity 
7.8 
1.7 
2.7 
.. ei:::_ ht per 
L'l Pounds 
15.44 
9.35 
7.72 
meter is much lowsr than t~1at of r.:lin.forcec rlastics, t:1e lov:er 
s trencth of w ·:lie h requires added thiclme s s. :oreover, as a 
r las tlc bocy ra c.i.u~.re s stron~ er steel surrorts, t lie wei~ ht 
:<qined over stee1 is reduceC. from 39 percent to 15 percent. 
: t ar y;e s.rs th& t if a suf'f'ic ie n tly strong, aluminu.m alloy is 
used, stoe1 sup_r:.orts ar·e cot Leces~3ary. ~1owev-3r, this relation-
sh:i.p snoulC.: not b•3 taken as final, since teCc1nical cevelorment 
of rlastics is still a(v8ncin::: rapicJ.y. 
Alu::ninum ins te ac of steel end fra:ae s for l1.e avy transfor::1e rs 
:lave also ·oeer used •. ::·1e followint. table zives a co~1parison 
of wei~hts and costs for both ~aterials. 
If aluminum is usee, :r.o shield is required while j_t is 
necessary i~1 t~1e ca"'e of steel to avoid excessive eddy current 
loses. 
In builc"inc.: ar.d construction, the largest sales outlet for 
al1Y0~nux, v:her·a lare;e spans ar·e necessgry, such as hangars, 
opportunitiss for reCuction in structural teadwei~ht are great 
and alurnlnum alloys become competitivG wit1 steel. 
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':'.
1 A.--=:T_ -.58 
' 
:ate ri. al Labor '..i.otal 
.ateriial ·,,e i;:~;ht Cost Cost Cost 
A ltLL1 mxc, 1 1.ik d- .b r ame 100 S7 13 100 
SteeJ -~, , 1-.·. ~:.:nc...,l· rame 149 20 ,. 0 26 
:)te el .Jhi~ld G6 oo 64 J4 
:~teel :::r1d-!:-rane and 
~) -lie ld 235 50 70 120 
Sou:rce: ~.ron J.~e.;.e, August 11, 1955, f• ~8. 
arn percentabe: w.a1 6 ht and total cost of aluminum respect-
iv<aJy equ.ls 100. 
PLASTIC'S 
- ---- -·--
I 
Co:iparison b~atv;een steal arc plastic ~rices ls more:: 6:, ffi-
cult beca~J.se t:::ere are so :nan:v diffur~:mt forms of' plastic wi t~1. 
, .. ~a"e 1 '" ".t.Pr-,rl·n-~~.J- .l~v L+..a.. _ e '~-· prices. Polystyrene is priced at 2? certs 
a :r;ounc, • a11C~ ti1e flurocarbons at :)_j a pound. If & co;.:;:arison 
,,:_t1 ster:ol is att,a::1r.:-tec on an eq_ual voluae basis, it can be 
at best :or.;.ly an extremely rough guide and applicable only where 
I 
strengtJ re~uirements are low. 
l'qr exaq:le, a ct::bic foot oi' st<Je1 weie::hs 4SO r:ounc~s and 
costs , f4.30 at seven cents a pouno. Polyetc:1ylone weit)ls 57.4 
pounds a cubic foot anc a_t 32 ceG ts a roullc, costs ~-21. i:31 per 
I 
cubic foot. Polystyrene weie:;hs 66.1 pouncs per cubic foot and at 
a price- of 29 cents a pound, costs ~-H3.16 to purchase. :n other 
words, vvit:~ t:1e price of one cubic foot of polyethyler,e one can 
purchase about five-eifh1:hs of a cubic foot of steel, while t 1e 
price of one c1;bic foot qf ro:tystyreLe buys sli.~htly over half a 
cubic i'oot of steel. hence v.:.1ere t.1e area to b8 covered, S'..lCIJ 
... 
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as ror a machine housing, is more important than strength char-
acteristics these two plastics have a price advantage over 
steel. 
In addition, si nee many important developments in plastics 
are or such recent origin, it seems likely that the price ratio 
will tend to £all further. The scale of research in plastics 
is considerable and will inevitably produce favorable effects 
on prices. Prospects of price reduction appear to be enhanced 
as the industry steadily introduces continuous process production 
and adds to automatic processes. Capital costs tend to rise 
under such a program, but labor costs per unit may be considerably 
lowered to yield a lower price level. Trade publications indicate 
that laboratory experiments demonstrate that it is possible 
to produce polyethylene under much lower pressures than are at 
present employed under production conditions. If such experiments 
succeed under production conditions, polyethylene will probably 
fall further in price and will eventually compete with steel in 
some uses such as tubes.l Progress is also being made in using 
glass fiber as a reinforcing agent for plastic. Raising the 
strength performance of plastic is fundamental for increasing 
the possible range of uses in competition with steel. 
Reinforced plastics, a relative newcomer to ths market, 
achieved sales of 168 million pounds in 1957 and exceeded 
200 million pounds in 1959. Originally, the use of reinforced 
plastics was largely confined to machine housings, special 
pipes, safety helmets, and high voltage transmission conduits. 
lSee Business Week, February 2?, 1960, p. 145. 
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In these uses competition with steel occurs. But lately, im-
provements in resins, reinforcing agents, and fabricating tech-
niques have opened markets in transportation equipment and build-
ing materials. Largest of the new domains is missiles, with 
demand for warheads, radomes, motors and fuel tanks •. 
Reinforced plastics are made by combining a resin with 
glass fiber, me,tal mesh, asbestos, or wood. To the added material, 
the resin gives some desirable quality such as a tlgher strength 
to weight ratio or greater resistance to fire. The resin picks 
up greater tensile or impact strength. The polyesters are the 
most dominant group and were used in 90 percent of all rein-
forced plastics in 1957. The epoxies, low pressure phenolics, 
silicones, and polyvinyl chloride are also used. The Bakelite 
Division of Union Carbide is testing an epoxy resin that is 
sui ted for combination with me tala to make dies· for the me tala 
industry. 1 
The following table gives a general comparison of common 
tooling materials in the United States. 
On a cubic foot basis, which takes advantage of the light 
weight of plastics, sales of plastics have drawn ahead of copper 
and all other non-ferrous metals. 
lBusiness Week, September 20, 1958, p. 56. 
TABLE 59 
COMMON TOOLING MATERIALSa 
Tooling Material 
Aluminum 
Kirksite 
Material Comparison 
Factor (Dollars 
per cubic foot) 
85 
80 
Steel (Boiler Plate) 35 
Laminated Glass--Cloth; 
Ep9xy . 75 
Unfilled Epoxy (cast) 90 
Phenolic (cast) 45 
Heavily Filled Epoxy 
(cast) 20 
Labor 
Comparison 
. Factorb 
8 
8 
12 
6 
2 
2 
2 
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Resultant Comparison 
Factor 
(Dollars 
per cubic foot) 
680 
640 
420 
450 
180 
90 
40 
Source: Automotive Industries, March 1, 1956, p. 53. 
aBasia: One cubic foot of tool, typified by a press 
block. 
bThis figure is dimensionless, based only upon the relative 
amount of labor required for grinding, machinery or castings. 
This comparison shows a rather favorable position for plastics. 
However, tools of this material frequently do not have the 
required strength and they are not recoverable as scrap. On 
the other hand, as the size of the tool increases, more labor is 
required to make it and the relative position of plastics becomes 
still better. Welding tools and fixtures have also been made 
made from plastics, affording anything fD~m one-third to one-
half saving compared with conventional material. (See Iron Age, 
June :30, 1955. ) 
The table below indicates the relative prices of various 
types of plastics for 1956. The average price for all plastics 
has dropped from about 75 cents a pound in 1927 to 35 cents 
in 1956.1 
lH. Simonds, op. cit., p. 123. 
TABLE .60 
PRICES OF PLASTICS--1956 
Price Per 
Type Pound 
Acetates 0.33 
Acrylics 0.75 
Butyrates 0.50 
Epoxy Resins 0.90 
Flurocarbons 8.00 
Phenolics 0.20 
Polyamides (nylon) 1.43 
Polyesters 0.37 
Polyethlene 0.41 
Polystyrene 0.29 
Polyvinyl Acetate 0.42 
Polyvinyl Alcohol 0.80 
Polyvinyl Chloride 0.30 
Silicones (Glass Filled>2 50 
Source: H. Simonds, op cit., p. 124. 
-If the production of plastics is broken down into its 
main component types, the dominance of polystyrene and ployethy-
lene are apparent. The table below provides the data. 
TABLE 61 
PRODUCTION OF PLASTICS--1956 
Type 
Vinyls 
Polystyrene 
Polyethylene 
Alkyds 
Urea and Melamine 
Cellulosics 
All others 
TOTAL 
Millions of 
Pounds 
725 
625 
525 
500 
325 
150 
575 
3,900 
Source: H. Simonds, op. cit., p. 120. 
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Comparati\te data on the price movemen~s of steel, ancL.con• 
crete are not available. Some indication of the price trends 
can be obtained by substituting tre price movements of cement 
for concrete and comparing these with steel prices. The 
table below shOws the relationship. 
TABLE 62 
PRICES OF PORTLAND CEMENT AND STEEL INGOTS IN THE 
UNITED STATES--1938-1955 (In Dollars) 
Steea. Prices Cement Prices Ratio 
Year::,::.:::· Per Pound Per Pound Steel to 
1938 .031 .0038 8.1 
19!53 .063 .0070 9.0 
1954 .066 .0073 9.0 
1955 .069 .0076 9.1 
1956 .075 .0079 9.5 
ot 
Cement 
Source: u.s., Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract 
of the United States (Washington: u.s. Government Printing 
Office; 1957), p. 722-38. 
Since steel weighs 490 pounds per cubic foot (its specific 
gravity is 7.85) and cement weighs about 200 pounds per cubic 
foot (its specific gravity is 3.1), it is possible to estimate 
the amounts of cement that the price of one cubic foot of steel 
will purchase by use of the data in the table above. For example, 
in 1938 the price of a cubic foot of steel was $15.19 and that 
of cement only $0.76. Therefore, in 1938 one could purchase 
201 cubic feet or cement with the price of one cubic root of steel. 
In 1953, the figure was 22t cubic feet of cement, and in 1956 
about 23.3 cubic feet of cement would have been purchased with 
the purchase price of one cubic foot of steel. It is evident 
that steel prices have been rising faster than prices for cement. 
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The table also shows that little change is taking place 
in the relative price movements and that much stability in the 
relationship exists. If anything, the price movements have 
bean slightly in favor of cement, although it does not appear 
to be serious for the steal industry. Imports of cement rosa 
from an average value of $8 million (1946-1950) to $17 million 
(1951-1955). This rapid growth may have furthar price effects. 
The possibility of using wood as an effective substitute 
for steal appears remota with reference to their relative price 
movements as shOwn below. 
TABLE 63 
INDEX NUMBERS OF THE RATIO OF CONSTRUCTIONAL 
STEEL PRICES TO SAWN TIMBER PRICES 
(Ratio in 1937-1939 = 100) 
1913 1947/1950 
120 43 
It is clear that wood 1~ becoming much more expensive 
in relation to steal. Thera is no reason to expect a reversal 
of this trend. Both industries are basic in the sense that the 
materials are primary and hence subject in large measure to the 
law of diminishing returns. However, it is likely that lumber 
is at more of a disadvantage in tbls respect. Steel production 
is superior in its ability to subject the raw material to mechani-
cal processes capable of rapid improvement. A reduction of the 
quality of iron ore from the mines has been successfully offset 
by improvements at the fabricating site to such an extent that 
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diminishing returns has not been evident. Steel o~mpanies have 
·also been more successful in shifting their operations ~o 
foreign sources o'$ ore supply as do,m~stio .iron o·re ranges have 
been depleted. Benefiaation of low gra~e ore prior to pro-
duction of steel has substantially raised quality without the 
addition of excessive costs. 
However, since the end of World War II,the index of steel 
prices using 1947-49 as the base rose to 154.7 in 1956 as delayed 
price increases were put into effect. The index of lumber prices 
over the same period and using the same base rose to only 121.1. 
The relative advantage of steel indicated above has diminished 
somewhat. Yet the construction of the following table still 
yields surprising results in view of the magnitude of price 
increases in steel from 1947 to 1956. 
TABLE 64 
INDEX NUMBERS OF THE RATIO OF CONSTRUCTIONAL 
STEEL PRICES TO SAWN TIMBER PRICES 
(Ratio in 1947-1949 : 100) 
1929 
130 
1956 
127 
The table shOws that, even with significant postwar price 
increases in steel, timber is still at an increasing relative 
disadvantage. 
Relations Between Costs of Installation, Maintenance,md:~~~on 
of Steel and Its Competitors 
AlthOugh the price of the material chOsen in the form 
required normally accounts for a substantial portion of the total 
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cost of the final article produced, tbs cost of conversion into 
the final manufactured good, maintenance, and depreciation (in 
the sense of the life-time of the material) can vary considerably 
from material to material. General figures are virtually imposs-
ible to state accurately because ·the relative costs are expected 
to vary considerably according to the particular application. 
Some conclusions, however, may be tentatively advanced in a 
number of instances as to whether the installat.ion on maintenance 
cost of steel or competing materials are likely to be low.er in 
comparable applications. While these generalizationsmay be inde~in• 
able in quantitative terms, some value may be attached to them 
as an indication of whether the gap between the price of steel 
and that of competing goods will be widened or narrowed by such 
factors. 
One rough generalization is that the lightness o~ the 
competing materials results in a lowered installation cost although 
degrees of difference will appear according to the material. 
As to maintenance cost, a logical assumption is that it largely 
depends upon the corrosion resistance of the material considered. 
Except for lumber, it is likely that the maintenance cost of all 
~~~ther materials will generally be lower than that of commer-
cial steel. It is recognized that in some cases, such as spray-
ing steel with aluminum paint, competing materials actually be-
come complementary in nature. In addition there may be a certain 
relation between maintenance cost and installation or processing 
cost. For example, a bituminous coating of steel pipe may be 
regarded as maintenance cost although the cost of maintenance 
arises at the processing or even the installation stage of production 
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Depreciation cost depends mainly upon the original price 
or the material and its lifetime. During inflation there is a 
tendency to calculate depreciation on the basisof replacement 
cost; but it shov.ld be remembered that when tha enterpriser 
makes the choice between two material~ he must base his calcula-
tions on present prices and correct these towards replacement 
cost only at a later stage. 
It is difficult to consider plastic in this regard because 
the most promising competitors to steel such as polystyrene and 
polyethylene are so new that little experience has been accu-
mulated to enable one to assess their lifetime in actual practice. 
It is generally regarded that for most uses lumber has a shorter 
lifetime than ste~ Aluminum and concrete are difficult to com-
pare with steel, but on the whole the differences appear slight. 
The purpose of the foregoing sections has been to provide 
a general background for consideration of the factors bearing 
on the question of choice•. Many exceptions to the generaliza-
tions certainly exist. Yet it is of some value to state and 
summarize in a concise form the areas which are in need of 
definitive study. The table below attempts to summarize the 
general factors determining the competitive position of steel 
in relation to the alternative materials. 
It appears that the main points where competitive materials 
have the advantage over steel are: price for equal volume as 
compared with price for equal weight; installation and maintenance 
cost. Therefore, the most effective way to improve the compe-
titive position of steel is to attempt to rind methods to decrease 
the weight of steel in specific applications, to search for new 
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and improved methods of installing it, and to discover devices 
for reducing the maintenance cost. Another broad conclusion 
that appears evident lies in identifying plastics as the 
single strongest potential competitor because an advantage 
exists for every factor mentioned except the price of the 
raw material and prospects are somewhat attractive for decreasing 
the price significantly relative to that of ordinary crude steel. 
TABLE 65 
FACTORS CONCERNI~G STEEL AND COMPETING MATERIALS 
Future 
Price Price Trend As 
for for Process- Install- Main ten- Compared 
Equal Equal ing ation ance Life To Steel 
Material Weight Volume Cost Costa Cost Time Prices 
Aluminum .Much Higher Higher Lower Lower Compar- Slight 
Higher able Decrease 
Plastics Much Higher Lower Lower Lower b Decrease 
Higher 
Concrete Lower Much Lowerc Lower b Unchanged 
Lower 
Timber Lower Much Lower Lower Higher Shorter Increase 
Lower 
aor cost of fabrication into finished good, whichever is 
applicable. 
bExperience is not sufficient for. new materials to warrant 
a general statement. 
cwith concrete, processing and installation tend to be the 
same thing. 
Estimate of Substitution of Other Materials for Steel 
As has been pointed out already, it is not easy to ascertain 
the amount of steel actually replaced by competing materials. 
Nevertheless, it is profitable to attempt to calculate the amounts 
involved and to obtain an indication of the upper limit that 
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substitution of other materials for steel might reach should 
the most unfavorable situation for steel prevail. In the fol-
lowing calculation, which of necessity must be highly approximate, 
an attempt is made to determine the order of the magnitudes 
involved. 
From.·the data given earlier, the following table provides 
an estimate of the actual or potential competition between 
aluminum and steel. 
The table applies estimates of the actual or potential 
competition between steel and aluminum. In order to give the 
steel industry apologists the best possible advantage for the 
argument of this chapter, i.e., that ~arket power is severely 
limited by inter-industry competition, it is assumed that in 
computing the figures below, that three-f-ourths of the aluminum 
produced and sold to the building materials industry, to the 
transportation industry, and to the consumer durables industry 
competes actually or potentially with steel. While there is 
no definitive way to gauge the exact degree of competition, 
logic decrees that. the figures chosen are very high, making it 
appear that the steel industry has many competitors from aluminum 
for various uses. For the container industry and other miscell-
aneous uses, it is estimated that the proper figure is 25% while 
it is 15% for the electrical industry. In the military s~re, 
due to the preponderance of aluminum in airplanes, it is assumed 
that no competition occurs. In other words, of the projected 
8,930,000,000 pounds of aluminum consumption for 1956, it is 
estimated that 46.9% of it (4,110,000,000 pounds} is in actual 
or potential competition with steel. This amounts to 2,055,000 
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tons of aluminum competing with steel. 
TABLE 66 
COMPETITION BETWEEN ALUMINUM AND STEEL IN VARIOUS 
INDUSTRIES(l965 Projected Data)& 
Aluminum Not Com- Aluminum Competing 
Industry peting with Steel withSteel Total 
Military 800J. 9.0%- 800 
Building 
18.5% Materials 525 5.0 1,575 2,100 
Transpor-
tation 375 4.2 1,125 12.6 1,500 
Electrical 595 6.6 105 1.2 700 
Consumer 
Durables 180 2.0 520 5.8 700 
Containers & 
Packaging 375 4.2 125 1.4 500 
Subtotal 2,850 31.0% 3,450 39.5% 6,300 
Other 1,970 22.1 600 7.4 2,630 
Total 4,820 53.1% 4,110 46.9% 8,930 
Percentage 
of Total 
9.0%' 
23.5 
16.8 
7.8 
7.8 
5.6 
70.5% 
29.5 
100.0% 
Source: James E. Rosensweig, "The Demand for Aluminum," 
University of Illinois Bulletin, April, 1957, p. 161. 
&Amounts in millions of pounds 
To estimate the amount of steel repl•ced and to be replaced 
by aluminum and plastics the following procedure is adopted. 
Of total consumption of aluminum, that competing with steel is 
taken from TABLE 66 and is estimated to be 46.9 percent, while 
for plastics an arbitrary estimate of 30 percent is used. These 
percentages may be applied to the esti~ated consumption of aluminum 
and plastics fOr 1965. Aluminum will reach an output of 4,465,000 
tons (8,930,000,000 pounds), and at current growth rates plastics 
output could achieve a level of 8,000,000 tons.l The percentage 
lNew York Times, November 29, 1959, Section 3, page 1. An 
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of 46.9 for aluminum yields a figure of 2,055,000 tons of aluminum 
as competing with steel. If this is converted into a steel equi-
valent by the use of a conversion factor based on the ratio of 
densities: 
7.85 steel • 2.9 
2.71 aluminum 
then 2,055,000 tons of aluminum divided by 2.9 yields 707,000 
tons of steel being replaced by aluminum by 1965.1 Baaed on a 
capacity of 147,000,000 tons of steel for 1959, it is apparent 
that only one-half of. one percent of steel capacity is affected 
by competition with aluminum. At worse, even if all aluminum 
produced is taken as competitive with steel, the competition 
would result in only one and one-half percent of steel capacity 
being affected.2 It should be noted that while aluminum prices 
estimate given here placed the production of plastics at 11,000,000 
tons by 19'70. 
Material 
Aluminum 
Steel (castor 
structu•al) 
Polyethylene 
Polystyrene 
).TABLE 67 
WEIGHTS OF VARIOUS MATERIALS 
AND CONVERSION RATIOS 
Approximate Volume per 
Specific Weight per 100 Pounds 
Gravity Cubic Foot in cu. feet 
2.'71 1'70 5.88 
'7.85 490 2.04 
.92 57 
1.06 66 
Specific 
Gravity Con-
version Ratio 
2.9 
1.0 
8.6 
7.4 
2Busines.s Week, November 1, 1958, p. 34. Steel production 
has averaged 75% of capacity over its 44 years of continuously 
recorded history. From 1951 to 1958, steel requirements appar-
ently remained quite stable at about 110 million tons. For the 
first time in twenty years, steel has capacity far enough ahead 
of predictable demand so that no boom can force it into a crash 
program of construction. Present capacity, therefore, stands at 
$bout 147 million tons. Under the assumption that steel consump-
tion for 1965 will be equal to steel capacity for 1958, it is 
2:37 
have fallen considerably over the long run, it is still quite 
high-priced in comparison to steel. For example, alundnum has a 
specific gravity of 2.71 and a tensile strength that reaches 
62,000 pounds per square inch when alloyed. Alloying costs more, 
of course. When alloyed, its specific gravity rises to 2.80. 
The tensile strength divided by the specific gravity yields a 
figure of 22,100 which represents a strength to weight ratio. 
For steel, since the tensile strength is 180,000 pounds per square 
inch, and its specific gravity is 7.85, the strength to weight 
ratio is 22,900--or roughly the same as for aluminum alloy. 
However, at present, steel is priced at seven cents per pound 
while pure aluminum is priced at 26 cents per pound. It is clear 
that steel can perform the same structural task as aluminum alloy 
at considerably less than one-fourth the cost in as much as 
aluminum alloy costs more than pure aluminum. Hence, the amount 
of aluminum effectively competing with steel must be at a m1n1mvm 
where strength to weight ratios are tmportant and a considerable 
quantity of steel is used in just such applications. 
With regard to plastics, if it can be stated that :30 percent 
of plastics output in 1965 will compete with steel, then about 
possible to estimate that approximat.ely '707 ,000 tons of steel 
will have been replaced by aluminum, i.e., 2,055,000/2.9 = 707,000. 
This figure will represent only about one-half of one percent of 
the estimated steel consumption in 1965. It also-represents 
slightly less than three-fourths of one percent of the steel con-
sumption of 1958. Even if one assumed that the entire projected 
output of aluminum competed with steel, that is the entire 
8,9:30,000,000 pounds (4,465,000 tons) and the conversion factor 
of 2.9 is used, then 1,540,000 tons of aluminum would be competing 
with 110,000,000 tons of steel or less than one and one-half 
percent. If steel consumption is taken to be 147,000,000 tons 
by 1965, then only slightly more than one percent would be com-
petitive with aluminum. 
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1,600,000 tons of plastics of a prospecti•e 8,000,000 tons will 
be placed into competing uses. Since the specific gravities of 
plastics varies according to type, a selection must be made. 
Polyethylene's speci-fic gravity is 0.92 while that of polystyrene 
is 1.06. The highest specific gravity of any pla-stic is 
approxima·te1y two. The tensile strength of polyethylene is 
1,900 pounds per square in~~ and that of polystyrene is 7,000 
pounds per square inch. The strength to weight ratios are 2,065 
and 6,600 respectively. At a current price ot 38 cents per 
pound for polyethylene, one must spend about $4.18 to give the 
same strength to weight of steel at seven cents. For poly-
styrene the appropriate figure is $1.01. In other words one 
needs about eleven times as much polyethylene to do the same job 
as steel, and about three and one-half times as much polystyrene. 
The conversion factor, as computed above for aluminum, 
is 8.6 for polyethylene and 7.4 for polystyrene. Since about 
. the same quantities are produced of each, an average converiion 
factor would be 8.0. Applying this figure to the tonnage 
competing with steel noted above (1,600,000) yields 200,000 tons 
8 
of steel being replaced by plastics. 
.0013 percent of present steel capacity. 
This ia. only 
It is impossible to estimate in the same way the amount ot 
steel that might have been replaced by concrete and timber since 
no data are available on consumption according to uses or on the 
amount of these materials competing with steel. However, compe-
tition between steel and concrete and timber occurs almost 
e~usively in building and construction. There is some compe-
tition in other fields, but the amounts involved are small and 
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can be disregarded for this purpose. The amount of steel consumed 
in the building and construction sectors represents about 25.4% 
of total steel consumption. If from this are excluded all rolled 
products! that either cannot or can only within narrow li~ts 
be replaced by any of the competing materials, the remainder 
represents only about nine percent. To estimate the amount of 
steel replaced by concrete and timber it would be necessary to 
know how large the percentage would have been had there been 
no competition. There is no way of determining the exact magni-
tude involved, but it might be assumed that had there been no 
competition from concrete and timber, steel consumption wou1d 
have been between 10 percent to 30 percent higher in this 
·sector, i.e., it would have represented approximately 10 percent 
to 12 percent of total steel consumption. In this case, the 
amount of steel replaced by all competing materials in the United 
States during 1959 might have been between three and four percent 
of total steel consumption. Although the calculation made is 
subject to a considerable margin of error, it shows clearly that 
competition from other materials has so far had only very limited 
effects on total steel consumption. 
It would even be more interesting to know how the situation 
is likely to develop within, say the next six years. Again, 
only very rough calculations can be made based on the following 
assumptions& 
lingots and semis, railway materials, heavy sections, 
so% of wire rods, plates and heavy forgings as well as the 
amount of steel replaced by plastics and aluminum in th4s 
sector already accounted for above. 
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1) Consumption of aluminum will increase by approximately 
47 percent from 1953 to 1965.1 Alumin~onsumption in the United 
States will consequently reach some 4.46 million tons.2 
2) The percentage of aluminum and plastics consumed in 
competition with steel will not increase, since most of the 
uses in which both materials do not compete with steel represent 
branches of the economy that tend to expand faster than overall 
production. For example, the aircraft, chemical and electrical 
industries in the ease of aluminum; and the electrical industry, 
decorative fittings and surfacing for plastics. 
3) The proportion of total steel consumption which is 
exposed to competition by concrete and timber will not increase 
beyond the nine percent calculated for 1959 since there are many 
other sectors of steel consumption expanding much faster than 
building and conatr~ction. 
On the basis of these assumptions the following estimate 
may be made: The amount of steel replaced by aluminum will be 
about 700,000 to 800,000 tons, or almost one-half of one percent 
of estimated apparent steel consumption in 1965, and 200,000 tons 
of steel will be replaced by plastics. Consequently, the amount 
of steel which is liable to be replaced will represent hardly more 
than six-tenths of one percent in 1965 and even if the rate of 
increase &f aluminum and plastics consumption were higher than 
assumed, the effect could hardly be more than to raise the per-
centage to one or two percent of total steel consumption. However, 
lSee J. Rosensweig, op. cit. 
2styrene and polythene plastics production amounted to 1,260,000 
tons in 1958 out of a total plastics output of 2,300,000 tons. At 
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since some steel has already been ab.sorbed by aluminum and plastics, 
the additional loss will at most be one- to two-percent. 
The upper limit to the replacement of steal consumption 
by concrete and timber would be the nine percent assumed to be 
competing with these materials in 1959. Obviously, it is 
impossible that all steel consumed in competition with concrete 
and timber will be replaced entirely by these materials in the 
near future. Consequently, the scope of competition compared to 
total steel consumption in this field is rather limited, too. 
Summing up, it can be said that even under the most adverse 
conditions from the steel industry's point of view, the amount 
of steel that might be replaced by other materials between 1959 
and 1965 seem virtually certain not to increase beyond three 
percent of estimated apparent steel consumption for 1959. 
It has been shOwn that inroads made by competing materials 
into the steel market have so far been quantitatively small and 
will probably remain so in the near future. Moreover, for almost 
the whole of the last fifteen years steel has been ~rly scarce, 
sometimes very scarce; thus giving every opportunity to competing 
materials, particularly aluminum which emerged from the war with 
spare capacity. Indications are that this is still a problem for 
aluminum.l Experience shows that whatever their cause may be, 
a rapid growth rate of 15% projected annually, styrene and 
polythene output will reach 3,339,000 tons. 
lBusiness Week, November 14, 1959, p. 170. Present aluminum 
capacity {1959) is about 200,000 tons a month, while the main 
producers are operating at the following rates of capacity: 
Kaiser, 80%; Reynolds, 80%; Alcoa, 81%. 
Since the early part of 1958, when the government was 
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the inroads made by competing materials tend to persist. It 
should also be remembered that, while in quantitative terms the 
steel industry as a whole is not greatly affected, the compe-
tition facing certain sections of the steel industry, particularly 
thin flats and tubes, is not insignifican~. 
The steel industry is well placed to institute effective 
counteraction. This can only be in the interests of the consumer, 
since the greater the competition between materials the more methods 
of production and design will improve, leading to reductions in 
costs and prices and a better final product •. 
The starting point of such counteraction must be focused 
on points where competing materials offer advantages over steel. 
As has been seen, these are mainly lightness, better corrosion 
resistance, frequently lower installation.costs and lower main-
tenance costs. The steel industry will probably concentrate on: 
1) Decreasing the weight of steel required for a given 
purpose, partly by promoting improvements in design and partly 
8tOCkpil1ng aluminum for strategic purposes at about 40,000 tons 
a month, ~overnment stockpiling has virtually dropped to zero. 
In 1958, $165 million worth was sold for stockpiling. This over-
capacity may tend to lead to price reduction in as much as it is 
estimated that the cost of not producing aluminum is from four to 
six cents a pound. In 1959~e selling price per pound of ingots 
averaged about 24.7 cents a pound while it was exported .at 22.5 
cents a pound-with ocean freight costing one cent a pound. Since 
the production costs are estimated to be around 16 .cents a pound, 
Harvey Aluminum, Revere Copper and Brass, Olin Mathieson, and 
Anaconda, formerly solely fabricators, decided to enter the primary 
ingot field, and they now have a combined total of 13 percent of 
aluminum capac!~. One result has been the lowering of aluminum 
sheet prices. ~he new grade of sheet ranges between 34 to 40 cents 
a pound. This grade is midway between low priced utility sheets 
and high priced specification sheet., Utility sheet had been priced 
between 39-and 47.6-cents a pound. !he aim seems to be to compete 
in construction with wood. 
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by offering better quality steel at unchanged prices. 
2) Improving the corrosion resistance of steel. 
3) ERcouraging cheaper methods of installing and employ-
ing steel products. 
4) Encouraging the combination of steel with aluminum or 
plastics in certain applications. 
5) Improving marketing techniques. 
On the first point, it is sometimes held to be contrary 
to the interests of the steel industry to attempt to decrease the 
weight of steel required for a given purpose, but this overlooks 
the fact that in the long run steel demand may possibly be elastic; 
and that the kind of policy indicated might in the end increase 
the total sales for steel. Earlier it was seen that considerable 
possibili~ies exist of improving design so as to use lighter 
steel sections in the building an~ civil engineering industry 
and in transportation. The same principles are involved in the 
growing use of low-alloy, high-strength steel and of cold-formed 
sections. In Sweden, for example, a light-weight steel train 
has been developed consisting of ten cars, weighing only 149 
tons, against 251 tons for an ordinary trSh. The cars are built. 
entirely of steel and corrugated steel plate, mainly spotwelded. 
Canadian companies have purchased, for transcontinental trains, 
173 coaches built partly of stainless steel.l In the United 
States, passenger cars and trucks have been constructed from 
high-strength low-alloy steel, involving weight savings of 
three to six tons for covered trucks. They have the same strength 
lFinancial T1mes, May 9, 1956, p. 5. 
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as ordinary vehicles and, of course, are much morecorrosion 
resistant. A 70 ton truck in this steel costs only $240 more 
than in normal steel, and saves $1,120 alone in net maintenance 
cost within 18 years, plus savings in operating cost or gains 
in revenue from increased payload.l The same method of construction 
has been used for buses where weight saving up to 40 percent has 
been obtained and> also< on tru~ks with similar results .2 Trailers 
have been build in the United States designed to use lighter 
~teel sections in the building and civil engineering industry 
and in transportation. The same principles are involved in th& 
g~owing use of low-alloy, high-strength steel and of cold-formed 
sections. In Sweden, for example, from a stainless steel more than 
twice as strong as ordinary steel, and the considerable saving 
of weight involved, resulted in a production cost only slightly 
higher than for trailers made of ordinary steel. This higher 
initial coat is amply offset in operating cost, maintenance, and 
a far longer life.3 
Regarding the second point, much work is being done to 
improve the corrosion resistance of steel, mainly by rendering 
the use of alloy and stainless steels economic in cases where 
steel parts are exposed to particularly severe conditions. 
Stainless steel is, for instance, used in shipbuilding in such 
critical spots as large vent co~s, electrical gear housings, 
lsusiness Week, August 16, 1~58, p. 30. u.s. Steel recently 
reduced price of stainless steel $100 a ton. 
2steel, November 29, 1955. 
3rron Age, August 25, 1955. 
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baffle plates in evaporators, drain tanks and other components. 
It appears that moat items can be fabricated out of stainless 
steel at a coat comparable to that of steels previously used 
by taking advantage of the greater strength to weight ratio. 
In addition, the sometimes rather high replacement coats are 
reduced considerabl7. 1 The Detroit automotive industry is finding 
increasing use for stainless steel in automobiles because of 
strength and anti-corrosive properties. The amount of stainless 
steel, 93 percent of which is cold-rolled strip, used per passen-
ger car increa~ed from 23 pounds per car in 1950 to some 
thirty pounds in 1955.2 Finally, it might be mentioned that 
aluminum over the last few years bad tended to yield much 
territory to stainless steel in the dye-stuffs industry because 
stainless steel offers a much wider margin of safety as a material. 
The same may happen in some fiel~of the food-stuffs industries. 
As it offers both strength and corrosion resistance, mild steel 
clad with stainless steel is adYancing branches of the chemical 
industry and is being used for pressure vessels in the oil 
refinery industry.3· 
With respect to the question of lowering installation 
costs, the point made above on decreasing the weight or steel 
required for a certain purpose applies equally here since lower 
weight facilitates handling. There ia still ample scope for 
improving the handling of steel on building sites and in factories. 
lsteel, October 3, 1955 
2rron jge, October 13, 1955, p. 67. 
3Light Metals, December, 1955. 
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The tendency to replace riveted steel by welded steel is an 
example of both improved installation techniques and weight saving. 
Modern welding techniques are supposed to save millions of tons 
of steel annually. The p~oportions involved in different branches 
of industry are: bridge building, 30- to 50-percent; machinery 
building, 25 percent; crane and excavator building, up to 45 
percent; shipbuilding about 20 percent; tubular construction, 
up to 60 percent.l Installation, techniques may be indirectly 
improved by changing the design and the material used; as for 
instance, the use of tubes for construction of hangars, factory 
buildings and the like. Another instance of this kind is the 
use of steel wire for walls in multi-story garages replacing 
solid concrete walls. 2 
As has already been pointed out, aluminum and plastics do 
not only compete with steel, but combine with it successfully 
in the manufacture of many commodities. Obviously, the combina-
tion of the favorable properties of these materials will help 
steel maintain its position in many instances or even compete 
with other materials in new fields, as in the case of steel-
core aluminum wire for low tension lines in rural electrification. 
This combination of steel and aluminum proved to be some 30 percent 
more economical than a copper wire.3 Butyrate sleeves fitted 
over metal tubing for furnittire legs to give greater resistance 
to hard wear and tear may improve the competttive position of 
lstee1, May 30, 1955, p. 75. 
2Stee1ways, August 1955, p. 19. 
3Light Metals, August, 1955. 
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of steel furniture against that of wood.l 
New·plastic coated steel sheets have also been developed. 
These are said to show strong resistance against corrosion and 
can be colored according to the consumer's taste by adding colors 
to the coating. These sheets are produced from 0.2 to 1.2 
millimeters thick with coa·tings of 0.05 to 0.5 millimeters. 
They can be worked easily in all traditional ways except welding, 
and they are apparently no more expensive than steel sheets pro-
tected by paint, though still three times cheaper than alloy 
steel. They are used in the chemical industry for containers, 
barrels, canalization, ventilator conduits, panelling, and parti-
tioning in offices. In addition, aluminum steel sheets have been 
developed for which there would seem to be prospects in the 
container field. Plastic coating of wire rope has likewise been 
successful as well as aluminum coating of steel wire.2 
The demand for steel has been high for so long that the 
steel industry has tended to negl$ct the problems of market 
development and sales promotion. This whole field is one 
where the steel industry could learn from the vigorous policies 
pursued by its competitors, particularly the aluminum industry. 
Competitors have done muoh to keep their products continually 
before the public and have promoted serious and scientifically 
considered market development policies. The problems are not 
the same for the steel industry but much similarity undoubtedly 
exists. 
lModern Plastics, May, 1955. 
2rron Age, February 23, 1956, p. 128. 
248 
Summary of Conclusions 
Oligopoly power in the steel industry does not appear 
to have weakened significantly, and the prospects for the future 
do not indicate that serious inroads in steel markets will 
be achieved by materials of competing industries. An examina-
tion of the physical properties of competing materials such as 
aluminum, plastics, timber and concrete shows that these materials 
are lighter than steel for equal volume, are more resistant 
toco~rosion (except wood), and are inferior with respect to 
heat resistance. Aluminum is a better conductor of heat than 
steel, all the other materials are good insulators; aluminum 
and plastics are more workable than steel, but steel is superior 
to all where strength and elasticity for equal size are impor-
tant. Installation and maintenance costs are also factors to 
judge in the selection of material. 
Therefore, whether one material or another is used may 
depend upon the above factors accompanied by their prices. 
Evidence suggests that even though prices for competing products 
(except wood) have declined over a long period, wherever the 
nature of the job requires important strength characteristics, 
it costs considerably more to do the task with the other materials 
than it does with steel. Thus in many areas inter-industry 
competition is not serious at all. In some cases where the use 
ofa material is on an area basis rather than a strength basis, 
it would appear that other materials have an advantage. Yet 
from 1956 to 1959 the price of one cubic foot of aluminum was 
equal to 1.25 cubic feet of steel. Hence in order to compete 
on an 11.res to-be-covered ·basis, aluminum must possess. advantages 
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in coats of installation, maintenance and durability. Plastic 
material is more competitive with steel where the area to be 
covered is important. The price of one cubic foot or polyethy-
lene or polystyrene is equivalent to about one-half to five-
eighths of the price of a cubic foot of steel. In these same 
terms, cement prices have been remarkably stable as a ratio of 
steel prices ever since 1938. Wood has become much more ex-
pensive in relation to steel. 
Under the assumption that 46.9 percent ot total expected 
aluminum consumption of 1965 (4,465,000 tons) will be compe-
titive with steel along with 30 percent of the expected 8,000,000 
tons of plastics, a total steel equivalent may be calculated. 
If the ratio of densities of steel to aluminum is 2.9 to 1 
(7.85), then the competing 2,055,000 tons of aluminum divided by 
(2.?1) . 
2.9 yields 707,000 tons of steel being replaced by aluminum by 
1965. The same procedure applied to plastics yields 200,000 
tons of steel being replaced by pla~tics. It is difficult to 
estimate the amount of steel replaced by concrete or timber. 
But since about 10 percent of the steel produced is sold to the 
construction industry in competition with wood and concrete, an 
arbitrary estimate is made that total steel consumption in this 
sector would be 10 to 12 percent higher in the absence of these 
two competing materials. 
Thus it appears that by 1965 the inroads made by other 
materials cannot exceed two or three percent of steel consumption 
of 1957. In addition, the steel industry may counteract by 
improving factors such as corrosion resistance, weight, installa-
tion coats, maintenance costs, and encouraging the use of steel 
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in combination with aluminum or plastics in certain applications. 
John Dunlop has expressed the view tha·t a growing inter-
industry competition may be the best solution to the steel .. wage-
price problem rather than proposed direct control~.l The material 
of this chapter does not appear to support the conclusion that 
such competition will be significant. 
lJobn Dunlop, "Policy Problems, Choices, and Proposals," 
Wagesi Prices, Profits and Productivity, The American Assembly, 
May, 959, p. 151-65. 
1} The basic steel industry increased its e.ff'eotive 
ttrealized prices" by 49.5 percent from 1947-49 to 1957; these 
:tncrea;,es took place each year regardless of whether or not 
the operating rate was high or low in reV:.t1on to capac! ty. 
These effective price increases were actually greater when steel 
shipments were decreasing in 1949 and 1954 thar. when they 
were lncreas 1 ng rapidly as 1n J 955. 'l'he magnitude of t~1e R teel 
price rise considerably exceeded the rise in the consumers' 
price index and the wqolesale price index, ne1 ther or wn.1 ch had 
risen by OnEt•half the gain achieved in steel. 
2) The demand for steel by consnmers appears to have 
increased •:~arkedly over the period. By· 1951 output had increased 
25.6 percent (from 77.7 million tons to 98.0) while realized 
steel prices rose 24.6 percent (from ~85.89 per ton to ~120.21 
per ton). By 1955 output rose 38.7 percent and prices by 
31.4 percent·; in 1957 the figures were 34.6 percent and 49.5 
percent re!'lpeotlvely. 'l'ne latter figures indicate that tne 
rapidly rising de:nand had slowed down and perhaps reached a 
plateau. The downtrend 1n the operating rate and the decrea3e 
in the ratio or unfilled orders to sales contribute to this 
conclusion. The data al;geest that an oltgopo11st experiencing 
an 1ncr,3asing demand during a period of moderate inflation is 
slow to adjust. Adjustment takes place by d1sorete steps--
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complete profit maximization fails to occur and "unliquidated 
monopoly" gains exist which can be liquidated at any time 
that circumstances warrant such action. When a demand plateau 
is reached, profit maximization may not occur because a fear of 
entry may exist; or 'because the higher profit may parmi t non-
.:i.ntograted producers to expand and integrate. This "unliquidated 
gain" may also be liquidated if pressures require the move. 
3) From 1947 to 1957 steelworker wages rose 85 percent 
and to 1958 increased 100.1 percent. These gains considerably 
exceeded all other comparison groups by a significant amount, 
especially in the latter part of the period. Earlier, in the 
immediate postwar period, inflation was.more rapid and com-
parison workers, even in ~ompetitive industries, achieved wage 
gains closely adhering to those won by the steelworkers. During 
a demand inflation when the labor supply is tight, competitive 
industries adjust quickly to rising demand, raising wages to 
retain their workers. When the price level stabilized or in-
creased moderately, the steelworkers·forged ahead. An elastic 
labor supply did not prove to be a problem. Restriction of entry 
prevents these gains from being eroded away. Union bargaining 
power is evident from the following data. Wages rose rapidly 
in the face of an excess supply of labor at prevailing rates as 
~videnced by: 
A~ Rising unemployment rates in steel centers. 
B) Rising layoff rates and falling quit rates. 
C) .The fact that steel key maintenance job wage rates 
were above or equal to those paid in other industries in 
steel centers. Therefore, wage.rates need not have been 
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raised as much as they were to recruit workers for increased 
output. 
D) An increased tonnage of about 37 percent being 
produced with a 3.9 percent increase in total steelworker 
employment. 
E) A declining work week. Output can be increased 
easily by increasing the length of the work week. 
F) Union barga1.ning power may also be discerned in 
the union's ability to capture all of the productivity 
gains and drive labor costs per ton of steel up over 
50 percent from 1947-1957. Such gains as pensions and 
supplementary unemployment were hardly likely to go into effect 
without negotiation by the union. In addition, several 
of the contract increases were successfully negotiated 
only after a strike. 
G)b~ latter part of the period the demand for steel 
products was weakening and not strong enough to be re-
flected ln an increased derived demand for labor of the 
magnitude shown.by rising wage rates. This weakening 
demand combined with an elastic labor supply cannot 
explain the wage increases won. Union bargaining power 
is a better explanation. 
In other words, a state of demand bas existed which has not been 
strong enough to account for the exceptional price and wage 
increases, but which has been potent enough and sufficiently 
inelastic to permit these increases without a telling decline in 
the demand for steel products. The bargaining power of the union 
has been employed by the market power of the steel industry. 
• 
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Rising physical productivity has also been a factor. 
4} Profits after taxes per ton of steel have· incre.ased 
from $5.24 in 194? to $10.55 in 195?. If the operating rate 
and return on equity are plotted for each year, the emerging 
regression line indicates the profit level which can be expected 
when the operating rate is known. From 194? to 1957 such a line 
lies about four percentage points above the data for 1921-195?. 
This indicates that the profit target has shifted up. Curiously, 
the shift appears to be more pronounced when excess capacity 
increased after the Korean war. Indications are that the 
profit target is set at ?0 percent of capacity. Whsn the 
operating rate rises the result is a rapid increase in profits. 
In the early part of the period the operating rate was high, 
and profits reached a high of $8.63 per ton after taxes in 1950. 
This level fell until 1955 when the figure was ·$9.88. When the 
operating rate trended down in 1956 and 1958, price increases 
were greatest. In other words, under standard cost pricing 
prices may be raised to meet a profit target if the operating 
rate goes down. 
5) The industry claims that inflation has resulted in 
depreciation allowances which are inadequatefor replacement 
of plant and equipment. Possessing strong market power, the 
steel industry appears to have tried to generate the funds 
needed for replacement, modernization and expansion internally 
via price increases. Depreciation allowances per ton of steel 
increased by 133 percent from 1947-49 to 195?, most of this 
occurring after 1952. Yet over the same period construction 
costs measured by the Department of Commerce rose 32.8 percent, 
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measured by Engineering News Record rose 52.2 percent, and producers' 
finished durable goods rose 44 percent. Department of Commerce 
estimates on depreciation, structures, and equipment in manu-
facturing suggest that from 1947 to 1955, for every $2 of depre-
ciation set aside on the basis of original cost, it would require 
$2.76 to replace the assets. Over this period steel industry 
depreciation allowances more than doubled. Fr.om 1947 to 1958 
depreciation accounted for 50 percent of the total sources of 
funds for all corporations. Thus the steel industry claims that 
the increased profits are "paper profits." 
While there is some merit in tbs argument, the depreciation 
gap is not so serious as claimed. Nor is the exercise of oligopoly 
power a happy solution to the problem. The complaint is p~tly 
of the steel industry's own making as steel prices rose. No 
hardship seems to have resulted anyway. Between 1946 and 1958 
u.s. Steel financed a $4 billion expenditure program of replace-
ment and expansion with virtually no help from capital markets. 
Of this $4 billion,$3.9 came from depreciation and retained 
earnings. The stockholder has not suffered much either. With 
two stock splits since 1947, he now has six shares instead of 
one, and he receives the same $3 in dividends per share as earlier. 
6) An examination of materials of other industries that 
compete with steel indicates that the industry need not be unduly 
concerned with inter-industry competition as steel prices rise. 
Oligopoly power cannot be expected to wane seriously. When 
technical characteristics such as corrosion~, strength, conductivity, 
etc., of aluminum, plastics, concrete and wood and their prices 
are compared with steel characteristics and steel prices, the 
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result does not indicate that serious inroads will be made in 
steel markets. rn·areas where strength to weight ratios are 
important, steel is clearly cheaper. In cases where the area to 
be covered is important rather than strength, steal is cheaper 
than aluminum but slightly more expensive than plastics. A 
decision to use competing materials rather than steel may depend 
on factors which are hard to estimate such as installation costs, 
durability, maintenance costs, etc. Not more. than a maximum 
three percent of steel capacity in 1959 is estimated as possibly 
lost to competing materials. This estimate is also somewhat 
high. 
General Conclusion 
The evidence appears to support the hypothesis. The 
steelworkers have won differential wage gains in the period 
of moderate inflation from 1947-49 to 1957 which they were 
unable to achieve in the period of rapid inflation studied by 
Albert Rees. The wage increases attained were considerably 
in excess of the productivity gains, drove unit labor costs 
up by 51.5 percent, and were won in the face of evidence that 
the supply of labor available to steel firms was not "tight" 
but in excess supply. As stated in the hypothesis, an oligo-
poly with closed entry effectively limits the entrance of 
new firms anxious to take advantage of a surplus labor supply 
and high prices. Thus the wage gains are not eroded away. 
The fact that steel labor was in tight supply during the 
rapid inflation studied by Rees and still was unable to win 
differential wage gains suggests that the industry was unable 
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to exploit fully a rising steel product demand. The hypothesis 
suggested that a better adaptation to rising product demand is 
likely to occur in a period of modepate inflation. This improved 
ability to liquidate an unliquidated gain enhances the union's 
ability to win wage gains which exceed those of most comparison 
groups. Competitive industries are able to keep pace with 
oligopolistic ones .in raising wage_s to retain workers in a rapid 
inflation when all demand curves <are rising and the labor supply 
is tight; adjustment to a rising demand is more complete when 
the product market is atomistic and permi:IB relative1·:7 comparative 
wage gains. An oligopolist using standard cost pricing methods 
would be embarrassed by the flow of profits that would result 
if prices were raised to liquidate a sharply rising product 
demand during rapid inflation when the operating rate is close 
to capacity. The existence of a grey market for steel during 
the period studied by Rees confirms this. The evidence tends to 
support the hypothesis which suggests that when the steel product 
demand reaches a plateau or falls in a period of moderate infla-
tion and the operating rate declines below standard, the industry 
may revise its long-term volume prospects. Adjustment occurs 
to this evaluation by raising product prices in order to earn 
the target rate of return on equity. If it is deemed that the 
moderate inflation converts depreciation allowances into values 
inadequate to replace existing facilities, the industry tends 
to revise its profit target upward and the necessary product 
price increases are greate~. Thus oligopolistic product market 
power is employed to climb an inelastic product demand curve when 
the curve is no longer rising to the right. Additional wage 
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are demanded, can be tolerated, and are likely to deviate con-
siderably from inter-industry wage increases which are smaller 
when the labor supply is no longer tight, and product demand 
curves no longer are rapidly rising. Evidence showing that 
steel price inc:rsases were greater when shipmertts fell than 
when shipments rose, supports the foregoing conclusion. 
In the earlier period from 1945 to about 1949 prices 
(and wages) were not raised sufficiently to adapt completely to 
a rapidly rising excess steel product demand. This reluctance 
to fully exploit demand stemmed f'rom (a) a high operating rate 
which resulted in large profits ~-any furthur price increases 
would have brought forth a flow of additional profits to induce 
new entrants and to enhance the financial ability of the non-
integrated firms to integrate; and (b) a fear that the post-war 
excess demand was a temporary phenomenon~-price and wage increases 
were expected to result in an Llflexible :nigh cost s true ture. 
Tlill evidence concernjng the steel pricing process under various 
operating rates tends to confirm these elements of the hypo the sis • 
.t'inally, the hypothesis raised the proposition that the 
relatively high price for steel not only fails to produce a 
natural corrective via entrants expanding steel supplies, but 
it also fails to enduce any significant substitution to steel 
by the materials of other industries. This is confirmed by an 
examination of the prices and price movements of competing mater-
ials in comparison to steel prices and estimates of other factors 
which are important in the decision to choose one material in 
preference to another. The evidence discloses that the steel firms 
need not be concerned unduly with possible future inter-industry 
competition. 
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The purpose of ti1e C::issertat!oro is to explair1 wily steel 
v0~1~ ;;5; rose ':'lOl'tJ rapidly durLJ£ Lie period of noderate :r,fla-
tieL a11d excess supply of laioor frO.i1 lJ47-4S' to 1957, t~1an 
t ~ey die} during the 1045-49 p:ariod of rar: id L1fla tion and 
excess demand for labor. :::'ne analysis is concerr:ed wltll 
rrice and rro.fi t relations :1ips ra t~1er t:.-1an wi_ t l unior1 policies 
and rower. 
C:llif~er I s!~ws that changes in labor productl~ity are 
ir.ac1equate explanations of the rapic r1se in steel w9ges 
Hat~1er t:1e 1'lyrotheses arc advm:ced 
(1) t~1FJt ris'ng profits were rilade IOssibJe b'' an upward 
s·::.:fting iuels.stic steel r:roduct denand curve until 1955 and 
an upw·:crd shift in t .1e r:rofi t tarce t sfL:r 19S5 perm:: tting 
siz<Sable r~rice and wage incPeases; and (2) tn.at in the 
104.5-49 period, wheL decnand was increaslng rapidly, wage-
L~Vi~7 abllitv was Jinjted by t-~ industry's reluctaLce to 
.L "" ..._, t; ~ .... 
exrloit excess demand by price increases. Tne reluctance to 
rai~e rrices (and W8.[0 BS) in t 1e earlier period stemr:J.ed fro:n 
two considerations. Jne vvas t:1a t t;le rate of increase in 
de~and would Lot be ~aintained an~ ~~nee an increase in 
:t:-Pices ,:;r1C wr:goes would rest~lt in an inflexible-downward, 
'1i_~·;l cost s true ture. ';:":1e second was ti'lat sjnce rrofi ts 
2 
we1•e alr,:;ac;, la r&:~ due to a i1it; ~l rr-:t t0 of c arac i ty u till za·tior;, 
adc1:t tional price anc rrofi t increases would be likely to have 
tt1e unvw.lttec effects of inducin~; new entrants ir1to t:::1e industry 
and rrovidtng int•3rnal funds for financing integration by tne 
existiLg non-integrated steel co:npmies. 
C'1arter II compares tae related move~nent of steel we.ges 
cluring t:1.e two rer:i.oc>s al·Jd si,ows the change fro~11 a si tL:at::.on 
of an excess de:rrand to an excess sur-rl;y of steel l&bor. 
Charter III demonstrstes Lwt during the .second period 
stool wages rose faster tc1an rroductivit;y to drive up unit 
labor costs. For a more nearly 1:1dequate co:-1parison of labor 
costs and prices, t;le chapter consideJ'S th.e impact of a growing 
salaried worY force on unit costs and also calculates an 
L1rltcit r·eal:ized steel :r:rice index to acco1.c1t mor·J fully 
for sxtras and discounts. 
c:1arters IV and V exa·a:ine the steel pricing process. 
::oirst, the role of non-labor costs, suc~1 as materials, taxes, 
lnterust, and cer;reciation ir.. tneir contribution to steel 
frice increases is reviewed. Seconcly, it is sno\v-:::1 trlB.t the 
rols ·")f t!1e profit target in t_le pricing rrocess was more 
.lmy_ortant than a rising rro8uct dema11d, at least in the 
exr;1ana tion cf L1e price rlse after 1955. 
C1apter \'I atter1:rts to show tnot inter-industry compe-
tition of plastics, wood, ce"'lent, and aluminu.m has rteither 
r1et~rially retarded steel price ga:ns nor significantly 
increased L'le elasti_c: ty of steel dernard. Aralysis of t~1e 
c':lnC."it:_ons that lean to t~1e select.i.on of one rYJaterial over 
3 
ar1otl:1er under cnar.tgint'· price relaticESni,Ps fTOVide estimates 
of' the a;nount of steel replaced or lj_kely to lle roplaced. 
T'le resnlts sur:ort t>l.e vlew that int:er-inJustry cor'lpetition 
llas Lot teen an i":'lportart limiting influence on steel prices. 
~he coLclusion in~icated by this study seems to confirm 
t::1e view that, wl1ile both periods were characterlzed by rela-
tively :dgh profits, limited entry, and a lack of.good substi-
tutes to reduce t:1e inelasticity of steel product C.emand, tb.e 
industry was better able to capture the unliquidated monopoly 
gai:r.s through .rrice increases durinr; the V::Jriod of noderate 
inflation from l947-4G to 1957 L1an in the rapiC. ir..fla ti on 
of 1945-49. Suc~1. gains were S'lared with the union in high 
wages despite the excess labor supply available to the steel 
indt,s try t~w t developed after 1952. 
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